Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

After serving twenty years in the United States Air Force, the claimant sought educational assistance benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to pay for a flight training course at MidCoast Aviation Services, LLC. He needed this pilot certification to qualify for a job as a sensor operator with General Atomics. Although he supported his application with a certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) confirming MidCoast’s status as an approved pilot school, his application was denied.The VA initially denied the benefits, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the denial. The Board found that while the claimant had basic entitlement to educational assistance, the law did not permit benefits for the MidCoast course because the school was not an educational institution of higher learning (IHL), and the course was not part of a college degree program. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims also affirmed the Board’s decision. The majority held that the claimant was ineligible for benefits because MidCoast was not affiliated with an IHL, relying on 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b). A dissenting judge argued that FAA-approved flight training courses should be eligible regardless of IHL affiliation, based on 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed how to reconcile the two statutes. It held that while FAA-approved courses at certified pilot schools are “deemed approved,” veterans are only eligible for benefits if the flight training course is provided by an IHL and counts toward a college degree, per 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b). Since the claimant’s course did not meet this requirement, the court affirmed his ineligibility for benefits. The court further concluded that any challenge to related VA regulations was moot, as statutory ineligibility foreclosed relief. View "LOOMIS v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

A soldier deployed in Afghanistan in 2009 left his post without permission to report leadership deficiencies, was captured by a Taliban-allied group, and held hostage for five years. His disappearance prompted a search mission that injured several American servicemembers. In 2014, he was released in exchange for five detainees at Guantanamo Bay, an event that sparked political debate. Upon return, he faced court-martial charges for desertion and misbehavior before the enemy. He pled guilty, and the presiding military judge imposed a dishonorable discharge, rather than the lengthy prison sentence sought by the prosecution.After the court-martial, the soldier challenged his conviction, alleging unlawful command influence, citing public comments by Senator John McCain and President Donald Trump, and raised concerns about the presiding judge’s undisclosed application for a Department of Justice position. The U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces also upheld the decision. Subsequent requests for reconsideration and review were denied, as was a petition for a writ of error coram nobis.He then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking collateral review and expungement of his conviction and sentence. The District Court granted partial relief, vacating military court orders issued after the judge’s DOJ application and allowing for possible further proceedings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Article III district courts lack jurisdiction on collateral review to vacate court-martial judgments, as such authority resides with direct appellate tribunals. The Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bergdahl v. USA" on Justia Law

The claimant served in the Air Force from 1985 to 1989. During his service, he experienced eye pain, which was diagnosed as conjunctivitis and ultraviolet keratitis, and headaches, which were ultimately attributed to acute gastroenteritis. Decades after his service, he applied to the Department of Veterans Affairs for disability compensation for tinnitus, an eye disability, and migraines. He relied on his own statements about the onset of these conditions, while private medical records suggested that the conditions did not arise until well after his military service.The VA Regional Office denied service connection for all three claimed conditions. The claimant appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which also denied his claims. The Board found the private medical records more credible than the claimant’s later statements made during the benefits process, reasoning that individuals have a strong incentive to be accurate when seeking medical care. The claimant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s determination. That court explained that the Board properly relied on the principle that statements made to medical providers are generally more trustworthy than those made when seeking benefits.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the Veterans Court erred in allowing the Board to give greater probative weight to statements made for medical treatment, and whether this approach conflicted with the statutory benefit-of-the-doubt rule. The Federal Circuit held that it is not legal error for the Board to use the principle that people have a strong incentive to be truthful when seeking medical care as a guide in weighing evidence, and that this practice does not conflict with the benefit-of-the-doubt rule. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. View "HERNANDEZ v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Christopher Johnson served in the United States Marine Corps from February 1991 to August 1992. In October 1991, he was injured as a passenger in an off-base car accident. A Naval Hospital Commander found the injury occurred in the line of duty, but a subsequent Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) determined the injury resulted from intentional misconduct, rendering him ineligible for disability retirement or severance pay. Johnson was medically discharged in August 1992 without benefits. He did not challenge the PEB determination at that time. In 2016, Johnson learned of the Commander’s earlier favorable determination through a FOIA request and applied to the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR), which in 2017 reversed the original line-of-duty finding and remanded his case to an ad hoc PEB. The ad hoc PEB found him fit for duty in 2018, and the BCNR affirmed this in 2020.Johnson filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims in February 2024, seeking backpay and benefits under the Tucker Act and 10 U.S.C. § 1201. He argued his claim was timely due to exceptions to the statute of limitations: the “reopening rule” and the “half-a-legal-loaf doctrine.” The Court of Federal Claims dismissed his complaint, concluding his claims accrued at the time of discharge and were therefore untimely.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that neither the reopening rule nor the half-a-legal-loaf doctrine applied, as Johnson’s claim accrued in 1992 when the PEB denied benefits and he was discharged. Subsequent administrative actions did not reset the statute of limitations. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims, holding Johnson’s suit was barred as untimely under the Tucker Act. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "JOHNSON v. US " on Justia Law

