Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Seven members of the South Dakota Air National Guard, who also work as federal civilian employees of the Department of the Air Force, alleged that the South Dakota Adjutant General wrongfully denied them military leave while they were serving on active duty, in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). The plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to 15 days of paid military leave each year in their civilian roles, which they were denied while on active duty.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, dismissed the USERRA claims sua sponte after a court trial, concluding that the plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of an antimilitary animus to prevail. The court did not reach the merits of the parties’ arguments and found that the plaintiffs had failed to plead or prove such animus. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to military leave. The court held that the plaintiffs did not need to show antimilitary animus because the benefit in question, military leave, is only available to members of the military. The court found that the plaintiffs' active duty under Title 10 orders was not "active Guard and Reserve duty" as defined by 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(6), and therefore, the exception in 32 U.S.C. § 709(g)(2) did not apply. Consequently, the plaintiffs were entitled to accrue military leave under 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a)(1) while serving on active duty under Title 10. The court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Christiansen v. Morrell" on Justia Law

Joshua Smith was substituted in his deceased veteran father’s appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The Board denied Mr. Smith’s request for an earlier effective date for benefits for service-connected injuries based on allegedly newly associated service department records. The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision.The Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) regional office initially granted service connection for PTSD effective from the date of the 2010 request to reopen the claim. Mr. Smith, Sr. appealed for an earlier effective date. The Board remanded the case to obtain complete records, and the regional office found a PTSD diagnosis from 2007 but did not grant an earlier effective date. After Mr. Smith, Sr. died, the Board dismissed the appeal as moot. Joshua Smith was substituted as the claimant, and the Board granted an earlier effective date based on the 2007 diagnosis but limited Mr. Smith’s eligibility to accrued benefits necessary for last sickness or burial expenses. The regional office calculated the total accrued benefits and deferred a decision on payment pending evidence of expenses.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Mr. Smith’s appeal was moot because, as a substituted party, he was only entitled to reimbursement for last sickness and burial expenses, which amounted to $1,143. Since the accrued benefits already exceeded this amount, any decision granting an earlier effective date would not affect the outcome for Mr. Smith. The court dismissed the appeal. View "SMITH v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Veterans Guardian VA Claim Consulting LLC, along with John F. Rudman and Andre Jesus Soto, challenged a New Jersey law that restricts charging for advice on claiming veterans benefits. Veterans Guardian, a consulting company, provides paid advice to veterans on how to claim benefits. The plaintiffs argued that the New Jersey law, which mirrors federal regulations but adds civil enforcement mechanisms, violates their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the law did not trigger First Amendment scrutiny because it regulated conduct, not speech. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court made several errors. The Third Circuit held that Veterans Guardian's services likely constitute speech and that New Jersey's law burdens that speech by prohibiting charging for it. The court emphasized that laws restricting compensation for speech must survive First Amendment scrutiny. The Third Circuit also noted that the District Court failed to analyze the separate provisions of the New Jersey law, which impose different restrictions on speech. The court expressed skepticism about the constitutionality of the provision that bans accepting payment for services rendered before a veteran appeals the VA's initial benefits decision.The Third Circuit vacated the District Court's decision and remanded the case for further consideration, instructing the lower court to develop a fuller record and reconsider the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction with the guidance provided. View "Veterans Guardian VA Claim Consulting LLC v. Platkin" on Justia Law

