Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was discharged from the U.S. Army due to a personality disorder. He was later charged under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. 3261(a), and sentenced, by a federal district court, to life in prison for participating in a sexual assault and multiple murders while stationed in Iraq. Co-conspirators, still on active duty and subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 802(a)(1), were tried by courts-martial and each sentenced to between 90 and 110 years imprisonment; they are eligible for parole in ten years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first noting that Iraq could not prosecute the defendant and that prosecution in the U.S. did not violate international law. The Army completed a valid discharge of defendant, so that he was no longer subject to courts-martial. His trial under MEJA did not violate the separation-of-powers principle or his due process or equal protection rights. Defendant was no longer similarly situated with his co-conspirators when charges were filed. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

American citizen-civilians alleged that they were detained and illegally tortured by U.S. military personnel while in Iraq in 2006 and released from military custody without being charged with a crime. At the time they worked for a privately-owned Iraqi security services company. Plaintiffs sought damages and brought a claim to recover personal property that was seized. The district court denied motions to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts supporting Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility for the alleged torture and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings. The law was clearly established in 2006 that the alleged treatment was unconstitutional. No reasonable public official could have believed otherwise. A "Bivens" remedy is available for alleged torture of civilian U.S. citizens by U.S. military personnel in a war zone. The court noted that U.S. law provides a civil remedy for aliens who are tortured by their own governments. Claims by aliens, alleging torture by U.S. officials, are distinguishable. The Administrative Procedure Act's "military authority" exception precludes judicial review of military actions affecting personal property in a war zone. View "Vance v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

American citizen-civilians alleged that they were detained and illegally tortured by U.S. military personnel while in Iraq in 2006 and released from military custody without being charged with a crime. At the time they worked for a privately-owned Iraqi security services company. Plaintiffs sought damages and brought a claim to recover personal property that was seized. The district court denied motions to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts supporting Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility for the alleged torture and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings. The law was clearly established in 2006 that the alleged treatment was unconstitutional. No reasonable public official could have believed otherwise. A "Bivens" remedy is available for alleged torture of civilian U.S. citizens by U.S. military personnel in a war zone. The court noted that U.S. law provides a civil remedy for aliens who are tortured by their own governments. Claims by aliens, alleging torture by U.S. officials, are distinguishable. The Administrative Procedure Act's "military authority" exception precludes judicial review of military actions affecting personal property in a war zone.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant on his claims that defendant committed employment discrimination, in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301, et seq. Plaintiff claimed that his military service was a motivating factor in defendant's decision to discharge him and that defendant terminated him without cause. The court held that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that defendant was hostile to his membership in the uniformed services; that the timing of plaintiff's termination failed to support his argument that his membership in the uniform services was a motivating factor in defendant's decision; and that defendant's reason for termination have not varied. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on this claim. The court also held that defendant's decision to discharge plaintiff was not arbitrary and there was no evidence to suggest that defendant tried to evade the statute and that plaintiff had notice that his conduct would constitute cause for discharge. Therefore, the court also affirmed summary judgment on this claim. View "Rademacher v. HBE Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four Afghan and five Iraqi citizens captured and subsequently held in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, by the United States military sued defendants, seeking damages and declaratory relief as the result of their treatment while in U.S. custody. Each plaintiff asserted two Bivens claims, namely, defendants tortured him in violation of his due process right under the Fifth Amendment and defendants' conduct constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the ATS based on defendants' alleged infliction of "prolonged arbitrary detention," "torture," and "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their constitutional claims and ATS claims. The court held that defendants were protected from plaintiffs' constitutional claims by qualified immunity. The court also held that, even if defendants were not shielded by qualified immunity and plaintiffs could claim the protections of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, the court would decline to sanction a Bivens cause of action because special factors counseled against doing so. The court further held that plaintiffs' claim under the ATS alleged a violation of the law of nations, not of the ATS, and therefore, did not violate a statute of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(2)(B). The court finally held that because plaintiffs have not alleged a cognizable cause of action, they have no basis upon which to seek declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal. View "Ali v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

The petitioner joined the Air Force in 1979 and, after being denied promotion twice, was discharged from active duty in 1989. The Deputy for Air Force Review Boards eventually agreed to void a substandard officer effectiveness report in her record. After the petitioner's separation from active service, the Special Selection Board reconsidered the record and did not recommend promotion. After several requests, the Air Force reinstated the petitioner to active duty in 1995 and promoted her to major, with a date of rank of 1988. After again being denied promotion twice, she applied for direct promotion in 2002, arguing that one of her evaluations was prepared by an officer she had reported for misconduct and that the break in service deprived her of an opportunity to develop a record to support promotion. Relief was denied. The petitioner was involuntarily retired in 2003. The Court of Claims rejected her suit. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that the Corrections Board thoroughly reviewed the claims and that the decision was not arbitrary.