Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

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A Navy Reserve Lieutenant, while serving as a sailing instructor in 1992, rescued a drowning student on Lake Mendota in Madison, Wisconsin. His reserve unit nominated him for the Coast Guard Gold Lifesaving Medal, submitting statements from the rescued student and a motorboat operator. Ultimately, he received a Coast Guard Public Service Commendation instead. Decades later, after learning about the possibility of post hoc military decorations, he sought the Navy and Marine Corps Medal with the assistance of a U.S. Senator. Unable to locate the original eyewitnesses, he submitted a citation referencing their earlier statements and an affidavit from his former commanding officer attesting that such statements had existed.The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations denied the nomination, citing the absence of required eyewitness statements as set forth in Navy policy. The nominee appealed to the Navy’s Board for Correction of Naval Records, which also denied his application, concluding he did not meet the baseline eligibility criteria and that his evidence did not substitute for the eyewitness statements. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia subsequently granted summary judgment to the Secretary of the Navy, ruling that the Board’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that, under the highly deferential standard of review for military records corrections, the Board’s requirement for two eyewitness statements was reasonable and its refusal to accept other evidence as a substitute was not arbitrary and capricious. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy. View "Voegeli v. Cao" on Justia Law

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A Navy veteran developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after serving from 1996 to 2008, leading to his discharge. Initially, a Navy Physical Evaluation Board assigned him a ten percent disability rating, which only qualified him for a one-time severance payment, not retirement benefits. After discharge, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) evaluated him and assigned a thirty percent disability rating for PTSD. In 2016, the veteran appealed his Navy rating to the Physical Disability Board of Review (PDBR), which confirmed the ten percent rating. Following a voluntary remand, the PDBR later recommended a retroactive six-month temporary disability rating of fifty percent under VA regulations, followed by a permanent ten percent rating.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the veteran’s challenge to the PDBR’s decision. He argued that the Navy could not retroactively reduce his temporary rating to ten percent without a new physical examination, as required by certain statutes and regulations, and claimed the ten percent rating was arbitrary and capricious. The district court rejected both arguments, holding that the Navy lawfully applied the relevant statute and that the rating was supported by substantial evidence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the PDBR was authorized to retroactively adjust disability ratings based solely on service records and evidence presented, without requiring a new physical examination, when acting under 10 U.S.C. § 1554a. The court also found that the permanent ten percent disability rating was adequately explained and supported by substantial evidence, and that differences between Navy and VA ratings were not, by themselves, arbitrary or capricious. The judgment in favor of the government was affirmed. View "Nealy v. Phelan" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, a Marine Corps Reserve officer, served on active duty and was placed on medical hold due to a service-related condition. His active-duty orders were extended several times, but ultimately expired in March 2017 because he declined to waive the "sanctuary" protection under 10 U.S.C. § 12686, which restricts the involuntary release of reservists from active duty within two years of qualifying for active-duty retirement. He challenged his release, asserting it was unlawful and deprived him of active-duty retirement benefits.The United States Court of Federal Claims initially held that the Marine Corps unlawfully required the waiver as a condition for further extension of active duty, remanding the case to the Board for Correction of Naval Records to determine the appropriate remedy. The Board corrected his records to show he remained on active duty until mid-April 2017, entering the sanctuary period. However, the Board found that the Secretary of the Navy would have immediately used his authority under § 12686 to approve the plaintiff’s release, preventing him from reaching twenty years of active-duty service required for retirement. The Claims Court upheld the Board’s decision, except for a minor correction to the release date, and issued a final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Claims Court’s decision de novo but applied the same standard: whether the Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. The court held that the Secretary of the Navy, under both statute and regulation, had broad authority to approve release from active duty during the sanctuary period, not limited to cases of physical disability or separation for cause. The court also found the constructive service doctrine did not require the plaintiff to remain on active duty through the sanctuary period. The Claims Court’s decision was affirmed. View "FAERBER v. US " on Justia Law

