Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Federal agents executed a search warrant on the home of an Air Force serviceman, Mr. Crosby, in 2018, seizing electronic devices that contained over 4,000 files of child pornography. Mr. Crosby admitted to possessing the material and was administratively separated from the Air Force. In 2020, he was indicted in New Mexico for possession of child pornography and arrested in Pennsylvania, where he continued to download such material. A subsequent search found additional illicit content. Mr. Crosby was held in custody for five days before being released on pretrial conditions. He was later indicted in Pennsylvania, and the cases were consolidated in New Mexico.The District Court of New Mexico accepted Mr. Crosby's guilty plea and calculated a Guidelines range of 78–97 months based on various offense enhancements. The government requested a 78-month sentence, while Mr. Crosby argued for a non-custodial sentence, citing his autism spectrum disorder (ASD) diagnosis and low risk of recidivism. The district court ultimately sentenced Mr. Crosby to five days' time served, emphasizing his ASD, potential for rehabilitation, and low recidivism risk, while noting his compliance with pretrial conditions and employment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. The court found that the district court failed to adequately consider several § 3553(a) factors, including retribution, general deterrence, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the established sentencing range. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's explanation was insufficient to justify the significant downward variance from the Guidelines range. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Crosby" on Justia Law

Frank Moseley was charged with murder after he killed his fiancé, who had told him she might be pregnant with another man's child. Moseley, a combat veteran diagnosed with PTSD, testified that his condition contributed to the crime. The jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) and a weapon enhancement.The Superior Court of Orange County sentenced Moseley to 11 years in state prison, striking the additional punishment for the weapon use. The court acknowledged Moseley’s PTSD as a mitigating factor but did not explicitly consider the relevant service-related statutes (Penal Code §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91) when denying probation. Moseley’s counsel mentioned these statutes at the sentencing hearing but stated they were not "directly applicable." The probation department’s report and the sentencing briefs from both parties also failed to cite these statutes.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not expressly consider Moseley’s service-related PTSD as required by §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. These statutes mandate that a trial court must consider a defendant’s service-related PTSD as a factor in mitigation when deciding on probation and sentencing. The appellate court determined that the record was ambiguous regarding whether the trial court was aware of its statutory obligations under these sections.The appellate court reversed Moseley’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to comply with its statutory obligations under §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Moseley" on Justia Law

Seven plaintiffs, all members of the Air Force, challenged the Air Force’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, arguing it violated their religious beliefs. They sought religious exemptions, which were denied, leading to administrative discharge proceedings. One plaintiff, Byron O. Starks, Jr., was separated from service, allegedly for a preexisting medical condition, though he claimed it was due to his refusal to get vaccinated.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed the case as moot after the Air Force rescinded the vaccine mandate. The court also dismissed Starks’s claims for lack of standing, citing his separation from service and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the rescission of the mandate did not address all alleged harms, particularly the claim that the Air Force’s religious exemption process was a sham. The court held that Starks had standing because his separation caused ongoing harm, such as ineligibility for certain veteran benefits. The court also clarified that RFRA claims are not subject to the Mindes exhaustion requirement, allowing Starks to proceed without exhausting intraservice remedies.The Fifth Circuit determined that the claims of the six still-serving plaintiffs were not moot, as they alleged ongoing harm from the Air Force’s religious exemption process. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs to continue their challenge against the Air Force’s broader vaccination policies and religious accommodations process. View "Crocker v. Austin" on Justia Law

Gregory Numann and Diane Gallant were married in 2002 and separated in October 2016. They verbally agreed to maintain separate residences, with Numann paying child support and both contributing to their child's college fund. Numann served in the military from 1989 to 2015, accruing a pension worth about $730,000 at separation. Gallant, who worked throughout the marriage, had two retirement accounts worth about $30,000. Gallant filed for divorce in 2021, seeking a portion of Numann’s military retirement benefit.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, held a two-day trial and issued a divorce decree in July 2022. The court awarded Gallant 50% of the marital portion of Numann’s military retirement benefit from the date of separation. It also credited Numann for child support payments made after their child reached the age of majority. The court found that Gallant was entitled to a portion of the retirement benefit starting from the date of separation and ordered Numann to pay Gallant $94,248.70, representing her share of the retirement payments received since separation. The court balanced this against other obligations to avoid prolonged financial entanglement.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the division of the military retirement benefit from the date of separation did not violate federal law under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA). The court clarified that the USFSPA allows state courts to treat military retirement pay as marital property subject to division under state law. The court also found no evidence of judicial bias against Numann. However, the court remanded the case to correct an inconsistency in the final written order regarding the division of the military retirement benefit. View "Numann v. Gallant" on Justia Law

Clifford Porter and Peggy Huckstadt were married from 1977 to 1994, during which Porter served in the military. Upon their divorce, the trial court awarded Huckstadt a fractional share of Porter’s military retirement pay. Porter retired from the military in 2002 and later worked as a surgeon. In 2009, he was involuntarily recalled to active duty, served for three years, and was promoted, which increased his retirement pay. Porter retired again in 2012. In 2022, Porter sought to clarify that Huckstadt’s share should be based on his 2002 retirement rank and salary, not the increased benefits from his 2012 retirement.The trial court disagreed, ruling that the increased benefits from Porter’s recall service were community property subject to division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the salary increases during the recall period were based on 17 years of community efforts during the marriage.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that Porter’s rank and salary at his second retirement could not be used to calculate the community portion of the military pension. The court found that the “community efforts doctrine” did not apply under these specific circumstances, as the increased benefits were not a direct result of community effort and performance. The court also determined that the dissolution decree intended to value Huckstadt’s share based on Porter’s rank and salary at his first retirement in 2002, not his second retirement in 2012. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Porter" on Justia Law

