Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries
Champagne v. McDonough
Julien P. Champagne, a veteran who served from December 1953 to December 1956, filed a claim in September 1987 for benefits related to his cerebellar degenerative disorder (CDD) using VA Form 21-526. The VA regional office (RO) interpreted this as a pension claim and awarded a disability pension in December 1987. In 1999, Champagne sought service connection compensation for malaria and any residual illnesses, including CDD. The RO granted service connection for malaria at 0% in 2002 but did not grant compensation for CDD. Champagne filed a notice of disagreement in 2003, and after multiple proceedings, he was granted compensation for CDD at 100%, effective February 3, 2005. This effective date was later changed to July 14, 2003, but Champagne sought an earlier date, arguing it should be from 1987.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied an earlier effective date in October 2020, finding no indication in the 1987 application that Champagne intended to claim service connection compensation. Champagne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision in July 2022. The Veterans Court held that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a), the VA may consider a pension claim as a compensation claim but is not required to do so.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the plain language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) is permissive, allowing but not requiring the VA to consider a pension claim as a compensation claim. The court also found no merit in Champagne’s argument that the Veterans Court engaged in impermissible fact-finding, as the court had merely determined that any findings by the RO would not bind the Board. View "Champagne v. McDonough" on Justia Law
United States v. Joseph Gray
Joseph Scott Gray, a decorated U.S. Army veteran, was convicted of defrauding the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) by lying about his health to obtain benefits. After leaving the military in 2003, Gray falsely claimed severe disabilities to receive increased benefits, including "individual unemployability" and "aid and attendance" benefits. His fraudulent activities were exposed when investigators videotaped him performing daily activities without assistance, contradicting his claims of severe disability.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan convicted Gray of several fraud-related offenses. The jury found him guilty, and the district court sentenced him to five years in prison and ordered him to pay $264,631 in restitution, covering benefits received from 2004 onward. Gray appealed, challenging the exclusion of an expert witness, the calculation of his criminal history score, the reasonableness of his sentence, and the restitution order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the exclusion of Gray's expert witness, Dr. Ennis Berker, as the proposed testimony was deemed irrelevant to the issues at trial. The court also found no procedural error in the calculation of Gray's criminal history score and deemed the five-year sentence substantively reasonable, considering the severity and duration of his fraudulent conduct.However, the court vacated the restitution order, ruling that it should not cover losses before January 2015, as the indictment only charged Gray with a conspiracy beginning in 2015. The case was remanded for recalculation of the restitution amount, limited to the period specified in the indictment. View "United States v. Joseph Gray" on Justia Law
United States v. Crosby
Federal agents executed a search warrant on the home of an Air Force serviceman, Mr. Crosby, in 2018, seizing electronic devices that contained over 4,000 files of child pornography. Mr. Crosby admitted to possessing the material and was administratively separated from the Air Force. In 2020, he was indicted in New Mexico for possession of child pornography and arrested in Pennsylvania, where he continued to download such material. A subsequent search found additional illicit content. Mr. Crosby was held in custody for five days before being released on pretrial conditions. He was later indicted in Pennsylvania, and the cases were consolidated in New Mexico.The District Court of New Mexico accepted Mr. Crosby's guilty plea and calculated a Guidelines range of 78–97 months based on various offense enhancements. The government requested a 78-month sentence, while Mr. Crosby argued for a non-custodial sentence, citing his autism spectrum disorder (ASD) diagnosis and low risk of recidivism. The district court ultimately sentenced Mr. Crosby to five days' time served, emphasizing his ASD, potential for rehabilitation, and low recidivism risk, while noting his compliance with pretrial conditions and employment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. The court found that the district court failed to adequately consider several § 3553(a) factors, including retribution, general deterrence, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the established sentencing range. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's explanation was insufficient to justify the significant downward variance from the Guidelines range. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Crosby" on Justia Law
People v. Moseley