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Wilbert Evans served in the U.S. Marine Corps and was stationed in Japan, where he claimed to have flown to Vietnam to deliver mail as a postal clerk. In 2004, he applied for service-connected disability benefits for multiple myeloma and Type II diabetes mellitus, alleging herbicide exposure in Vietnam. The Department of Veterans Affairs regional office denied these claims for lack of service connection. After subsequent attempts to reopen these claims and additional claims for head trauma and hearing loss, all were denied again, most recently in September 2022. Mary L. Evans, his surviving spouse, appealed the September 2022 denial to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which granted service connection for multiple myeloma based on Camp Lejeune exposure but denied the other claims.Ms. Evans appealed the Board’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. Her briefing focused on the denial of service connection for Type II diabetes mellitus, arguing the Board erred in finding no evidence of service in Vietnam. The Veterans Court reversed the Board’s denial of service connection for diabetes but left undisturbed the grant for multiple myeloma and dismissed the other claims due to lack of argument. Ms. Evans later sought reconsideration, arguing for an earlier effective date for the myeloma claim based on the same Vietnam service, but the Veterans Court found this argument waived as it was not raised in her original briefing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Veterans Court’s denial of reconsideration. The Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review waiver determinations or challenges to the application of law to facts in this case, as the Veterans Court’s decision was based on finding the myeloma argument waived. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "EVANS v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

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The claimant in this case is the surviving spouse of a veteran who served in Vietnam and was granted service connection for coronary artery disease in January 2021, with an effective date of January 5, 2021. The veteran sought an earlier effective date, which was denied by a Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in July 2021. Shortly thereafter, the veteran’s representative requested a complete copy of his VA claims file under the Privacy Act, and asked for a 90-day extension from the date of receipt to submit additional argument to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The veteran filed a Notice of Disagreement and opted for the “Direct Review” lane under the Appeals Modernization Act, which does not permit submission of additional evidence but allows argument. The Board denied both the request for an earlier effective date and the extension, issuing its decision 47 days after the claims file was produced.The veteran appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board’s refusal to grant the 90-day extension violated the court’s “fair process” doctrine. The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that while the veteran had a right to submit argument, the requested delay was inconsistent with the procedural standards and the expeditious nature of the Direct Review lane. The surviving spouse was substituted as appellant following the veteran’s death.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the fair process doctrine exists, survives the Appeals Modernization Act, and applies to the Direct Review lane. The court held that a claimant in the Direct Review lane does not have a reasonable expectation that the Board must grant a request for a 90-day period after receipt of a claims file to submit argument. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s judgment. View "BRACK v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

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After serving twenty years in the United States Air Force, the claimant sought educational assistance benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to pay for a flight training course at MidCoast Aviation Services, LLC. He needed this pilot certification to qualify for a job as a sensor operator with General Atomics. Although he supported his application with a certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) confirming MidCoast’s status as an approved pilot school, his application was denied.The VA initially denied the benefits, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the denial. The Board found that while the claimant had basic entitlement to educational assistance, the law did not permit benefits for the MidCoast course because the school was not an educational institution of higher learning (IHL), and the course was not part of a college degree program. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims also affirmed the Board’s decision. The majority held that the claimant was ineligible for benefits because MidCoast was not affiliated with an IHL, relying on 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b). A dissenting judge argued that FAA-approved flight training courses should be eligible regardless of IHL affiliation, based on 38 U.S.C. § 3672(b)(2)(A)(ii).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed how to reconcile the two statutes. It held that while FAA-approved courses at certified pilot schools are “deemed approved,” veterans are only eligible for benefits if the flight training course is provided by an IHL and counts toward a college degree, per 38 U.S.C. § 3680A(b). Since the claimant’s course did not meet this requirement, the court affirmed his ineligibility for benefits. The court further concluded that any challenge to related VA regulations was moot, as statutory ineligibility foreclosed relief. View "LOOMIS v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

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A soldier deployed in Afghanistan in 2009 left his post without permission to report leadership deficiencies, was captured by a Taliban-allied group, and held hostage for five years. His disappearance prompted a search mission that injured several American servicemembers. In 2014, he was released in exchange for five detainees at Guantanamo Bay, an event that sparked political debate. Upon return, he faced court-martial charges for desertion and misbehavior before the enemy. He pled guilty, and the presiding military judge imposed a dishonorable discharge, rather than the lengthy prison sentence sought by the prosecution.After the court-martial, the soldier challenged his conviction, alleging unlawful command influence, citing public comments by Senator John McCain and President Donald Trump, and raised concerns about the presiding judge’s undisclosed application for a Department of Justice position. The U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces also upheld the decision. Subsequent requests for reconsideration and review were denied, as was a petition for a writ of error coram nobis.He then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking collateral review and expungement of his conviction and sentence. The District Court granted partial relief, vacating military court orders issued after the judge’s DOJ application and allowing for possible further proceedings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Article III district courts lack jurisdiction on collateral review to vacate court-martial judgments, as such authority resides with direct appellate tribunals. The Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bergdahl v. USA" on Justia Law

