Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Ryan Bussey, a former Army soldier, received a Bad Conduct Discharge (BCD) after being found guilty of wrongful sexual contact. He sought to upgrade his discharge to Honorable, arguing that his combat-induced Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) contributed to his conduct. The Army Board for Correction of Military Records acknowledged Bussey's PTSD but concluded it was not a mitigating factor for his crime of conviction.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Army, upholding the Board's decision. Bussey appealed this decision, seeking review under the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Board erred in its decision. The court held that the Board failed to consider all the circumstances resulting in Bussey's discharge, focusing too narrowly on whether PTSD caused the legal elements of the crime. The court emphasized that the Board should have analyzed whether PTSD potentially contributed to the facts, events, and conditions leading to Bussey's wrongful sexual contact.Additionally, the court found that the Board did not give liberal consideration to Bussey's PTSD-based claim, as required by 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B). The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case to the Board to reconsider Bussey's upgrade request under the appropriate standard, instructing the Board to resolve doubts and inferences in favor of Bussey. If the Board finds that PTSD contributed to the circumstances resulting in Bussey's discharge, it may grant the requested relief. View "Bussey v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Daniel R. Smith, who is currently blind, underwent medical examinations upon entering military service in August 1964 and upon leaving in June 1965. Both examinations noted poor night and color vision, with vision correctable in both eyes. After his discharge, Smith filed several claims with the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for benefits based on retinitis pigmentosa, an eye disease causing vision loss. An ophthalmologist opined that Smith's condition preexisted his service and did not worsen during service. The VA denied his claim, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals agreed, finding clear and unmistakable evidence rebutting the presumption of sound health upon entry into service. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims reviewed the case and affirmed the Board's decision, finding that Dr. Wilson's opinion constituted clear and unmistakable evidence that Smith's retinitis pigmentosa did not increase in severity during service. Smith appealed, arguing that Dr. Wilson's opinion did not meet the clear and unmistakable evidence standard and that it improperly relied on the absence of evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed Smith's appeal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the factual determination that Dr. Wilson's opinion met the clear and unmistakable evidence standard. The court also found that the Veterans Court did not rely on an absence of evidence but rather on affirmative evidence comparing Smith's vision tests at entry and separation from service. Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that it could not address Smith's legal contention regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. View "SMITH v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Military-Veterans Advocacy (MVA) filed a petition for review challenging the validity of two provisions in a Final Rule issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The provisions in question are 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2), which requires users of VA’s Information Technology (IT) systems to potentially pass a background suitability investigation, and 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), which permits the VA to inspect the computer hardware and software used to access VA IT systems and their location at any time without notice.The VA issued the Final Rule on June 24, 2022, after a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and consideration of public comments, including those from MVA. MVA argued that the regulations violated the pro-veteran canon of construction, due process, and were arbitrary and capricious. The VA addressed some of these comments in the Final Rule but maintained the provisions as proposed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the VA has the authority to promulgate the Background Check Provision under 38 U.S.C. §§ 501, 5721–28, which allows the VA to establish and maintain information security programs. The court found that the Background Check Provision was reasonable and based on risk assessments, thus within the VA’s statutory authority.However, the court found that the Inspection Provision exceeded the VA’s statutory authority. The provision allowed the VA to inspect the location where the hardware and software are used, which could include private areas such as a user’s home. The court determined that this provision was not based on a risk assessment and was overly broad, thus not the product of reasoned decision-making.The court granted MVA’s petition in part, setting aside 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), and denied the petition in part, upholding 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2). View "MILITARY-VETERANS ADVOCACY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

Petitioners, veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton, applied for service-connected PTSD disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Bufkin's claim was denied due to insufficient evidence linking his PTSD to his military service. Thornton, who already received benefits, sought an increased disability rating, which the VA denied. Both cases were reviewed de novo by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which upheld the VA's decisions. Bufkin and Thornton then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the evidence was in "approximate balance" and they were entitled to the benefit of the doubt.The Veterans Court affirmed the Board's decisions, finding no clear error in the approximate-balance determinations. Petitioners appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging the Veterans Court's interpretation of 38 U.S.C. §7261(b)(1). They argued that the Veterans Court should review the entire record de novo to determine if the evidence was in approximate balance. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the Veterans Court's decisions.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the VA's determination of whether evidence is in "approximate balance" is predominantly a factual determination, subject to clear-error review. The Court clarified that the Veterans Court must review the VA's application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule using the same standards as other determinations: de novo for legal issues and clear error for factual issues. The judgment of the Federal Circuit was affirmed. View "Bufkin v. Collins" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jose Antonio Cossio, Jr., sought reconsideration of his bad-conduct discharge from the Air Force, which stemmed from court-martial convictions in 2004. Cossio had used his access to an Air Force computer system to reroute another airman’s paycheck to an orphanage in Siberia, leading to his conviction for larceny and violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, among other charges. He was sentenced to ten months of confinement, demotion, a fine, and a bad-conduct discharge. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in the military courts.Cossio has repeatedly challenged his convictions and sentence over the years. In this case, he petitioned for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, arguing that his conduct did not meet the elements of larceny and that a Supreme Court decision invalidated his computer fraud conviction. The district court dismissed his petitions, finding that Cossio did not meet the requirements for habeas corpus jurisdiction as he was not “in custody” under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) and that he did not meet the essential elements for a writ of mandamus.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Cossio was not “in custody” as required for habeas corpus jurisdiction because the consequences of his convictions were collateral and did not restrain his physical liberty. Additionally, the court found that Cossio’s petition for a writ of mandamus failed because he did not demonstrate that the Secretary of the Air Force had a clear, nondiscretionary duty to grant the requested relief, nor did he show a clear right to the issuance of the writ. View "Cossio v Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals" on Justia Law