Frank Moseley was charged with murder after he killed his fiancé, who had told him she might be pregnant with another man's child. Moseley, a combat veteran diagnosed with PTSD, testified that his condition contributed to the crime. The jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) and a weapon enhancement.The Superior Court of Orange County sentenced Moseley to 11 years in state prison, striking the additional punishment for the weapon use. The court acknowledged Moseley’s PTSD as a mitigating factor but did not explicitly consider the relevant service-related statutes (Penal Code §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91) when denying probation. Moseley’s counsel mentioned these statutes at the sentencing hearing but stated they were not "directly applicable." The probation department’s report and the sentencing briefs from both parties also failed to cite these statutes.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not expressly consider Moseley’s service-related PTSD as required by §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. These statutes mandate that a trial court must consider a defendant’s service-related PTSD as a factor in mitigation when deciding on probation and sentencing. The appellate court determined that the record was ambiguous regarding whether the trial court was aware of its statutory obligations under these sections.The appellate court reversed Moseley’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to comply with its statutory obligations under §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Moseley" on Justia Law
Crocker v. Austin
Seven plaintiffs, all members of the Air Force, challenged the Air Force’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, arguing it violated their religious beliefs. They sought religious exemptions, which were denied, leading to administrative discharge proceedings. One plaintiff, Byron O. Starks, Jr., was separated from service, allegedly for a preexisting medical condition, though he claimed it was due to his refusal to get vaccinated.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed the case as moot after the Air Force rescinded the vaccine mandate. The court also dismissed Starks’s claims for lack of standing, citing his separation from service and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the rescission of the mandate did not address all alleged harms, particularly the claim that the Air Force’s religious exemption process was a sham. The court held that Starks had standing because his separation caused ongoing harm, such as ineligibility for certain veteran benefits. The court also clarified that RFRA claims are not subject to the Mindes exhaustion requirement, allowing Starks to proceed without exhausting intraservice remedies.The Fifth Circuit determined that the claims of the six still-serving plaintiffs were not moot, as they alleged ongoing harm from the Air Force’s religious exemption process. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs to continue their challenge against the Air Force’s broader vaccination policies and religious accommodations process. View "Crocker v. Austin" on Justia Law
Numann v. Gallant
Gregory Numann and Diane Gallant were married in 2002 and separated in October 2016. They verbally agreed to maintain separate residences, with Numann paying child support and both contributing to their child's college fund. Numann served in the military from 1989 to 2015, accruing a pension worth about $730,000 at separation. Gallant, who worked throughout the marriage, had two retirement accounts worth about $30,000. Gallant filed for divorce in 2021, seeking a portion of Numann’s military retirement benefit.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, held a two-day trial and issued a divorce decree in July 2022. The court awarded Gallant 50% of the marital portion of Numann’s military retirement benefit from the date of separation. It also credited Numann for child support payments made after their child reached the age of majority. The court found that Gallant was entitled to a portion of the retirement benefit starting from the date of separation and ordered Numann to pay Gallant $94,248.70, representing her share of the retirement payments received since separation. The court balanced this against other obligations to avoid prolonged financial entanglement.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the division of the military retirement benefit from the date of separation did not violate federal law under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA). The court clarified that the USFSPA allows state courts to treat military retirement pay as marital property subject to division under state law. The court also found no evidence of judicial bias against Numann. However, the court remanded the case to correct an inconsistency in the final written order regarding the division of the military retirement benefit. View "Numann v. Gallant" on Justia Law
In re Marriage of Porter
Clifford Porter and Peggy Huckstadt were married from 1977 to 1994, during which Porter served in the military. Upon their divorce, the trial court awarded Huckstadt a fractional share of Porter’s military retirement pay. Porter retired from the military in 2002 and later worked as a surgeon. In 2009, he was involuntarily recalled to active duty, served for three years, and was promoted, which increased his retirement pay. Porter retired again in 2012. In 2022, Porter sought to clarify that Huckstadt’s share should be based on his 2002 retirement rank and salary, not the increased benefits from his 2012 retirement.The trial court disagreed, ruling that the increased benefits from Porter’s recall service were community property subject to division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the salary increases during the recall period were based on 17 years of community efforts during the marriage.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that Porter’s rank and salary at his second retirement could not be used to calculate the community portion of the military pension. The court found that the “community efforts doctrine” did not apply under these specific circumstances, as the increased benefits were not a direct result of community effort and performance. The court also determined that the dissolution decree intended to value Huckstadt’s share based on Porter’s rank and salary at his first retirement in 2002, not his second retirement in 2012. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Porter" on Justia Law
