Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

The claimant served in the Air Force from 1985 to 1989. During his service, he experienced eye pain, which was diagnosed as conjunctivitis and ultraviolet keratitis, and headaches, which were ultimately attributed to acute gastroenteritis. Decades after his service, he applied to the Department of Veterans Affairs for disability compensation for tinnitus, an eye disability, and migraines. He relied on his own statements about the onset of these conditions, while private medical records suggested that the conditions did not arise until well after his military service.The VA Regional Office denied service connection for all three claimed conditions. The claimant appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which also denied his claims. The Board found the private medical records more credible than the claimant’s later statements made during the benefits process, reasoning that individuals have a strong incentive to be accurate when seeking medical care. The claimant then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s determination. That court explained that the Board properly relied on the principle that statements made to medical providers are generally more trustworthy than those made when seeking benefits.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the Veterans Court erred in allowing the Board to give greater probative weight to statements made for medical treatment, and whether this approach conflicted with the statutory benefit-of-the-doubt rule. The Federal Circuit held that it is not legal error for the Board to use the principle that people have a strong incentive to be truthful when seeking medical care as a guide in weighing evidence, and that this practice does not conflict with the benefit-of-the-doubt rule. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. View "HERNANDEZ v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Christopher Johnson served in the United States Marine Corps from February 1991 to August 1992. In October 1991, he was injured as a passenger in an off-base car accident. A Naval Hospital Commander found the injury occurred in the line of duty, but a subsequent Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) determined the injury resulted from intentional misconduct, rendering him ineligible for disability retirement or severance pay. Johnson was medically discharged in August 1992 without benefits. He did not challenge the PEB determination at that time. In 2016, Johnson learned of the Commander’s earlier favorable determination through a FOIA request and applied to the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR), which in 2017 reversed the original line-of-duty finding and remanded his case to an ad hoc PEB. The ad hoc PEB found him fit for duty in 2018, and the BCNR affirmed this in 2020.Johnson filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims in February 2024, seeking backpay and benefits under the Tucker Act and 10 U.S.C. § 1201. He argued his claim was timely due to exceptions to the statute of limitations: the “reopening rule” and the “half-a-legal-loaf doctrine.” The Court of Federal Claims dismissed his complaint, concluding his claims accrued at the time of discharge and were therefore untimely.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that neither the reopening rule nor the half-a-legal-loaf doctrine applied, as Johnson’s claim accrued in 1992 when the PEB denied benefits and he was discharged. Subsequent administrative actions did not reset the statute of limitations. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims, holding Johnson’s suit was barred as untimely under the Tucker Act. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "JOHNSON v. US " on Justia Law

The case concerns a veteran who served in the Army in Vietnam and Kuwait. He applied for disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in December 2011, specifically seeking compensation for hypertension, which he claimed was directly related to his military service. Supporting his claim, he provided personal statements and a letter from a flight surgeon detailing hypertension during deployment. The VA Regional Office denied his claim, and after a lengthy appeals process, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted him benefits for hypertension under the PACT Act, a law enacted in 2022 that provides presumptive service connection for certain conditions, including hypertension for Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange. However, the Board did not address his original claim for direct service connection.After the Board’s decision, Mr. Hepler appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”), contending that the Board failed to adjudicate his direct service-connection claim for hypertension, which could have resulted in an earlier effective date for benefits. The Veterans Court dismissed his appeal as moot, reasoning that his entitlement to benefits under the PACT Act resolved the issue and any dispute over the effective date was a downstream matter requiring a separate appeal. Mr. Hepler’s motion for reconsideration was denied.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the Veterans Court’s decision was incorrect. The Federal Circuit held that the Board was required to adjudicate the veteran’s direct service-connection claim, even after granting benefits under the PACT Act, because the claims are distinct and the direct claim could entitle the veteran to additional, earlier benefits. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the Veterans Court to require the Board to grant, deny, or remand the direct service-connection claim. View "HEPLER v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

