Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Military chaplains, all non-liturgical Protestants, alleged that the Navy systematically discriminated against members of their religious denominations in the awarding of promotions. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that they lacked Article III standing and, alternatively, were unlikely to succeed on the merits. The court concluded that at least those plaintiffs whose promotions would likely be considered by future selection boards operating under the challenged policies have standing to pursue claims for injunctive relief. The court also concluded that the district court's resolution of plaintiffs' denominational preference theory was not based on factual findings that the court could review for clear error. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's determination that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. The court also vacated the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Church, et al v. United States Navy, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Sean Theodore Brehm, a citizen of South Africa, pled guilty to a federal charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, on condition that he be allowed to challenge through appeal the jurisdictional basis of the indictment underlying his conviction. The grand jury accused Defendant of stabbing a British subject, "J.O.," during an altercation at Kandahar Airfield, while both men were employed with private contractors supporting the NATO war effort in Afghanistan. On appeal, Defendant argued that the indictment's reliance on the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act was misplaced, in that the statute (which Defendant admitted was valid on its face) could not be applied to him in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Defendant also asserted that the government failed to establish a sufficient nexus between him and the United States to support the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, pointing out that, prior to his arrival in Virginia as an accused, neither he nor his victim had ever set foot in this country. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenges to his conviction and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Brehm" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a dual-status air reserve technician (ART) in the 301st maintenance group (301st MG). ARTs are full-time civilian employees who are also required to serve in the Air Force Reserve in the units for which they work as civilians. Plaintiff was the chief of training management of the 301st MG in his civilian capacity and a technical sergeant and chief of training of the 301st MG in his military capacity. Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment at the 301st MG, which caused him to leave his civilian job with the unit and lose his reserve position. The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary of the Air Force. The Fifth Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over all allegations with the exception of one incident for Defendant's failure to exhaust his Title VII administrative remedies and over the remaining claim by virtue of the Feres doctrine. Remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Filer v. Donley" on Justia Law

The Stolen Valor Act makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals and provides an enhanced penalty if the Congressional Medal of Honor is involved, 18 U. S. C. 704 (b),(c). After pleading guilty to falsely claiming that he had received the Medal of Honor, Alvarez challenged the Act as unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit held that the Act is invalid under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Characterizing the law as a content-based restriction on protected speech, the Court applied the “most exacting scrutiny.” Falsity alone does not take speech outside the First Amendment. While the government’s interest in protecting the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question, the First Amendment requires a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented; that link was not established. The government had no evidence that the public’s general perception of military awards is diluted by false claims or that counter-speech, such as the ridicule Alvarez received online and in the press, would not suffice to achieve its interest. The law does not represent the “least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” The government could likely protect the integrity of the military awards system by creating a database of Medal winners accessible and searchable. Dissenting Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas viewed the Act as significantly limited and necessary to the important governmental objective. View "United States v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

Appellee, a government contractor, underwent military detention in Iraq. After his release, he filed this action in the district court alleging claims under the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), 42 U.S.C. 2000dd et seq., and a Bivens action for violation of his due process rights. Secretary Rumsfeld moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion as to the claims under the DTA and some other claims, but did imply an action under the Bivens due process theory and denied Rumsfeld's motion to dismiss as to those claims. Secretary Rumsfeld appealed from the denial of his motion, arguing both that the claims were barred by qualified immunity and that the district court erred in implying such a cause of action in the first instance. The court agreed that the district court erred in implying such a cause of action and reversed the order. View "Doe v. Rumsfeld, et al." on Justia Law

