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Saunders served on active duty in the Army, 1987-1994. Saunders did not previously experience knee problems but, during her service, sought treatment for knee pain and was diagnosed with patellofemoral pain syndrome (PFPS). Saunders’s exit examination reflected normal lower extremities but noted Saunders’s history of knee swelling. The VA denied Saunders’s 1994 claim for disability compensation because she failed to report for a medical examination. In 2008, Saunders filed a new claim, which was denied. In 2011, a VA examiner noted that Saunders reported bilateral knee pain while running, squatting, bending, and climbing but had no anatomic abnormality, weakness, or reduced range of motion. Saunders had functional limitations on walking, was unable to stand for more than a few minutes, and sometimes required a cane or brace. The examiner concluded that Saunders’s knee condition was at least as likely as not caused by, or a result of, Saunders’s military service but stated there was no pathology to render a diagnosis. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals and Veterans Court rejected her claim under 38 U.S.C. 1110. The Federal Circuit reversed; “disability” in section 1110 refers to the functional impairment of earning capacity, not the underlying cause, which need not be diagnosed. Pain alone can serve as a functional impairment and qualify as a disability, no matter the underlying cause. View "Saunders v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

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The Guard Recruiting Assistance Program (G-RAP), designed to increase recruiting to the Air National Guard during the “War on Terror” was run by Docupak, a private corporation. Docupak selected and trained Recruiting Assistants (RAs) to find and direct potential airmen to full-time recruiters. The program paid a $1,000 pre-loaded gift card upon actual enlistment of a potential airman and another $1,000 upon the airman’s completion of training. The RAs were to identify individuals that were not already working with a full-time recruiter and were prohibited from splitting the payment with full-time recruiters. Osborne, a full-time recruiter, was accused of referring names of pre-existing recruits to RA Andolsek so that they could claim the incentive, with kickbacks to Osborne. Osborne was charged with aiding Andolsek in embezzling from the Department of Defense, 18 U.S.C. 641; 18 U.S.C. 2, which “caused” the Department to reimburse Docupak for $9,000. Andolsek pleaded guilty and testified against Osborne. Osborne argued that the funds were stolen from a private contractor, so they only violated Docupak’s internal policy, not a federal regulation. The Sixth Circuit reversed Osborne’s conviction. No reasonable jury could have found that the funds were something of value to the government beyond a reasonable doubt, given the evidence of control. The government did not retain a reversionary interest in the funds and imposed few restrictions. Docupak gave the government access to information, but the government did not retain the right to conduct audits. View "United States v. Osborne" on Justia Law

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From 1968-1991, Lledo was employed at the Subic Bay, Philippines U.S. Navy Public Works Center, initially as an Apprentice (electrician) “excepted service – indefinite appointment.” Lledo resigned with the designated severance pay in 1991, having worked in various positions, finally as a Telephone Installation and Repair Foreman. In 2014, Lledo applied for deferred retirement benefits under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and requested to make a post-employment deposit into the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF). The Office of Personnel Management denied the requests. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed, stating that all of Lledo’s appointments, including his final position, were either not-to-exceed appointments or indefinite appointments in the excepted service; “[w]hile [Lledo] has shown that he had sufficient creditable federal service, he has failed to show that any of that service was performed in a position covered under the [Act].” The Federal Circuit affirmed. Under 5 U.S.C. 8333(a)–(b), to qualify for a CSRS retirement annuity, an employee must have performed at least five years of creditable civilian service, and must have served at least one of his last two years of federal service in a covered position, subject to the Act. Temporary, intermittent, term, and excepted indefinite appointments are not covered positions; substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Lledo’s service was excluded from CSRDF coverage. View "Lledo v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

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Holton supervised a Portsmouth Naval Shipyard crane team that was moving submarine covers. Each unit weighed roughly 60,000 pounds. Holton briefed the crew and gave control over the crane to the authorized rigger, then left the crane to supervise preparation of the landing area. From this position, Holton could not see the crane’s boom. Holton’s crew had previously performed the operation, which involved a tight curve, without incident. The crane traveled too far on the inside of the curve; its boom struck Building 343, causing $30,000 in damage. Shipyard Instructions allow drug testing of employees after an accident causing damage in excess of $10,000, when “their actions are reasonably suspected of having caused or contributed to an accident.” The executive director authorized drug testing of the entire team. Holton took the test, certifying that the drug-testing contractor took the proper steps. Holton’s sample tested positive for marijuana twice. The Executive Director removed him. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed, finding that the Navy’s failure to provide Holton with advance written notice of why he was being tested, as required by regulation, was harmless because it did not change the outcome. The Federal Circuit affirmed. There was reasonable suspicion that Holton, who briefed the crew, caused or contributed to the accident; the drug test was properly administered and did not violate Holton’s constitutional rights or the regulation's standard. View "Holton v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