Thomas Smith, a veteran, sought specially adapted housing (SAH) benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to build a home spa for his service-connected low back disability. Before receiving a response, he constructed the spa. His initial request was denied, and he did not appeal. Later, he sought reimbursement for the spa's construction costs, which was also denied by the VA and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. Smith appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims but died before the case was decided. His daughter, Karen Hicks, sought to substitute herself in the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims denied Hicks's motion for substitution, stating she was not entitled to pursue her father's claim. The court found that Hicks had not obtained a determination from the VA that she was an eligible accrued-benefits claimant, a prerequisite for substitution under the court's precedent in Breedlove v. Shinseki.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Hicks argued that the Veterans Court should have made the determination of her eligibility for substitution without requiring a VA determination. She also contended that she should be allowed to pursue the claim under 38 C.F.R. § 36.4406, which governs SAH benefits, and under the equitable doctrine of nunc pro tunc. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, holding that the court did not err in requiring a VA determination for substitution eligibility and that Hicks did not meet the regulatory requirements for reimbursement. The court also upheld the application of the nunc pro tunc doctrine, which did not apply as Smith died before the case was submitted for decision. View "SMITH v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Kenneth Dojaquez, an attorney, appealed a decision regarding his entitlement to additional attorney's fees under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3). Dojaquez represented a veteran, Billy Wayne Slaughter, who was awarded an increased disability rating by the Board of Veterans' Appeals. The agency assigned an effective date of August 1, 2012, for the increased rating in a decision dated March 2, 2019, but did not notify Slaughter of this decision until April 26, 2019. Dojaquez argued that his attorney's fees should be calculated up to the notification date, not the decision date.The Board of Veterans' Appeals concluded that Dojaquez was only entitled to attorney's fees through March 2, 2019, the date of the agency's decision. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed this decision, relying on the interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(1) and established case law, specifically Snyder v. Nicholson, which defined the end date for calculating past-due benefits as the date of the award decision, not the notification date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the "date of the final decision" under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3) refers to the date of the agency's decision assigning an effective date, not the date the veteran was notified of the decision. This interpretation ensures that attorney's fees are calculated based on past-due benefits up to the date of the award decision, consistent with the statutory language and previous case law. The court rejected Dojaquez's argument that the notification date should be used, as it would conflict with the statutory scheme and potentially allow attorneys to receive more than 20% of the claimant's past-due benefits. View "DOJAQUEZ v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

The case involves a motor vehicle collision near the entrance to Hickam Air Force Base in Honolulu, where Charles Yuen allegedly rear-ended another car. Military police (MPs) arrived at the scene, identified Yuen as the driver, and conducted field sobriety tests and a preliminary alcohol screening. They then detained Yuen until Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officers arrived, who conducted their own tests and arrested Yuen for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII).The District Court of the First Circuit of the State of Hawai'i adjudicated Yuen guilty of OVUII based on the testimony of HPD officers. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the conviction, finding that there was substantial evidence to support it. However, the ICA did not find sufficient evidence in the record to establish ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence based on a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and held that Yuen's trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the MPs, which could have been considered a violation of the PCA. The court found that this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel as it potentially impaired a meritorious defense. The court also agreed with the ICA that there was substantial evidence to support Yuen's conviction. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated Yuen's OVUII conviction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Yuen" on Justia Law

The case involves veterans' benefits appeals that were erroneously deactivated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) due to a computer program error. The VA operates two adjudicatory systems for benefits claims, and the legacy system is relevant here. Under this system, a claimant must file a Notice of Disagreement and, if unresolved, a Substantive Appeal. The VA's electronic database, VACOLS, automatically closed appeals if no timely Substantive Appeal was noted, leading to approximately 3,000 erroneously closed appeals. This affected U.S. Army veterans J. Roni Freund and Marvin Mathewson, whose successors are the named petitioners in this class action.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed the petitions and denied class certification. The court found the case moot as to the individual petitioners after the VA reactivated their appeals. It also held that the petitioners failed to meet the commonality and adequacy requirements for class certification under Rule 23. The court did not address whether the case was moot as to the class or the superiority of class resolution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Veterans Court abused its discretion in its commonality and adequacy findings. The Federal Circuit held that the inherently transitory exception to mootness applied, as the VA's practice of reactivating appeals quickly made it likely that individual claims would become moot before class certification could be ruled upon. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the class was not ascertainable due to the difficulty in identifying class members.The Federal Circuit vacated the Veterans Court's order denying class certification and remanded the case for further consideration of class certification and appropriate relief. View "FREUND v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Eric Mote, a former Captain in the United States Air Force, sought the removal of a Letter of Admonishment (LOA) and a Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP) from his military records, along with back pay for the fine associated with the NJP. The LOA and NJP were issued following Mote's repeated requests for a "White Heritage Month" at Hill Air Force Base, which were denied by his superiors. Mote's subsequent communications, which were deemed disrespectful, led to the LOA and NJP.The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed Mote's case and granted judgment on the administrative record in favor of the government, upholding the decision of the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR). The Claims Court found that the AFBCMR's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. The court also held that the LOA and NJP were not illegal reprisals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Claims Court's decision regarding the NJP, finding that the AFBCMR's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. However, the appellate court vacated the portion of the Claims Court's decision that reviewed the LOA and remanded the case for a determination of whether the Claims Court had jurisdiction over the LOA claim under the Tucker Act. The appellate court emphasized that the Claims Court's jurisdiction to grant non-monetary relief is limited to cases where such relief is incident to a money judgment. View "MOTE v. US " on Justia Law