Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Bell served on active duty from 1952-1954 in the Army, and from 1955-1957 in the Air Force. During service, Bell sustained a lower back injury. Years later Bell filed a VA claim for entitlement to service connection for a lumbar spine disability and received a 20% disability rating, effective March 2017. In a December 2019 internal memorandum, the agency requested an administrative review by the Director of Compensation Service on the issue of entitlement to an extra-schedular rating for Bell’s lumbar spine disability under 38 C.F.R. 3.321(b)(1); the agency recommended denying entitlement to an extra-schedular rating. The Director issued an advisory opinion denying entitlement, finding that the “lumbar spine disability picture does not demonstrate an unusual or exceptional disability pattern that would render application of the regular rating criteria impractical.” The regional office denied entitlement to an extra-schedular disability evaluation.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals the Veterans Court, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision. Bell “d[id] not present any argument, under any applicable authority,” why the denial should be reversed. The regulation authorizing the Director of Compensation Service to approve an extra-schedular rating does not prohibit the Director from considering recommendations from agency officials before making this decision. View "Bell v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Appellant Watkins Law & Advocacy, PLLC, submitted requests under the Freedom of Information Act to various federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Watkins sought records concerning the process by which the names of certain veterans and other VA beneficiaries are added to a background check system that identifies persons barred from possessing firearms for having been adjudicated as “mental defective[s].” Watkins initiated this FOIA action in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the agencies on almost all claims (and to Watkins on the remaining claims, none of which are at issue here). Watkins appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the FBI and DOJ on the adequacy of their searches and to the VA on its withholding of documents based on the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the FBI and DOJ. But we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the VA and remand for further proceedings. The VA did not satisfy its burden to show that the withheld documents are exempt from disclosure. The court concluded that the VA failed to adequately set out its basis for asserting the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges as to the withheld documents. The court wrote that because the VA offers no arguments about specific documents other than the eight that Watkins highlighted as illustrations, a blanket remand is appropriate. View "Watkins Law & Advocacy, PLLC v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Bufkin served in the Air Force from 2005-2006. In 2013, he sought service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. VA medical records reflected his visits with a VA psychiatrist, who wrote that he met the criteria for PTSD but did not identify the specific stressor or whether the stressor related to Bufkin’s military service. The VA scheduled an examination with a VA psychiatrist, who opined that his “symptoms do not meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD.” Bufkin filed a notice of disagreement, arguing that the favorable opinion and the unfavorable opinion were in equipoise, and therefore, VA was legally obligated to grant service connection. Bufkin underwent another VA examination with another examiner, who concluded that his symptoms did not meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. The VA continued its denial of service connection. While his appeal was pending, another VA psychiatrist opined that in addition to a severe anxiety disorder, Bufkin “suffers from chronic PTSD.”The Board of Appeals denied service connection, finding that the preponderance of evidence supported a finding that Bufkin does not have PTSD. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. There was no error in the Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule, 38 U.S.C. 5107(b): “[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence” the Secretary “shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” The Board considered conflicting medical statements but found that the rule did not apply. View "Bufkin v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Cavaciuti served in the Army, 1965-1967. In 2020, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted him entitlement to a total disability rating due to individual unemployability (TDIU) and directed the VA to assign him an effective date. The VA nonetheless denied Cavaciuti’s claim, finding that he was capable of gainful employment. Cavaciuti sought a writ of mandamus. After negotiations, the VA informed the Veterans Court that it had granted Cavaciuti entitlement to TDIU with a 2008 effective date. Cavaciuti argued that the case was not moot because the RO had not invalidated its erroneous rating decision and that the VA misused confidential settlement information to render the case moot.The court dismissed Cavaciuti’s petition as moot because the VA had provided him with the relief that he sought. Cavaciuti sought attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The Veterans Court denied the application, finding that Cavaciuti did not satisfy the criterion for prevailing party status because the dismissal order did not award benefits, change the parties’ legal relationship, or otherwise address the merits of Cavaciuti’s writ petition. The Federal Circuit affirmed. There was no judicial change in the parties' legal relationship. The VA implemented the Board’s decision, as Cavaciuti requested, following a settlement rather than based on any court order. The fact that the government’s representations would prevent future changes does not render the dismissal a judicial imprimatur sufficient to make Cavaciuti the prevailing party. View "Cavaciuti v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Johnson first enlisted in 1999; in 2006 he extended his enlistment for 23 months to affiliate with the Marine Corps. Active Reserve (AR) Program. He subsequently reenlisted for terms of three and four years; his scheduled end of active service was November 2015. In March 2013, the Corps issued permanent change of station (PCS) orders for Johnson to relocate from Virginia Beach to Phoenix. Johnson unsuccessfully tried to have his orders changed, citing personal hardship. Johnson stayed in Virginia despite being counseled. He signed a “page 11,” acknowledging that he was assigned code RE-3O for failing to comply with PCS orders, and was not eligible for promotion, reenlistment, commissioning or warrant officer programs, special education programs, or involuntary separation pay unless specially authorized. Johnson was transferred into the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program and received a DD Form 214 reflecting the RE-3O code. Months later, the Reserve mobilized Johnson back to the AR Program, stationed in Quantico, and preliminarily approved him for appointment to warrant officer. His appointment was delayed due to the RE-3O code.Johnson reenlisted for two years and unsuccessfully petitioned the Board of Naval Corrections to remove the RE-3O code and grant his appointment. The Federal Circuit held that Johnson was properly released from the AR Program and transferred to the IRR under the procedures described in the AR Program Policy Manual. Johnson was not entitled to additional notice and a separation board before his transfer. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