A Navy veteran served from 2004 to 2011 as a nuclear machinist mate and exhibited persistent sleep issues during his assignment aboard the USS Eisenhower. Although he was described by colleagues as frequently falling asleep while on duty, his official performance evaluations did not reflect any related deficiencies. The Navy conducted a sleep study in 2010 that suggested possible sleep apnea but did not test for narcolepsy. The veteran received non-judicial punishment for falsifying a maintenance log and, following this, his specialized classification was recommended for removal due to perceived unreliability. He ultimately sought early separation and was honorably discharged for reduction in force. Later, the Department of Veterans Affairs diagnosed him with narcolepsy, assigning a 40 percent service-connected disability rating effective upon discharge.The veteran petitioned the Board for Correction of Naval Records to retroactively recognize his discharge as due to medical disability (narcolepsy), to restore his reenlistment bonus, and to change the record of his classification removal to reflect medical unfitness rather than misconduct. The Board forwarded his record for a post hoc Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) fitness determination, which found him fit for duty, a conclusion later maintained after correction of an initial record mix-up. The Board denied the veteran’s requests, and the United States Court of Federal Claims affirmed the Board’s decisions, also ruling that claims for bonus recoupment and record correction were time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Federal Claims Court erred by upholding the Board’s decision. The appellate court held that the Board failed to address the required factors under Navy regulations (SECNAVINST 1850.4E § 3304) for determining fitness, specifically omitting analysis of common military tasks, deployability, and special qualifications. The court vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "QOYE v. US " on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former U.S. Marine, served from 1999 until his voluntary discharge in 2013. During his service, he suffered traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD, both incurred during deployments to Afghanistan. After returning from his final deployment, he was promoted and served as an instructor, but was never evaluated by a medical review board to determine fitness for duty or eligibility for medical disability retirement. Following discharge, he received a 100 percent disability rating from the Department of Veterans Affairs. In 2018, he applied to the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) to change his discharge reason to medical disability retirement due to his TBI and PTSD.The BCNR denied his petition in 2019, finding him fit for duty at discharge, and denied again in 2023 after a voluntary remand. The plaintiff challenged these decisions before the United States Court of Federal Claims, which found his complaint timely but ultimately granted judgment for the government, holding that the BCNR’s fitness determination and denial of medical disability retirement were proper.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case without deference and found several errors. The court held that the BCNR applied the wrong legal standard for assessing fitness, failing to relate the plaintiff’s disabilities to the duties of his office, grade, rank, or rating as required by Navy policy. The BCNR also neglected to consider mandatory factors, such as common military tasks and deployability, in its fitness assessment. Additionally, the court determined that the BCNR failed to apply the required “liberal consideration” standard to the plaintiff’s evidence of unfitness, as mandated by statute and Department of Defense policy. The Federal Circuit vacated the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BEE v. US " on Justia Law

The appellant, a former Marine, sought to upgrade his 1986 discharge from “Other Than Honorable” to “Honorable.” He argued that his misconduct while in the service was the result of undiagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major depressive disorder, which he claimed were caused by racial harassment and traumatic experiences during his time in the Marine Corps. He supported his application with a psychologist’s assessment diagnosing him with PTSD and major depressive disorder linked to his service. The Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) also considered an advisory opinion from a Navy psychologist, who concluded that while some of the appellant’s misconduct might be attributable to PTSD or depression, not all incidents were clearly connected.After the BCNR denied his request for a discharge upgrade, the appellant brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He argued that the BCNR did not apply Department of Defense guidance requiring liberal consideration for discharge-upgrade applications involving PTSD and that the Board failed to adequately explain its reasoning. The district court, applying an “unusually deferential” standard of review to the BCNR’s decision, found that the Board’s denial was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The court granted summary judgment for the Secretary of the Navy and denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the administrative record de novo but accorded the BCNR “unusual deference” under governing law. The court held that the BCNR properly considered all relevant Department of Defense memoranda and the evidence linking the appellant’s mental health conditions to his misconduct. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the BCNR’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious and adequately explained. View "Taylor v. Cao" on Justia Law

The defendant served in the military and received disability-related unemployability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs, which required recipients to notify the VA if they became employable. After founding a nonprofit in 2019 and working full-time, the defendant did not report his employment to the VA and continued receiving benefits. He was indicted for theft of government funds under 18 U.S.C. § 641, with a jury later convicting him. The indictment included notice of possible criminal forfeiture.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, the government moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture before sentencing, but the court did not address it. At sentencing, the court imposed prison time, supervised release, and restitution, but did not orally address forfeiture. The court allowed the defendant to file supplemental briefing after sentencing. Following the hearing, the district court issued several written judgments and amended judgments, none of which initially included forfeiture. The government repeatedly moved to amend the judgment to include forfeiture. Eventually, the district court issued an order imposing forfeiture and amended the judgment to reflect this, several months after sentencing. The defendant appealed, arguing errors in the handling of forfeiture under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 and violations of his right to presence under Rule 43(a) and the Due Process Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, although the district court violated Rule 32.2(b)(4)(B) by failing to impose forfeiture at sentencing and to include it in the judgment, this rule is a time-related directive subject to harmless-error review. The error was harmless because the defendant had notice and opportunity to contest forfeiture. The court also found no violation of the defendant’s due process right to presence, and although Rule 43(a) was violated, it did not affect substantial rights. The oral sentence and written judgment were not in conflict. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Harrell" on Justia Law

