Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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Plaintiff was on active duty with the United States Army. He bought a car from Select Cars of Thornburg in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and financed his purchase with a loan from United Auto Credit Corporation. The loan financed not only the car’s cost but also the cost of Guaranteed Asset Protection. Guaranteed Asset Protection is like extra insurance, covering any amount still due on the car loan after auto insurance is paid out if the car is totaled or stolen. Plaintiff’s claims arise from this single loan. This loan, Plaintiff alleged, violated the Military Lending Act because the loan agreement mandated arbitration and failed to disclose certain information. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the loan was not covered by the Act at all.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a statutory provision must be given the ordinary meaning it had when it was enacted. Relevant dictionaries, carefully considered, sometimes shed light on that ordinary meaning. Yet here, dueling dictionaries provide more than one linguistically permissible meaning.  But by examining the relevant phrase in its statutory context. This context shows that while “the express purpose” can be used in different senses, it is best read in Section 987(i)(6) to mean the specific purpose. This loan was offered for the specific purpose of financing Plaintiff’s car purchase. And that satisfies Section 987(i)(6)’s relevant condition and the Act is inapplicable. View "Jerry Davidson v. United Auto Credit Corporation" on Justia Law

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The Small Business Act requires that many federal agencies set aside contracts to be awarded to certain categories of small businesses, including service-disabled-veteran-owned (SDVO) small businesses, 15 U.S.C. 644(g)(1)(B). For a limited liability company (LLC) to qualify as SDVO, one or more SDVs must directly and unconditionally own at least 51% of each class of member interest. For an LLC to be controlled by SDVs, one or more SDVs must control the company’s long-term decision making, conduct its day-to-day management and administration of business operations, hold the highest officer position, serve as managing members, have “control over all decisions” of the LLC and “meet all supermajority voting requirements,”XOtech LLC, previously organized with Marullo (an SDV) as its only manager, became a multiple-manager company with four “Members” as owners. The Army issued a Request for Proposals seeking an SDVO contractor to provide logistics support for Army Reserve facilities. XOtech was awarded the contract. The Director of the SBA’s Office of Government Contracting determined that XOtech did not qualify for SDVO status and sustained a protest, finding that, although Marullo owned XOtech, he lacked sufficient control over XOtech’s operations because he required the vote of at least one non-SDV to make management decisions. The Claims Court and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that service-disabled veterans do not control “all decisions” of XOtech as required by 13 C.F.R. 125.13(d). View "XOTech, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law