Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence in Riverside County, California, and sought pretrial military diversion under Penal Code section 1001.80. He had served five months of active duty in the United States Marine Corps and several years in the reserves. The trial court denied his request, finding him ineligible because he had not completed at least one year of active service or one day of combat, relying on a local Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and its interpretation of legislative intent.The defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate in the Appellate Division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The People conceded that Penal Code section 1001.80 does not require a minimum of one year of service. The Appellate Division agreed, holding that the statute contains no such time requirement and remanded for the trial court to reconsider eligibility. The Appellate Division also clarified that, even if eligible, a defendant is not automatically entitled to diversion; the trial court retains discretion to assess suitability for diversion, guided by the statute’s rehabilitative purpose.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, then transferred the case for review. The court held that Penal Code section 1001.80 does not impose a minimum service duration for eligibility for military diversion, and the MOU’s one-year requirement does not apply to diversion under this statute. The court further held that trial courts must first determine eligibility under the statute and then exercise discretion to assess suitability for diversion, considering factors consistent with the statute’s rehabilitative goals. The court issued a writ directing the superior court to vacate its denial and conduct further proceedings consistent with these principles. View "Angulo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A defendant was stopped by police in the early morning hours after being observed swerving and speeding. The officer detected signs of alcohol intoxication, and the defendant refused a chemical test, leading to a blood draw pursuant to a warrant. The defendant was charged with four misdemeanor offenses related to driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, with additional allegations of a high blood alcohol content and refusal to submit to testing. The defendant, a military veteran, moved for pretrial military diversion under California Penal Code section 1001.80, submitting evidence of his military service and documentation of alcohol use disorder and other mental health conditions allegedly resulting from his service.The Superior Court of Orange County denied the motion for military diversion, reasoning that there was no nexus between the defendant’s alcohol abuse and his military service, and that his alcohol use predated his service. The court appeared to require the defendant to show a relationship between his qualifying condition and the commission of the charged offenses. The defendant then sought a writ of mandate from the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that for misdemeanor charges, Penal Code section 1001.80 does not require a defendant to show a nexus between the qualifying condition (such as substance abuse) and the commission of the offense. The court further clarified that the burden of proof for eligibility is a “reasonable possibility” standard: the defendant must show a reasonable possibility that he is suffering from a qualifying condition as a result of military service. The court granted the writ, directed the trial court to vacate its denial, and ordered a new hearing applying the correct legal standards. View "Segura v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The defendant, a military veteran, was convicted in 2017 of multiple firearm-related offenses, including possession of assault weapons and ammunition as a felon, as well as possessing a forged driver’s license. The convictions stemmed from his involvement in acquiring and storing firearms and ammunition, despite being prohibited from doing so due to his criminal record. The defendant’s background included significant childhood trauma, military service, and subsequent mental health and substance abuse issues, which were not considered at his original sentencing. While incarcerated, he received mental health treatment and engaged in rehabilitation efforts.After his conviction and sentencing to 20 years in prison, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, which allows veterans to seek reduced sentences if their mental health conditions related to military service were not considered at sentencing. The Superior Court of Orange County found the defendant eligible for relief, acknowledging a connection between his mental health disorders and military service. However, the court denied resentencing, reasoning that there was no evidence linking his mental health issues to the commission of his offenses and refusing to consider his rehabilitative conduct in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an irrelevant factor—requiring a nexus between the defendant’s mental health condition and his offenses—and by failing to consider relevant factors, such as the defendant’s rehabilitation while incarcerated and changes in the law favoring mitigation. The appellate court reversed the order denying resentencing and remanded the matter for a new resentencing hearing under section 1170.91, subdivision (b). View "People v. Hayde" on Justia Law

Frank Moseley was charged with murder after killing his fiancé, who had told him she might be pregnant with another man's child. Moseley, a combat veteran diagnosed with PTSD, testified that his condition contributed to the crime. The jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) and a weapon enhancement. The trial court sentenced Moseley to 11 years in state prison, striking the additional punishment for the weapon use.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed the case. The probation department's report and the sentencing briefs from both the prosecution and defense did not cite the relevant service-related statutes (Penal Code §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91). At the sentencing hearing, Moseley's counsel mentioned these statutes but stated they were not "directly applicable." The trial court referred to Moseley's PTSD as a mitigating factor when imposing the sentence but did not consider it when denying probation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not expressly consider the mandatory statutory obligations under §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91 when sentencing Moseley. These statutes require the court to consider a defendant's service-related PTSD as a factor in mitigation when deciding on probation and sentencing. Due to this ambiguity, the appellate court reversed Moseley's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, ensuring the trial court adheres to its statutory obligations. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Moseley" on Justia Law