Michael C. Baxley served in the Army beginning in 1974. After various instances of misconduct, he was identified as a drug abuser and entered the Army’s rehabilitation program. In 1975, he was designated a rehabilitation program failure, and subsequent further misconduct led to a recommendation for discharge. During his discharge proceedings, evidence of his rehabilitation failure was introduced, and he was discharged “under other than honorable conditions.” Years later, his discharge status was upgraded to “under honorable conditions (general),” but without “honorable” status, he was unable to access certain veterans benefits. In 2018, following a VA determination of a service-connected mental health condition, Baxley requested the Army Board for Correction of Military Records to upgrade his discharge to “honorable,” arguing that exempt evidence was improperly used against him and that relevant Army guidance regarding mental health conditions was not followed.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Board’s denial of Baxley’s request and granted summary judgment to the Board. The court found no violation of the Army’s Exemption Policy and concluded that the Board adequately considered the Army guidance for discharge upgrades related to mental health conditions (the Kurta Memorandum).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the administrative action de novo. The Court held that the Board’s decision regarding the Exemption Policy was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to meaningfully assess whether evidence of Baxley’s rehabilitation failure was developed as a direct or indirect result of protected communications during his rehabilitation program, as the policy requires. Therefore, the Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the Kurta Memorandum, finding the Board’s consideration sufficient and not arbitrary or capricious. View "Baxley v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

The case concerns an attorney who represented a veteran in seeking disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The veteran originally filed a claim in 2007 for a bilateral hip disability and received a rating in 2008, which was later increased. In 2018, the Board issued a final denial for a higher rating for the left hip, which was not appealed and thus became final. In 2021, after the veteran underwent left hip replacement surgery, the attorney assisted with a new claim, resulting in a significantly increased rating and an award of past-due benefits. The attorney sought fees from this award, arguing that her work fell within the statutory scheme permitting attorney’s fees for representation after notice of the agency’s initial decision.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the attorney’s request for fees, reasoning that the December 2021 rating decision was the initial decision for the increased rating claim, and since the attorney had not performed compensable work after that decision, she was not entitled to fees under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed, concluding that the September 2021 claim for increased compensation was a new claim, not part of the same “case” as the original 2007 claim, and thus the attorney’s work prior to the December 2021 decision was not compensable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the matter de novo and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The court held that, for purposes of attorney’s fees under § 5904(c)(1), a new claim for increased disability based on new evidence and circumstances is not part of the same “case” as the original claim. The attorney was not entitled to fees for work performed prior to the December 2021 rating decision. The judgment was affirmed. View "JACKSON v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The defendant engaged in a series of shootings at military-related sites in Northern Virginia in late 2010, and was apprehended in June 2011 at Arlington National Cemetery, carrying materials linked to his offenses. He later pleaded guilty to three charges: injuring government property, using a firearm during a crime of violence, and attempting to injure a veteran’s memorial. As part of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, he accepted a twenty-five year sentence and waived his right to appeal within statutory limits. After being found competent despite a schizophrenia diagnosis, he was sentenced accordingly and did not initially appeal.Years later, the defendant sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit previously vacated his firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and remanded for resentencing on the remaining counts. On remand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held a new competency hearing and discussed whether to postpone sentencing to monitor medical compliance. Ultimately, the court declined a lengthy postponement due to statutory and constitutional concerns, resentenced the defendant to consecutive maximum terms totaling 240 months, and ordered a pre-release hearing to plan for his transition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed four challenges to the resentencing. Two claims were deemed forfeited for not being raised at sentencing, and the remaining two failed under the abuse-of-discretion standard. The court held that the defendant did not demonstrate a plain error under Tapia v. United States regarding the imposition of a sentence to promote rehabilitation or medical compliance. The court further found the sentence to be both procedurally and substantively reasonable, and rejected arguments regarding the district court’s authority to order a pre-release hearing. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Melaku" on Justia Law