Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Karwacki was convicted by a special court martial of delivering peyote to fellow soldiers and received a bad-conduct discharge from military service. Later, he applied for a permit to carry a concealed firearm in Wisconsin. The state denied his application under Wis. Stat. §941.29(1m)(b), which bars firearm possession by anyone convicted of a crime elsewhere that would be a felony if committed in Wisconsin. Although the military court labeled his offense a misdemeanor, