Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Air Force Staff Sergeant Cameron Beck was killed in a collision with a car driven by Blanca Mitchell, a civilian government employee, on Whiteman Air Force Base. Beck was on active duty and driving home for lunch when the accident occurred. Mitchell pleaded guilty to careless and imprudent driving. Beck’s wife and son received benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Defense. They filed a wrongful death claim, which the Air Force denied, but allowed them to pursue the claim in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Feres doctrine, which grants the government immunity for injuries arising out of activities incident to military service. The court concluded that Beck’s death was incident to his service because he was on active duty and on-base at the time of the accident. The court also denied the plaintiffs' requests for additional discovery and to file supplemental suggestions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the Feres doctrine applied, as Beck was on active duty, on-base, and subject to recall at the time of the accident. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional discovery, as the facts necessary to resolve the jurisdictional inquiry were undisputed and the additional facts sought were not material to the determination of whether Feres applied. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Beck v. United States" on Justia Law

Christian N. Davis, a former Army corporal, was convicted by a general court-martial in 1993 of multiple offenses, including attempted premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit murder, premeditated murder, arson, and adultery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. After his conviction, Davis sought clemency and parole but was denied. He was later transferred to a federal civilian prison, where his parole was again denied.Davis filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, citing his age, health conditions, low risk of recidivism, and rehabilitative efforts. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing the motion for lack of jurisdiction, as § 3582 requires such motions to be filed in the sentencing court, and Davis's sentence was imposed by a military court. The district court accepted the magistrate judge's findings, dismissed Davis's motion for compassionate release for lack of jurisdiction, and denied his habeas claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3582 does not apply to sentences imposed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and that such motions must be filed in the sentencing court. Since Davis's sentence was imposed by a general court-martial, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion for compassionate release. The court also rejected Davis's arguments based on 10 U.S.C. § 858(a) and the case Bates v. Wilkinson, concluding that neither authorized civilian courts to modify military sentences. View "Davis v. USA" on Justia Law

Mr. Anthony W. Knox, a former Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and a member of the United States Air Force Reserves, brought reemployment and discrimination claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). He sought to retroactively correct the effective dates of a within-grade pay increase and a promotion. Knox was deployed on active duty from November 2002 to November 2003. During his deployment, his DEA supervisor indicated that his next within-grade increase should be effective February 23, 2003, but it was incorrectly set as April 20, 2003. Knox returned to the DEA in November 2003 and was eventually promoted to GS-13 in April 2016.The Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) granted Knox’s within-grade increase reemployment claim but denied his promotion claims and his within-grade increase discrimination claim. The Board found that the delay in Knox’s within-grade increase was an administrative error unrelated to his military service and that his promotion was discretionary, not automatic.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Board’s denial of Knox’s discrimination claims, finding substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that the delay in his within-grade increase was not due to his military service. However, the court vacated and remanded the Board’s decision on Knox’s promotion reemployment claim, stating that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard by requiring Knox to prove he was entitled to an automatic promotion. The correct standard is whether Knox may have been entitled to the promotion, considering factors such as whether the promotion was generally granted to all employees and whether it was reasonably certain that the benefit would have accrued but for his military service. View "KNOX v. DOJ " on Justia Law

Thomas Rodenhizer, a U.S. Army veteran, sought an earlier effective date for his veteran benefits, which the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. During the appeal, Mr. Rodenhizer passed away, and his mother, Deborah Rodenhizer, moved to be substituted in his place. The Veterans Court denied her motion, vacated the Board’s decision, and dismissed the appeal, stating that Ms. Rodenhizer had not established her right to the benefits.The Veterans Court’s decision was based on the fact that Ms. Rodenhizer had not provided evidence that she requested a determination of accrued-benefits eligibility from the VA within one year of her son’s death, as required by 38 U.S.C. § 5121(c). Additionally, the VA had not made a determination about her eligibility to receive accrued benefits. The Veterans Court concluded that it could not make the factual determination of her eligibility in the first instance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Veterans Court erred in denying the motion to substitute and dismissing the appeal before a final decision was made in the parallel VA proceeding regarding Ms. Rodenhizer’s eligibility as an accrued-benefits claimant. The Federal Circuit vacated the Veterans Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to hold the appeal and motion to substitute in abeyance pending the outcome of the VA’s determination of Ms. Rodenhizer’s eligibility. The court emphasized that this approach would prevent unnecessary reworking of the same claim and save families from facing unnecessary administrative hurdles. View "RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Andrew J. Winterbottom, a veteran, was awarded a 30% disability rating for his service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which was later increased to 50%. He appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals seeking a higher rating. During a Board hearing in June 2021, the judge questioned Winterbottom about specific violent episodes, which he later claimed demonstrated judicial bias. In May 2022, the Board denied a higher rating, concluding that his violent behavior was not unprovoked.Winterbottom appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for its decision and exhibited bias. The Veterans Court partially agreed, remanding the case because the Board did not adequately explain why it gave less weight to a private counselor's opinion. However, the court found no bias warranting reassignment, stating the judge's questions aimed to determine if the violent conduct was provoked.Winterbottom then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating it lacked jurisdiction to review non-final orders from the Veterans Court. The court noted that exceptions to the finality requirement, as outlined in Williams v. Principi, did not apply to Winterbottom's case. The court also declined to create a new exception for judicial bias claims, suggesting that such claims should be raised through a mandamus petition or after a final judgment. Thus, the appeal was dismissed. View "WINTERBOTTOM v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Angela Reading, a mother and former school board member, alleged that federal and local government officials violated her First Amendment rights by censoring and retaliating against her after she posted comments on Facebook. The controversy began when Reading criticized a poster at her child's elementary school that featured various sexual identities. Her post drew significant attention and backlash from military personnel at a nearby base, leading to a series of communications and actions by local and federal officials, including heightened security at a school board meeting and referrals to counter-terrorism authorities.Reading sought a preliminary injunction to prevent further interference with her free speech rights. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied her motion, concluding that she failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether Reading had standing to seek a preliminary injunction. The court found that the bulk of the alleged unlawful conduct occurred during a brief period and had significantly subsided by the time Reading filed her lawsuit. The court determined that Reading did not show a substantial risk of future harm or a likelihood of future injury traceable to the defendants. Consequently, the court held that Reading lacked standing to seek a preliminary injunction and affirmed the District Court's order denying her motion. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Reading v. North Hanover Township" on Justia Law

