Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of knowingly making a false statement to the Department of Defense security personnel when he entered Brooke Army Medical Center demanding to see a patient in the hospital accused in the Fort Hood shooting, Major Nidal Hasan, an army psychologist. The false statement at issue was defendant's statement to an army captain that he was Major Hasan's lawyer. Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that his false statement was material. The court concluded that a statement to a decision maker in a military hospital that the speaker was a lawyer for a restricted military prisoner was the type of statement capable of influencing the decision maker to allow the speaker to visit the patient and that the protocols in place did not affect the statement's materiality. The court also concluded that defendant's delivery of the statement in a manner not likely to persuade did not affect the materiality of the statement. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Abrahem" on Justia Law

Appellants, as representatives of the estates of their deceased sons, brought this action against federal officials and employees in district court seeking money damages relating to the alleged mistreatment and eventual death of those sons while they were detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. The district court granted the motion of the United States to be substituted as defendant and the motion of the United States for dismissal of the claims. Because the court was satisfied that neither the district court nor this court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action due to the jurisdictional bar created by section 7(a) of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), 28 U.S.C. 2241(e), the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, although on different grounds than those relied upon by the district court. The court held that the Supreme Court did not declare section 2241(e)(2) unconstitutional under Boumediene v. Bush and that provision retained vitality to bar those claims. Therefore, the decision of the district court dismissing the claims should be affirmed, although for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Al-Zahrani v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law

Appellant Rick Strandlof was charged under the Stolen Valor Act (18 U.S.C. 704(b)) which makes it illegal to falsely claim to have received a military award or honor. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the Act is constitutional. Despite never having served in the armed forces, Appellant founded the Colorado Veterans Alliance, and frequently told veterans he graduated from the United States Naval Academy, was a former U.S. Marine Corps Captain, and had been wounded in combat in Iraq. He bragged of receiving a Purple Heart, and he boasted that he had been awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in battle. A number of local veterans found Appellant to be an unconvincing imposter. Angered by Appellant's lies, they contacted the FBI and reported their suspicion that Appellant was a phony. After military officials confirmed Appellant never attended the Naval Academy or served in the military, the government filed a criminal complaint in the District of Colorado charging him with making false claims about receipt of military decorations or medals, in violation of the Act. Reasoning that false statements are generally protected by the First Amendment, the district court declared the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional and dismissed the charges against Appellant. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with that reading of Supreme Court precedent and reversed: "[a]s the Supreme Court has observed time and again, false statements of fact do not enjoy constitutional protection, except to the extent necessary to protect more valuable speech. Under this principle, the Stolen Valor Act does not impinge on or chill protected speech, and therefore does not offend the First Amendment." View "United States v. Strandlof" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, presently incarcerated due to his conviction after trial for federal crimes of terrorism, and his mother, sued for legal and equitable relief based on plaintiff's prior military detention as an "enemy combatant." Plaintiff sought a declaration that defendants' policies were unconstitutional, an order enjoining his future designation as an enemy combatant, and nominal damages of one dollar from each defendant. The court affirmed the district court's refusal to imply a new cause of action for money damages against top Defense Department officials for a range of policy judgments pertaining to the designation and treatment of enemy combatants. The court also held that defendants have asserted a valid qualified immunity defense to defendant's Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., claim. The court further held that the district court did not err in concluding that defendant lacked standing to seek an order enjoining the government from designating him as an enemy combatant. Therefore, finding plaintiff's claims to be without merit, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lebron, et al. v. Rumsfeld, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's decision to abstain, on the basis of Schlesinger v. Councilman, and dismiss without prejudice his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the U.S. Army's exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over him. The court held that the district court was well within its discretion in applying Councilman abstention and dismissing without prejudice petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court remanded, however, for correction of an error in the judgment because, although the district court applied Councilman abstention and dismissed the petition without prejudice, the judgment erroneously indicated that the district court granted the Army's summary judgment motion on the merits. View "Hennis v. Hemlick, et al." on Justia Law

Claimant appealed from a judgment of the district court ordering the forfeiture to plaintiff United States, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(a), of certain communication-jamming devices, to wit, the defendant-in-rem Jammers, owned by claimant and a company of which he was the majority shareholder and CEO. On appeal, claimant contended that the district court erred in dismissing his claim, arguing principally that the stipulation he signed was void on the grounds that it was signed under duress and without consideration. The court held that, as a matter of New York law, no consideration for claimant's agreement to the release was needed; and thus, if consideration was absent, its absence did not make the stipulation invalid. The court also held that claimant's assertions did not meet any part of the test of duress. The court further held that the district court correctly granted the government's motion to strike or for summary judgment on the ground of claimant's lack of Article III standing. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Twenty MilJam-350 IED Jammers" on Justia Law

The United States appealed the district court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus to the detainee. Three errors in the district court's analysis required the court to vacate that decision. First, the court failed to accord an official government record a presumption of regularity. Second, the district court failed to determine the detainee's credibility even though the court relied on his declaration to discredit the Government's key evidence. Third, the court's unduly atomized approach to the evidence was one the court rejected. The court remanded so the district court could evaluate the detainee's credibility as needed in light of the totality of the circumstances. View "Latif, et al. v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when defendant was accused of drunk driving on the Kitsap Naval Base in Bremerton, Washington. At issue was whether the Government violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by prosecuting and convicting defendant for a crime after the Navy punished him for the same offense. The Government argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not implicated because the non-judicial punishment administered by the Navy under 10 U.S.C. 815 was not criminal in nature. The court agreed and held that the Government's prosecution of defendant was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, defendant's conviction was affirmed. View "United States v. Reveles" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of three years' imprisonment for unlawfully exporting PVS-14 Gen 3 night-vision devices in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. 2778. These devices, designed for military use, enabled users to see at greater distances in low light and dark conditions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by following the Sentencing Guidelines where the sentence was substantively reasonable because the district court explained that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and the district court had granted a downward departure. View "United States v. Carper" on Justia Law

The buyer of a personal computer found child pornography on the hard drive and contacted authorities. The seller, a non-commissioned Naval officer, was ordered to return to his home, where police were questioning his pregnant wife. His house was searched and he was questioned at the house and at the station. He entered a guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(b) and 2258(8)(A), reserving the right to appeal denial of a motion to suppress. The First Circuit remanded. Given the influence of military authority, defendant was in custody when he was questioned at home without having received a Miranda warning. The situation at the house would have left any member of the armed services reasonably feeling that he lacked free choice to extricate himself, and sufficiently compelled to answer to authority. Authorities deliberately planned to subject defendant to unwarned questioning, so a warning issued after leaving the house may have been inadequate to cure the situation with respect to statements made at the station. View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law