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In a contract dispute between BAE and Korea, BAE sought a declaratory judgment that it had not breached any contractual obligation to Korea and a permanent injunction barring Korea from prosecuting its suit against BAE in Korean courts. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of BAE's requested declaration, but refused to issue a permanent injunction. The court held that the BAE-Korea agreement's permissive forum selection clause provided no basis for dismissing this action; Korea was not immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) structure shields a U.S. contractor, such as BAE, from liability; enforcement of the BAE-Korea agreement would undermine the control the United States retained in all FMS transactions over price; because the U.S. government retained control over price in an FMS transaction, a foreign state generally has no cause of action — against anyone — if the price demanded by the U.S. government increases over time; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying BAE's petition for a permanent anti-suit injunction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "BAE Systems Technology v. Republic of Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Admin." on Justia Law

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Robert and Janice married in 1964; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received nothing. The trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed, contending: (1) under federal law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any award to Janice based on Robert’s receipt of either veteran’s disability benefits or CRSC; (2) the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest; (3) the trial court erred by making its award of spousal support nonmodifiable; (4) because the judgment dividing the community property was long-since final, the trial court could not give Janice any remedy for the loss of her community property interest in the retired pay; (5) all of Robert's income was exempt, therefore could not be required to satisfy Janice's claim; and (6) Janice was not entitled to spousal support, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. The Court of Appeal agreed federal law prohibited the trial court from compensating Janice, in the form of spousal support or otherwise, for the loss of her share of Robert’s retired pay. However, it could properly modify spousal support, provided it did so based on the relevant factors and not as compensation. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to hold a new trial on Janice’s request for a modification of spousal support. View "In re Marriage of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

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Robert and Janice married in 1964; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received nothing. The trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed, contending: (1) under federal law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any award to Janice based on Robert’s receipt of either veteran’s disability benefits or CRSC; (2) the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest; (3) the trial court erred by making its award of spousal support nonmodifiable; (4) because the judgment dividing the community property was long-since final, the trial court could not give Janice any remedy for the loss of her community property interest in the retired pay; (5) all of Robert's income was exempt, therefore could not be required to satisfy Janice's claim; and (6) Janice was not entitled to spousal support, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. The Court of Appeal agreed federal law prohibited the trial court from compensating Janice, in the form of spousal support or otherwise, for the loss of her share of Robert’s retired pay. However, it could properly modify spousal support, provided it did so based on the relevant factors and not as compensation. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to hold a new trial on Janice’s request for a modification of spousal support. View "In re Marriage of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

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In November 2014, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied Bly’s request for service connection for bilateral hearing loss. Bly appealed to the Veterans Court. After his opening brief was filed, Bly and the government filed a joint motion for partial remand. The Veterans Court granted the motion, citing to Rule 41(b) of the Veterans Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, and noting that “this order is the mandate of the Court.” Bly applied for attorneys’ fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, 31 days later. Remand orders from the Veterans Court may entitle veterans to EAJA fees and expenses. Under 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B), such EAJA applications must be made “within thirty days of final judgment in the action.” The Veterans Court reasoned that its judgment became final immediately because the order remanded the case on consent and stated that it was the mandate of the court. The Federal Circuit vacated the denial of his application, reasoning that the consent judgment at issue became “not appealable” 60 days after the entry of the remand order under 38 U.S.C. 7292(a). View "Bly v. Shulkin" on Justia Law

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In November 2014, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied Bly’s request for service connection for bilateral hearing loss. Bly appealed to the Veterans Court. After his opening brief was filed, Bly and the government filed a joint motion for partial remand. The Veterans Court granted the motion, citing to Rule 41(b) of the Veterans Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, and noting that “this order is the mandate of the Court.” Bly applied for attorneys’ fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412, 31 days later. Remand orders from the Veterans Court may entitle veterans to EAJA fees and expenses. Under 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(B), such EAJA applications must be made “within thirty days of final judgment in the action.” The Veterans Court reasoned that its judgment became final immediately because the order remanded the case on consent and stated that it was the mandate of the court. The Federal Circuit vacated the denial of his application, reasoning that the consent judgment at issue became “not appealable” 60 days after the entry of the remand order under 38 U.S.C. 7292(a). View "Bly v. Shulkin" on Justia Law

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Petitioner alleged that the Army terminated him and excluded him from his work site because he had made complaints that were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the petition for review of the Board's adverse decision, holding that the Army was the only proper respondent; petitioner received due process; and the Board's decision on the merits was supported by substantial evidence and was procedurally proper. Accordingly, the court denied in part and granted in part as to the petition for review of the Army's adverse decision, remanding for further proceedings. View "Johnen v. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law