Frank Moseley was charged with murder after he killed his fiancé, who had told him she might be pregnant with another man's child. Moseley, a combat veteran diagnosed with PTSD, testified that his condition contributed to the crime. The jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) and a weapon enhancement.The Superior Court of Orange County sentenced Moseley to 11 years in state prison, striking the additional punishment for the weapon use. The court acknowledged Moseley’s PTSD as a mitigating factor but did not explicitly consider the relevant service-related statutes (Penal Code §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91) when denying probation. Moseley’s counsel mentioned these statutes at the sentencing hearing but stated they were not "directly applicable." The probation department’s report and the sentencing briefs from both parties also failed to cite these statutes.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not expressly consider Moseley’s service-related PTSD as required by §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. These statutes mandate that a trial court must consider a defendant’s service-related PTSD as a factor in mitigation when deciding on probation and sentencing. The appellate court determined that the record was ambiguous regarding whether the trial court was aware of its statutory obligations under these sections.The appellate court reversed Moseley’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to comply with its statutory obligations under §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Moseley" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Charles Yeager-Reiman, a veteran, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor grand theft in connection with fraudulent activities related to veterans' benefits from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Yeager-Reiman appealed his conviction, arguing that his prosecution was preempted by federal law, as his offenses concerned the theft of benefits from the VA.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five disagreed with Yeager-Reiman's contention, and affirmed the lower court's judgement. The court ruled that federal preemption did not apply in this case. While federal law establishes the guidelines and regulations for VA benefits, it does not prohibit state-level criminal prosecutions for fraudulent activities related to these benefits.In terms of field preemption, the court determined that the provisions of the federal law did not indicate an intent by Congress to occupy the field of criminal prosecution of veterans in connection with the theft of VA benefits. As for obstacle preemption, the court found that allowing state-level prosecutions for theft of VA benefits actually promotes Congress's purpose of aiding veterans by preserving funds for veterans' benefits through deterrence.Therefore, the court concluded that neither field preemption nor obstacle preemption deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear Yeager-Reiman's case. View "People v. Yeager-Reiman" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Sullivan, III, appeals a stipulated judgment of dissolution of marriage. He challenged a 2018 order that was incorporated into the stipulated judgment, in which the family court found that it lacked jurisdiction to divide his ex-wife Lisa Sullivan’s military pension under the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse’s Protection Act (FUSFSPA). Jeremiah argued the court erred because Lisa “consent[ed] to the jurisdiction of the Court.” The Court of Appeal concluded the stipulated judgment was not appealable because it did not resolve all issues between the parties. At the parties’ joint request, however, the appellate court exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. On the merits, it rejected the trial court’s ruling that a service member had to explicitly and specifically consent to the court’s authority to divide her military retirement under the FUSFSPA. Furthermore, the Court concluded Lisa did consent to the jurisdiction of the court within the meaning of the FUSFSPA by voluntarily filing her dissolution petition in California, seeking a judicial confirmation of “all” her separate property acquired before marriage, asking the court to determine “any” community property assets, and requesting the appointment of an expert under California Evidence Code section 730 to determine a proposed division of the parties’ retirement accounts. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted appropriate writ relief directing the family court to vacate the stipulated judgment and the relevant portion of the 2018 order. View "Marriage of Sullivan" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by summarily denying defendant's petition for recall and resentencing without following the required procedures of Penal Code section 1170.91. Pursuant to section 1170.91, sentencing courts must consider any trauma, substance abuse, and mental health problems caused by a defendant's service in the United States military as mitigating factors weighing in favor of a low-term sentence. In this case, defendant filed a petition after the statute's effective date; stated that he had served in the Marine Corps and ended up suffering from "serious mental health issues and substance abuse addiction" as a result; and attached extensive Marine Corps service records and CDCR mental health records. Therefore, as the People acknowledged, defendant's petition for resentencing met the statutory requirements under section 1170.91, subdivision (b). View "People v. Bonilla-Bray" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, appearing in propria persona, appealed from the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate directing the California Army National Guard (CAARNG) to vacate an order separating him, a commissioned officer, from CAARNG.The Court of Appeal held that the Feres doctrine did not bar plaintiff's writ petition. The court also held that plaintiff failed to show that the trial court erred in concluding that CAARNG properly separated plaintiff based on federal regulations incorporated into state law, where states may incorporate federal law regarding appointment and termination of National Guard officers and plaintiff failed to show the trial court erred in concluding that the Military and Veterans Code incorporates NGR No. 635–100, subdivisions (5)(a)(8) and (5)(a)(22). Finally, plaintiff failed to show prejudice from any of the trial court's purported procedural errors. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "DiRaffael v. California Army National Guard" on Justia Law

Wade, an active duty member of the Army Special Forces Group and affiliated with the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI) with a blood alcohol concentration above 0.15 percent. The court denied his request to enter a pretrial diversion program under the military diversion statute, Penal Code section 1001.80. The court of appeal directed the trial court to reconsider. The trial court departed from the principles behind Penal Code section 1001.80 by focusing on the nature of the offense and applying the felony sentencing guidelines without apparent consideration of the rehabilitative purpose of diversion. The court abused its discretion by denying Wade’s request using criteria which the Legislature implicitly rejected; the Legislature expressly intended to include DUI offenses within the scope of diversion. View "Wade v. Superior Court" on Justia Law