Carl Grant, a Vietnam War veteran suffering from dementia and PTSD, left his home in Conyers, Georgia, on February 2, 2020, and ended up in Birmingham, Alabama. Officer Vincent Larry of the Birmingham Police Department found Grant disoriented and detained him for a misdemeanor. Grant was taken to a hospital, where he was treated for minor injuries. While being escorted to the restroom, Larry allegedly assaulted Grant, causing severe spinal injuries that led to Grant's death on July 24, 2020. William Jenkins, representing Grant's estate, filed a lawsuit against Larry, the City of Birmingham, and various city officials.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted a summary judgment in favor of the City defendants, dismissing Jenkins's claims with prejudice on February 22, 2023. Jenkins filed a postjudgment motion on March 21, 2023, which was denied by operation of law on June 20, 2023. Jenkins also filed a "motion for clarification" on April 28, 2023, which the court purported to grant on June 21, 2023, reinstating claims against Larry and Scott Thurmond. However, this order was a nullity as the court had lost jurisdiction after the postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law.Jenkins filed a notice of appeal on November 3, 2023, which was dismissed as arising from a non-final order. He then filed another appeal on January 24, 2024, which was transferred to the Supreme Court of Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal, instructing the circuit court to vacate its June 21, 2023, order and all subsequent orders, as they were nullities. The February 22, 2023, judgment was deemed final, and Jenkins's failure to appeal it timely resulted in the dismissal of his current appeal. View "Jenkins v. City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

Malcolm Pipes, a former reservist in the United States Air Force, sought disability-retirement pay and benefits after suffering a stroke while participating in the Air Force’s Self-paced Fitness Improvement Program (SFIP). Pipes argued that he was in inactive-duty training (IDT) status at the time of his injury, which would entitle him to the benefits under 10 U.S.C. § 1204. The Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR) and the United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) previously denied his claim, leading to this appeal.In the first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, holding that Pipes was in a duty status when ordered to participate in the SFIP. However, the court did not address whether Pipes was in IDT status when performing the SFIP. On remand, the AFBCMR and the Claims Court again denied relief, concluding that Pipes did not have the necessary advance authorization for IDT status as required by Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 36-8001.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the Claims Court's decision. The court found that the AFMAN applies to all IDT and requires advance authorization for such status. Pipes failed to provide evidence of receiving this authorization. The court also rejected Pipes's argument that the lawful order to participate in the SFIP automatically placed him in IDT status. The court noted that the Department of Veterans Affairs' grant of service connection for Pipes's stroke did not impact the determination of his duty status under the AFMAN.The court affirmed the Claims Court's judgment, concluding that the AFBCMR's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. View "PIPES v. US " on Justia Law

Julien P. Champagne, a veteran who served from December 1953 to December 1956, filed a claim in September 1987 for benefits related to his cerebellar degenerative disorder (CDD) using VA Form 21-526. The VA regional office (RO) interpreted this as a pension claim and awarded a disability pension in December 1987. In 1999, Champagne sought service connection compensation for malaria and any residual illnesses, including CDD. The RO granted service connection for malaria at 0% in 2002 but did not grant compensation for CDD. Champagne filed a notice of disagreement in 2003, and after multiple proceedings, he was granted compensation for CDD at 100%, effective February 3, 2005. This effective date was later changed to July 14, 2003, but Champagne sought an earlier date, arguing it should be from 1987.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied an earlier effective date in October 2020, finding no indication in the 1987 application that Champagne intended to claim service connection compensation. Champagne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision in July 2022. The Veterans Court held that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a), the VA may consider a pension claim as a compensation claim but is not required to do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the plain language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) is permissive, allowing but not requiring the VA to consider a pension claim as a compensation claim. The court also found no merit in Champagne’s argument that the Veterans Court engaged in impermissible fact-finding, as the court had merely determined that any findings by the RO would not bind the Board. View "Champagne v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Joseph Scott Gray, a decorated U.S. Army veteran, was convicted of defrauding the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) by lying about his health to obtain benefits. After leaving the military in 2003, Gray falsely claimed severe disabilities to receive increased benefits, including "individual unemployability" and "aid and attendance" benefits. His fraudulent activities were exposed when investigators videotaped him performing daily activities without assistance, contradicting his claims of severe disability.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan convicted Gray of several fraud-related offenses. The jury found him guilty, and the district court sentenced him to five years in prison and ordered him to pay $264,631 in restitution, covering benefits received from 2004 onward. Gray appealed, challenging the exclusion of an expert witness, the calculation of his criminal history score, the reasonableness of his sentence, and the restitution order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the exclusion of Gray's expert witness, Dr. Ennis Berker, as the proposed testimony was deemed irrelevant to the issues at trial. The court also found no procedural error in the calculation of Gray's criminal history score and deemed the five-year sentence substantively reasonable, considering the severity and duration of his fraudulent conduct.However, the court vacated the restitution order, ruling that it should not cover losses before January 2015, as the indictment only charged Gray with a conspiracy beginning in 2015. The case was remanded for recalculation of the restitution amount, limited to the period specified in the indictment. View "United States v. Joseph Gray" on Justia Law