A collective-bargaining agreement between the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX), an association of carriers and other employers, earmarks all container loading and unloading work on the East and Gulf Coasts for the union’s members. So when USMX-affiliated ships docked at a new South Carolina terminal that used non-union lift operators, the union sued USMX and its carrier members for damages. Soon enough, USMX’s carrier members stopped calling at that terminal. At issue is whether the ILA’s lawsuit—and a separate provision of its contract with USMX—violate the National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board held that they don’t, and the South Carolina State Ports Authority petitioned for review.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board and denied the petition. The court agreed that USMX and the ILA haven’t made an agreement that violates Section 8(e). Moreover, the court explained that the Board rationally held that the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX sought to preserve its coastwide jurisdiction over loading and unloading work, so it didn’t violate the Act. And the Board and ALJ correctly concluded that Section 7(b) of the Master Contract didn’t constitute an illegal hot-cargo provision, whether by its text or by tacit agreement. View "South Carolina State Ports Authority v. NLRB" on Justia Law

After serving in the United States Navy, Plaintiff became eligible to receive education benefits under the G.I. Bill, which he used to pursue a bachelor’s degree. Plaintiff also sought tuition assistance from his employer, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), under the company’s Employee Education Program, but OPPD denied Plaintiff’s request because his G.I. Bill benefits fully covered his tuition expenses. Plaintiff sued, claiming that OPPD’s denial of company-provided tuition assistance based on his receipt of G.I. Bill benefits amounted to unlawful discrimination under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The district court granted summary judgment in OPPD’s favor, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff y has “failed to present sufficient evidence to make” the requisite “threshold showing” that his status as a military veteran was “a motivating factor” in OPPD’s decision to deny him EEP benefits. His discrimination claim under USERRA thus fails, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in OPPD’s favor. View "Andrew Kelly v. Omaha Public Power District" on Justia Law

Appellant brought an action against the Army in district court, challenging the Secretary’s assignment of a 20% disability rating. According to Appellant the Secretary should have given him a 30% rating, consistent with the rating he had received from the Department of Veterans Affairs in a separate assessment conducted by the VA to determine his eligibility for veterans’ disability benefits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Army.   The DC Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment to the Army and remanded. The court concluded that the Secretary’s approach when determining Appellant’s disability rating was inconsistent with the applicable statute and regulations. The court explained that to the extent the Physical Disability Board of Review (PDBR) concluded that Appellant’s leg condition rendered him collectively unfit when considered together with his back condition, it was obligated to assign a rating to the leg condition. By extension, the Secretary, in accepting the PDBR’s recommendation to give no rating to Appellant’s leg condition, acted contrary to law insofar as the PDBR concluded that his leg condition was collectively unfitting together with his back condition. The court further explained that the fact that a condition contributes to a soldier’s unfitness is enough, and the Secretary’s apparent addition of a “significantly” criterion naturally raises questions about what degree and manner of contribution is thought to suffice, questions that the terms of the statute and regulations do not make salient. Any assumption that a medical condition, to receive a rating, must contribute “significantly” to unfitness thus is contrary to law. View "Jason Sissel v. Christine Wormuth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Air Force veteran, appeals from a decision of the Physical Disability Board of Review (“Board”) declining to increase his disability rating, which would entitle him to greater benefits. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments that the Board was required to conduct a physical examination before making its decision and that its decision was arbitrary and capricious.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that by arguing that he could not be taken off the List or have his temporary 50% rating lowered until the Air Force conducted a physical examination—an examination that necessarily could not occur until years after his retroactive placement on the List—Plaintiff pushes for an interpretation that would effectively grant a retroactive 50% rating for years to all individuals whose disabilities are reviewed by the Board and fall under Section 4.129. But that defies the purpose of the Board: to ensure accurate disability determinations at the time of a member’s discharge, “based on the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented to the” Board. The court, therefore, rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Board was required to order a new physical examination before making its determination. Ultimately, the court concluded that its decision was supported by substantial evidence, with a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” View "Blair Coleman v. Frank Kendall" on Justia Law

Petitioner served as the personal assistant and public-relations secretary to Usama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda and mastermind of the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States. Members of a military commission convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to commit war crimes, providing material support for terrorism, and solicitation of others to commit war crimes. The members sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment for life, and the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review (“CMCR”) affirmed. On Petitioner’s first appeal to the DC Circuit, the court upheld the conspiracy charge but vacated the other convictions as unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The CMCR subsequently reaffirmed Petitioner’s remaining conspiracy conviction and life sentence twice. Petitioner asked the court to vacate his conspiracy conviction or, alternatively, to remand his case for resentencing by military commission members.   The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that Petitioner could have raised the change in law, or other similar objections, in his initial appeal to the CMCR or during the extensive proceedings since then. He did not. On the most recent remand to the CMCR, he questioned the admissibility of the statements in his opening brief but did not argue that Section 948r barred their admission until his reply. Accordingly, the court wrote that it declined to revisit its prior ruling that the convening authority is an inferior officer because the intervening Supreme Court case cited by Petitioner does not clearly dictate a departure from the circuit’s precedent. The court also upheld his sentence of life imprisonment. View "Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. USA" on Justia Law