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The claimant served in the Air Force from 1985 to 1989. During his service, he experienced eye pain, which was diagnosed as conjunctivitis and ultraviolet keratitis, and headaches, which were ultimately attributed to acute gastroenteritis. Decades after his service, he applied to the Department of Veterans Affairs for disability compensation for tinnitus, an eye disability, and migraines. He relied on his own statements about the onset of these conditions, while private medical records suggested that the conditions did not arise until well after his military service.The VA Regional Office denied service connection for all three claimed conditions. The claimant appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which also denied his claims. The Board found the private medical records more credible than the claimant’s later statements made during the benefits process, reasoning that individuals have a strong incentive to be accurate when seeking medical care. The claimant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s determination. That court explained that the Board properly relied on the principle that statements made to medical providers are generally more trustworthy than those made when seeking benefits.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the Veterans Court erred in allowing the Board to give greater probative weight to statements made for medical treatment, and whether this approach conflicted with the statutory benefit-of-the-doubt rule. The Federal Circuit held that it is not legal error for the Board to use the principle that people have a strong incentive to be truthful when seeking medical care as a guide in weighing evidence, and that this practice does not conflict with the benefit-of-the-doubt rule. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. View "HERNANDEZ v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

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Christopher Johnson served in the United States Marine Corps from February 1991 to August 1992. In October 1991, he was injured as a passenger in an off-base car accident. A Naval Hospital Commander found the injury occurred in the line of duty, but a subsequent Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) determined the injury resulted from intentional misconduct, rendering him ineligible for disability retirement or severance pay. Johnson was medically discharged in August 1992 without benefits. He did not challenge the PEB determination at that time. In 2016, Johnson learned of the Commander’s earlier favorable determination through a FOIA request and applied to the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR), which in 2017 reversed the original line-of-duty finding and remanded his case to an ad hoc PEB. The ad hoc PEB found him fit for duty in 2018, and the BCNR affirmed this in 2020.Johnson filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims in February 2024, seeking backpay and benefits under the Tucker Act and 10 U.S.C. § 1201. He argued his claim was timely due to exceptions to the statute of limitations: the “reopening rule” and the “half-a-legal-loaf doctrine.” The Court of Federal Claims dismissed his complaint, concluding his claims accrued at the time of discharge and were therefore untimely.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that neither the reopening rule nor the half-a-legal-loaf doctrine applied, as Johnson’s claim accrued in 1992 when the PEB denied benefits and he was discharged. Subsequent administrative actions did not reset the statute of limitations. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims, holding Johnson’s suit was barred as untimely under the Tucker Act. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "JOHNSON v. US " on Justia Law

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The case concerns a veteran who served in the Army in Vietnam and Kuwait. He applied for disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in December 2011, specifically seeking compensation for hypertension, which he claimed was directly related to his military service. Supporting his claim, he provided personal statements and a letter from a flight surgeon detailing hypertension during deployment. The VA Regional Office denied his claim, and after a lengthy appeals process, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted him benefits for hypertension under the PACT Act, a law enacted in 2022 that provides presumptive service connection for certain conditions, including hypertension for Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange. However, the Board did not address his original claim for direct service connection.After the Board’s decision, Mr. Hepler appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”), contending that the Board failed to adjudicate his direct service-connection claim for hypertension, which could have resulted in an earlier effective date for benefits. The Veterans Court dismissed his appeal as moot, reasoning that his entitlement to benefits under the PACT Act resolved the issue and any dispute over the effective date was a downstream matter requiring a separate appeal. Mr. Hepler’s motion for reconsideration was denied.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the Veterans Court’s decision was incorrect. The Federal Circuit held that the Board was required to adjudicate the veteran’s direct service-connection claim, even after granting benefits under the PACT Act, because the claims are distinct and the direct claim could entitle the veteran to additional, earlier benefits. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the Veterans Court to require the Board to grant, deny, or remand the direct service-connection claim. View "HEPLER v. COLLINS " on Justia Law