SMITH v. MCDONOUGH
Thomas Smith, a veteran, sought specially adapted housing (SAH) benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to build a home spa for his service-connected low back disability. Before receiving a response, he constructed the spa. His initial request was denied, and he did not appeal. Later, he sought reimbursement for the spa's construction costs, which was also denied by the VA and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. Smith appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims but died before the case was decided. His daughter, Karen Hicks, sought to substitute herself in the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims denied Hicks's motion for substitution, stating she was not entitled to pursue her father's claim. The court found that Hicks had not obtained a determination from the VA that she was an eligible accrued-benefits claimant, a prerequisite for substitution under the court's precedent in Breedlove v. Shinseki.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Hicks argued that the Veterans Court should have made the determination of her eligibility for substitution without requiring a VA determination. She also contended that she should be allowed to pursue the claim under 38 C.F.R. § 36.4406, which governs SAH benefits, and under the equitable doctrine of nunc pro tunc. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court's decision, holding that the court did not err in requiring a VA determination for substitution eligibility and that Hicks did not meet the regulatory requirements for reimbursement. The court also upheld the application of the nunc pro tunc doctrine, which did not apply as Smith died before the case was submitted for decision. View "SMITH v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law
DOJAQUEZ v. MCDONOUGH
Kenneth Dojaquez, an attorney, appealed a decision regarding his entitlement to additional attorney's fees under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3). Dojaquez represented a veteran, Billy Wayne Slaughter, who was awarded an increased disability rating by the Board of Veterans' Appeals. The agency assigned an effective date of August 1, 2012, for the increased rating in a decision dated March 2, 2019, but did not notify Slaughter of this decision until April 26, 2019. Dojaquez argued that his attorney's fees should be calculated up to the notification date, not the decision date.The Board of Veterans' Appeals concluded that Dojaquez was only entitled to attorney's fees through March 2, 2019, the date of the agency's decision. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed this decision, relying on the interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(1) and established case law, specifically Snyder v. Nicholson, which defined the end date for calculating past-due benefits as the date of the award decision, not the notification date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the "date of the final decision" under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)(3) refers to the date of the agency's decision assigning an effective date, not the date the veteran was notified of the decision. This interpretation ensures that attorney's fees are calculated based on past-due benefits up to the date of the award decision, consistent with the statutory language and previous case law. The court rejected Dojaquez's argument that the notification date should be used, as it would conflict with the statutory scheme and potentially allow attorneys to receive more than 20% of the claimant's past-due benefits. View "DOJAQUEZ v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law
State v. Yuen
The case involves a motor vehicle collision near the entrance to Hickam Air Force Base in Honolulu, where Charles Yuen allegedly rear-ended another car. Military police (MPs) arrived at the scene, identified Yuen as the driver, and conducted field sobriety tests and a preliminary alcohol screening. They then detained Yuen until Honolulu Police Department (HPD) officers arrived, who conducted their own tests and arrested Yuen for operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (OVUII).The District Court of the First Circuit of the State of Hawai'i adjudicated Yuen guilty of OVUII based on the testimony of HPD officers. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the conviction, finding that there was substantial evidence to support it. However, the ICA did not find sufficient evidence in the record to establish ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence based on a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i reviewed the case and held that Yuen's trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the MPs, which could have been considered a violation of the PCA. The court found that this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel as it potentially impaired a meritorious defense. The court also agreed with the ICA that there was substantial evidence to support Yuen's conviction. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated Yuen's OVUII conviction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Yuen" on Justia Law