George Roseberry, a U.S. Army veteran, sustained a lower back injury during his service from 1977 to 1989. In March 1994, he filed a claim for service connection related to degenerative disc disease, which was denied three months later. Between 1998 and 2005, he made several unsuccessful attempts to reopen his claim. On July 20, 2021, the Veterans Court remanded his case to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, concluding his appeal on October 12, 2021. On November 13, 2021, Roseberry filed an application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), which was one day late.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims dismissed Roseberry’s EAJA application as untimely. The court found that the application was due on November 12, 2021, 30 days after the effective date of the mandate, October 12, 2021. Roseberry’s counsel had mistakenly relied on the date the mandate was entered on the docket, October 15, 2021, leading to the late filing. The court determined that equitable tolling was not warranted as there were no “extraordinary circumstances” to justify the delay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit agreed that the correct standard for equitable tolling is “extraordinary circumstances,” as established by precedent. Roseberry’s late filing was due to ordinary neglect, which does not meet the threshold for equitable tolling. Consequently, the Federal Circuit upheld the dismissal of Roseberry’s EAJA application as untimely. View "ROSEBERRY v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Larry Williams served in the U.S. Navy from August 1972 to March 1974 and filed a claim for compensation for schizophrenia in April 1978. The VA's Regional Office (RO) denied the claim in July 1978. Williams filed a Notice of Disagreement in January 1979, and the VA received additional evidence, including a hospital report diagnosing chronic schizophrenia. In June 1979, the RO confirmed the denial of service connection for schizophrenia but did not send this decision to Williams. Instead, the RO issued a Statement of the Case, which included the new evidence and confirmed the denial.Williams did not perfect his appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. In 2009, he submitted a claim to reopen his previously denied claim and was eventually granted a 100 percent disability rating effective June 4, 2009. Williams sought an earlier effective date, but the Board denied this request. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board's decision, finding that the VA had complied with 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b) in the 1979 Statement of the Case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court's decision. The Federal Circuit held that the VA met the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b) by issuing the 1979 Statement of the Case, which included the new evidence and confirmed the denial of service connection. The court found that the Statement of the Case provided sufficient indication that the VA considered the new evidence in connection with the pending claim, thus satisfying the regulatory requirements. View "WILLIAMS v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Ryan Bussey, a former Army soldier, received a Bad Conduct Discharge (BCD) after being found guilty of wrongful sexual contact. He sought to upgrade his discharge to Honorable, arguing that his combat-induced Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) contributed to his conduct. The Army Board for Correction of Military Records acknowledged Bussey's PTSD but concluded it was not a mitigating factor for his crime of conviction.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Army, upholding the Board's decision. Bussey appealed this decision, seeking review under the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Board erred in its decision. The court held that the Board failed to consider all the circumstances resulting in Bussey's discharge, focusing too narrowly on whether PTSD caused the legal elements of the crime. The court emphasized that the Board should have analyzed whether PTSD potentially contributed to the facts, events, and conditions leading to Bussey's wrongful sexual contact.Additionally, the court found that the Board did not give liberal consideration to Bussey's PTSD-based claim, as required by 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B). The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case to the Board to reconsider Bussey's upgrade request under the appropriate standard, instructing the Board to resolve doubts and inferences in favor of Bussey. If the Board finds that PTSD contributed to the circumstances resulting in Bussey's discharge, it may grant the requested relief. View "Bussey v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Daniel R. Smith, who is currently blind, underwent medical examinations upon entering military service in August 1964 and upon leaving in June 1965. Both examinations noted poor night and color vision, with vision correctable in both eyes. After his discharge, Smith filed several claims with the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for benefits based on retinitis pigmentosa, an eye disease causing vision loss. An ophthalmologist opined that Smith's condition preexisted his service and did not worsen during service. The VA denied his claim, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals agreed, finding clear and unmistakable evidence rebutting the presumption of sound health upon entry into service. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims reviewed the case and affirmed the Board's decision, finding that Dr. Wilson's opinion constituted clear and unmistakable evidence that Smith's retinitis pigmentosa did not increase in severity during service. Smith appealed, arguing that Dr. Wilson's opinion did not meet the clear and unmistakable evidence standard and that it improperly relied on the absence of evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed Smith's appeal. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the factual determination that Dr. Wilson's opinion met the clear and unmistakable evidence standard. The court also found that the Veterans Court did not rely on an absence of evidence but rather on affirmative evidence comparing Smith's vision tests at entry and separation from service. Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that it could not address Smith's legal contention regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. View "SMITH v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Military-Veterans Advocacy (MVA) filed a petition for review challenging the validity of two provisions in a Final Rule issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The provisions in question are 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2), which requires users of VA’s Information Technology (IT) systems to potentially pass a background suitability investigation, and 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), which permits the VA to inspect the computer hardware and software used to access VA IT systems and their location at any time without notice.The VA issued the Final Rule on June 24, 2022, after a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and consideration of public comments, including those from MVA. MVA argued that the regulations violated the pro-veteran canon of construction, due process, and were arbitrary and capricious. The VA addressed some of these comments in the Final Rule but maintained the provisions as proposed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the VA has the authority to promulgate the Background Check Provision under 38 U.S.C. §§ 501, 5721–28, which allows the VA to establish and maintain information security programs. The court found that the Background Check Provision was reasonable and based on risk assessments, thus within the VA’s statutory authority.However, the court found that the Inspection Provision exceeded the VA’s statutory authority. The provision allowed the VA to inspect the location where the hardware and software are used, which could include private areas such as a user’s home. The court determined that this provision was not based on a risk assessment and was overly broad, thus not the product of reasoned decision-making.The court granted MVA’s petition in part, setting aside 38 C.F.R. § 1.602(c)(1), and denied the petition in part, upholding 38 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)(2). View "MILITARY-VETERANS ADVOCACY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law

Petitioners, veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton, applied for service-connected PTSD disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Bufkin's claim was denied due to insufficient evidence linking his PTSD to his military service. Thornton, who already received benefits, sought an increased disability rating, which the VA denied. Both cases were reviewed de novo by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which upheld the VA's decisions. Bufkin and Thornton then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the evidence was in "approximate balance" and they were entitled to the benefit of the doubt.The Veterans Court affirmed the Board's decisions, finding no clear error in the approximate-balance determinations. Petitioners appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging the Veterans Court's interpretation of 38 U.S.C. §7261(b)(1). They argued that the Veterans Court should review the entire record de novo to determine if the evidence was in approximate balance. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the Veterans Court's decisions.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the VA's determination of whether evidence is in "approximate balance" is predominantly a factual determination, subject to clear-error review. The Court clarified that the Veterans Court must review the VA's application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule using the same standards as other determinations: de novo for legal issues and clear error for factual issues. The judgment of the Federal Circuit was affirmed. View "Bufkin v. Collins" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Jose Antonio Cossio, Jr., sought reconsideration of his bad-conduct discharge from the Air Force, which stemmed from court-martial convictions in 2004. Cossio had used his access to an Air Force computer system to reroute another airman’s paycheck to an orphanage in Siberia, leading to his conviction for larceny and violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, among other charges. He was sentenced to ten months of confinement, demotion, a fine, and a bad-conduct discharge. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in the military courts.Cossio has repeatedly challenged his convictions and sentence over the years. In this case, he petitioned for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, arguing that his conduct did not meet the elements of larceny and that a Supreme Court decision invalidated his computer fraud conviction. The district court dismissed his petitions, finding that Cossio did not meet the requirements for habeas corpus jurisdiction as he was not “in custody” under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) and that he did not meet the essential elements for a writ of mandamus.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Cossio was not “in custody” as required for habeas corpus jurisdiction because the consequences of his convictions were collateral and did not restrain his physical liberty. Additionally, the court found that Cossio’s petition for a writ of mandamus failed because he did not demonstrate that the Secretary of the Air Force had a clear, nondiscretionary duty to grant the requested relief, nor did he show a clear right to the issuance of the writ. View "Cossio v Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals" on Justia Law