The case concerns a veteran who served in the Army in Vietnam and Kuwait. He applied for disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in December 2011, specifically seeking compensation for hypertension, which he claimed was directly related to his military service. Supporting his claim, he provided personal statements and a letter from a flight surgeon detailing hypertension during deployment. The VA Regional Office denied his claim, and after a lengthy appeals process, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted him benefits for hypertension under the PACT Act, a law enacted in 2022 that provides presumptive service connection for certain conditions, including hypertension for Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange. However, the Board did not address his original claim for direct service connection.After the Board’s decision, Mr. Hepler appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”), contending that the Board failed to adjudicate his direct service-connection claim for hypertension, which could have resulted in an earlier effective date for benefits. The Veterans Court dismissed his appeal as moot, reasoning that his entitlement to benefits under the PACT Act resolved the issue and any dispute over the effective date was a downstream matter requiring a separate appeal. Mr. Hepler’s motion for reconsideration was denied.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the Veterans Court’s decision was incorrect. The Federal Circuit held that the Board was required to adjudicate the veteran’s direct service-connection claim, even after granting benefits under the PACT Act, because the claims are distinct and the direct claim could entitle the veteran to additional, earlier benefits. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the Veterans Court to require the Board to grant, deny, or remand the direct service-connection claim. View "HEPLER v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

A Navy veteran served from 2004 to 2011 as a nuclear machinist mate and exhibited persistent sleep issues during his assignment aboard the USS Eisenhower. Although he was described by colleagues as frequently falling asleep while on duty, his official performance evaluations did not reflect any related deficiencies. The Navy conducted a sleep study in 2010 that suggested possible sleep apnea but did not test for narcolepsy. The veteran received non-judicial punishment for falsifying a maintenance log and, following this, his specialized classification was recommended for removal due to perceived unreliability. He ultimately sought early separation and was honorably discharged for reduction in force. Later, the Department of Veterans Affairs diagnosed him with narcolepsy, assigning a 40 percent service-connected disability rating effective upon discharge.The veteran petitioned the Board for Correction of Naval Records to retroactively recognize his discharge as due to medical disability (narcolepsy), to restore his reenlistment bonus, and to change the record of his classification removal to reflect medical unfitness rather than misconduct. The Board forwarded his record for a post hoc Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) fitness determination, which found him fit for duty, a conclusion later maintained after correction of an initial record mix-up. The Board denied the veteran’s requests, and the United States Court of Federal Claims affirmed the Board’s decisions, also ruling that claims for bonus recoupment and record correction were time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Federal Claims Court erred by upholding the Board’s decision. The appellate court held that the Board failed to address the required factors under Navy regulations (SECNAVINST 1850.4E § 3304) for determining fitness, specifically omitting analysis of common military tasks, deployability, and special qualifications. The court vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "QOYE v. US " on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former U.S. Marine, served from 1999 until his voluntary discharge in 2013. During his service, he suffered traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD, both incurred during deployments to Afghanistan. After returning from his final deployment, he was promoted and served as an instructor, but was never evaluated by a medical review board to determine fitness for duty or eligibility for medical disability retirement. Following discharge, he received a 100 percent disability rating from the Department of Veterans Affairs. In 2018, he applied to the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) to change his discharge reason to medical disability retirement due to his TBI and PTSD.The BCNR denied his petition in 2019, finding him fit for duty at discharge, and denied again in 2023 after a voluntary remand. The plaintiff challenged these decisions before the United States Court of Federal Claims, which found his complaint timely but ultimately granted judgment for the government, holding that the BCNR’s fitness determination and denial of medical disability retirement were proper.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case without deference and found several errors. The court held that the BCNR applied the wrong legal standard for assessing fitness, failing to relate the plaintiff’s disabilities to the duties of his office, grade, rank, or rating as required by Navy policy. The BCNR also neglected to consider mandatory factors, such as common military tasks and deployability, in its fitness assessment. Additionally, the court determined that the BCNR failed to apply the required “liberal consideration” standard to the plaintiff’s evidence of unfitness, as mandated by statute and Department of Defense policy. The Federal Circuit vacated the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BEE v. US " on Justia Law