Victor Silvers was convicted of the premeditated murder of his estranged wife, Brittney Silvers, who was an active member of the United States Army, and was shot and killed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Silvers was also found guilty of attempted murder, domestic violence, violation of a protection order, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and the use of a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to life in prison.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky took judicial notice that Fort Campbell was within the United States' special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. Silvers challenged this, arguing that the jury should have determined the jurisdictional status. He also moved to exclude a juror who wore a shirt supporting military veterans and had served in the Navy, claiming potential bias. Additionally, Silvers argued that his mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in taking judicial notice of the jurisdictional status of Fort Campbell, as it was a legal question rather than a factual one for the jury. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to deny Silvers's motion to exclude the juror, as the juror assured impartiality and the voir dire process was deemed adequate. Finally, the court upheld Silvers's mandatory life sentence, citing binding Supreme Court precedent and the Sixth Circuit's own precedent, which did not find such sentences to be cruel and unusual punishment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed both Silvers's conviction and his sentence. View "United States v. Silvers" on Justia Law

Captain Gardenia Dorado-Ocasio, an Army officer, challenged a decision by the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) regarding an adverse performance evaluation she received. The evaluation was based on her failure to comply with her superior's orders and alleged retaliation against a subordinate. Dorado-Ocasio claimed the evaluation was biased and factually inaccurate. The ABCMR upheld the evaluation, finding no substantive errors or evidence of bias.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Acting Secretary of the Army. The district court found that the ABCMR had adequately explained its decision and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the ABCMR's decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board had provided a discernible path for its determination. The court emphasized the special deference given to military judgments and found that the ABCMR had met the required standard of review. The court concluded that the ABCMR's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. View "Dorado-Ocasio v. Averill" on Justia Law

A veteran of the United States Air Force, Clinton Siples, was granted service connection for bilateral shoulder subluxation by a Regional Office (RO) of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). After the decision became final, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) decided Burton v. Shinseki, which interpreted 38 C.F.R. § 4.59 as not limited to cases of arthritis. Mr. Siples then filed a motion alleging clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in the RO’s rating decision, arguing that the newly interpreted § 4.59 would have required the VA to assign him a higher rating for his shoulder disability, which was not based on arthritis.The Veterans Court affirmed the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ (Board) denial of Mr. Siples’s CUE motion, stating that at the time of his rating decision, § 4.59 was not undebatably understood to apply to cases other than arthritis, and thus there was no error of the type required for CUE. The Veterans Court applied the standard that CUE must be analyzed based on the law as it was understood at the time of the original decision and cannot arise from a subsequent change in the law or interpretation thereof.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that CUE must be based on the law at the time of the decision, and at the time of the RO’s decision in Mr. Siples’s case, § 4.59 was not undebatably understood as applying to cases other than arthritis. The court concluded that the regulation’s plain language did not clearly apply to non-arthritis claims, and the understanding of § 4.59 in July 2004 did not undebatably require the RO to assign a higher rating to Mr. Siples’s non-arthritic shoulder disability. View "SIPLES v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, who are military members, filed a class action against Citibank, alleging violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) and other statutes. They claimed Citibank improperly charged them higher interest rates and fees on their credit card balances after they left active duty, contrary to the SCRA's protections. The credit card agreements included arbitration clauses that required disputes to be resolved individually, not as class actions.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied Citibank's motion to compel arbitration, holding that the SCRA allowed servicemembers to bring class actions in federal court despite any prior agreement to arbitrate. The court interpreted the SCRA's provision allowing class actions "notwithstanding any previous agreement to the contrary" as overriding the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the SCRA does not explicitly prohibit arbitration agreements and that the FAA requires enforcement of such agreements unless there is a clear congressional command to the contrary. The court found that the SCRA's language did not provide such a command and that the arbitration agreements should be enforced according to their terms, which included individual arbitration.The Fourth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration for all claims except those under the Military Lending Act (MLA). The court noted that the MLA explicitly prohibits arbitration agreements for disputes involving the extension of consumer credit to servicemembers. The district court was instructed to determine whether the MLA applied to the plaintiffs' credit card accounts and to address any related issues. View "Espin v. Citibank, N.A." on Justia Law

Air Force Staff Sergeant Cameron Beck was killed in a collision with a car driven by Blanca Mitchell, a civilian government employee, on Whiteman Air Force Base. Beck was on active duty and driving home for lunch when the accident occurred. Mitchell pleaded guilty to careless and imprudent driving. Beck’s wife and son received benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Defense. They filed a wrongful death claim, which the Air Force denied, but allowed them to pursue the claim in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Feres doctrine, which grants the government immunity for injuries arising out of activities incident to military service. The court concluded that Beck’s death was incident to his service because he was on active duty and on-base at the time of the accident. The court also denied the plaintiffs' requests for additional discovery and to file supplemental suggestions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the Feres doctrine applied, as Beck was on active duty, on-base, and subject to recall at the time of the accident. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional discovery, as the facts necessary to resolve the jurisdictional inquiry were undisputed and the additional facts sought were not material to the determination of whether Feres applied. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Beck v. United States" on Justia Law