After the September 11, 2011 attacks, the government detained plaintiff, an American citizen, as an enemy combatant. Plaintiff alleged that he was held incommunicado in military detention, subjected to coercive interrogation techniques and detained under harsh conditions of confinement, all in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiff and his mother sued John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from 2001 to 2003, alleging that they suffered from plaintiff's unlawful detention. The court held that, under recent Supreme Court law, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the court was compelled to conclude that, regardless of the legality of plaintiff's detention and the wisdom of Yoo's judgments, at the time he acted the law was not "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he [wa]s doing violated[d]" plaintiff's rights. Therefore, the court held that Yoo must be granted qualified immunity and accordingly reversed the decision of the district court. View "Padilla, et al. v. Yoo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Robert Newton alleged Major John R. Teter and Lieutenant Colonel Wayne E. Lee of the Utah Air National Guard violated his due process rights when they suspended and subsequently withdrew his Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) certificate, and when they suspended his employment as an Air Traffic Control Supervisor at Hill Air Force Base in Utah. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the suspension of his employment. It denied summary judgment on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the withdrawal of his ATCS certificate, holding this claim was not barred by qualified immunity or by intramilitary immunity under the "Feres" doctrine. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendants challenged the denial of qualified immunity and intramilitary immunity on Plaintiff's ATCS certificate claim. Plaintiff cross-appealed the grant of summary judgment on his employment claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff's ATCS certificate was not barred by the "Feres" doctrine, and that the Court had no jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity to defendants. The Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's cross-appeal. View "Newton v. Lee, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of knowingly making a false statement to the Department of Defense security personnel when he entered Brooke Army Medical Center demanding to see a patient in the hospital accused in the Fort Hood shooting, Major Nidal Hasan, an army psychologist. The false statement at issue was defendant's statement to an army captain that he was Major Hasan's lawyer. Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that his false statement was material. The court concluded that a statement to a decision maker in a military hospital that the speaker was a lawyer for a restricted military prisoner was the type of statement capable of influencing the decision maker to allow the speaker to visit the patient and that the protocols in place did not affect the statement's materiality. The court also concluded that defendant's delivery of the statement in a manner not likely to persuade did not affect the materiality of the statement. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Abrahem" on Justia Law

Appellants, as representatives of the estates of their deceased sons, brought this action against federal officials and employees in district court seeking money damages relating to the alleged mistreatment and eventual death of those sons while they were detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. The district court granted the motion of the United States to be substituted as defendant and the motion of the United States for dismissal of the claims. Because the court was satisfied that neither the district court nor this court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action due to the jurisdictional bar created by section 7(a) of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), 28 U.S.C. 2241(e), the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, although on different grounds than those relied upon by the district court. The court held that the Supreme Court did not declare section 2241(e)(2) unconstitutional under Boumediene v. Bush and that provision retained vitality to bar those claims. Therefore, the decision of the district court dismissing the claims should be affirmed, although for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Al-Zahrani v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law

Appellant Rick Strandlof was charged under the Stolen Valor Act (18 U.S.C. 704(b)) which makes it illegal to falsely claim to have received a military award or honor. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the Act is constitutional. Despite never having served in the armed forces, Appellant founded the Colorado Veterans Alliance, and frequently told veterans he graduated from the United States Naval Academy, was a former U.S. Marine Corps Captain, and had been wounded in combat in Iraq. He bragged of receiving a Purple Heart, and he boasted that he had been awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in battle. A number of local veterans found Appellant to be an unconvincing imposter. Angered by Appellant's lies, they contacted the FBI and reported their suspicion that Appellant was a phony. After military officials confirmed Appellant never attended the Naval Academy or served in the military, the government filed a criminal complaint in the District of Colorado charging him with making false claims about receipt of military decorations or medals, in violation of the Act. Reasoning that false statements are generally protected by the First Amendment, the district court declared the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional and dismissed the charges against Appellant. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with that reading of Supreme Court precedent and reversed: "[a]s the Supreme Court has observed time and again, false statements of fact do not enjoy constitutional protection, except to the extent necessary to protect more valuable speech. Under this principle, the Stolen Valor Act does not impinge on or chill protected speech, and therefore does not offend the First Amendment." View "United States v. Strandlof" on Justia Law