The appellant, a former Marine, sought to upgrade his 1986 discharge from “Other Than Honorable” to “Honorable.” He argued that his misconduct while in the service was the result of undiagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major depressive disorder, which he claimed were caused by racial harassment and traumatic experiences during his time in the Marine Corps. He supported his application with a psychologist’s assessment diagnosing him with PTSD and major depressive disorder linked to his service. The Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) also considered an advisory opinion from a Navy psychologist, who concluded that while some of the appellant’s misconduct might be attributable to PTSD or depression, not all incidents were clearly connected.After the BCNR denied his request for a discharge upgrade, the appellant brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He argued that the BCNR did not apply Department of Defense guidance requiring liberal consideration for discharge-upgrade applications involving PTSD and that the Board failed to adequately explain its reasoning. The district court, applying an “unusually deferential” standard of review to the BCNR’s decision, found that the Board’s denial was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The court granted summary judgment for the Secretary of the Navy and denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the administrative record de novo but accorded the BCNR “unusual deference” under governing law. The court held that the BCNR properly considered all relevant Department of Defense memoranda and the evidence linking the appellant’s mental health conditions to his misconduct. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the BCNR’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious and adequately explained. View "Taylor v. Cao" on Justia Law

The defendant served in the military and received disability-related unemployability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs, which required recipients to notify the VA if they became employable. After founding a nonprofit in 2019 and working full-time, the defendant did not report his employment to the VA and continued receiving benefits. He was indicted for theft of government funds under 18 U.S.C. § 641, with a jury later convicting him. The indictment included notice of possible criminal forfeiture.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, the government moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture before sentencing, but the court did not address it. At sentencing, the court imposed prison time, supervised release, and restitution, but did not orally address forfeiture. The court allowed the defendant to file supplemental briefing after sentencing. Following the hearing, the district court issued several written judgments and amended judgments, none of which initially included forfeiture. The government repeatedly moved to amend the judgment to include forfeiture. Eventually, the district court issued an order imposing forfeiture and amended the judgment to reflect this, several months after sentencing. The defendant appealed, arguing errors in the handling of forfeiture under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 and violations of his right to presence under Rule 43(a) and the Due Process Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, although the district court violated Rule 32.2(b)(4)(B) by failing to impose forfeiture at sentencing and to include it in the judgment, this rule is a time-related directive subject to harmless-error review. The error was harmless because the defendant had notice and opportunity to contest forfeiture. The court also found no violation of the defendant’s due process right to presence, and although Rule 43(a) was violated, it did not affect substantial rights. The oral sentence and written judgment were not in conflict. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Harrell" on Justia Law

Michael C. Baxley served in the Army beginning in 1974. After various instances of misconduct, he was identified as a drug abuser and entered the Army’s rehabilitation program. In 1975, he was designated a rehabilitation program failure, and subsequent further misconduct led to a recommendation for discharge. During his discharge proceedings, evidence of his rehabilitation failure was introduced, and he was discharged “under other than honorable conditions.” Years later, his discharge status was upgraded to “under honorable conditions (general),” but without “honorable” status, he was unable to access certain veterans benefits. In 2018, following a VA determination of a service-connected mental health condition, Baxley requested the Army Board for Correction of Military Records to upgrade his discharge to “honorable,” arguing that exempt evidence was improperly used against him and that relevant Army guidance regarding mental health conditions was not followed.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Board’s denial of Baxley’s request and granted summary judgment to the Board. The court found no violation of the Army’s Exemption Policy and concluded that the Board adequately considered the Army guidance for discharge upgrades related to mental health conditions (the Kurta Memorandum).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the administrative action de novo. The Court held that the Board’s decision regarding the Exemption Policy was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to meaningfully assess whether evidence of Baxley’s rehabilitation failure was developed as a direct or indirect result of protected communications during his rehabilitation program, as the policy requires. Therefore, the Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the Kurta Memorandum, finding the Board’s consideration sufficient and not arbitrary or capricious. View "Baxley v. Driscoll" on Justia Law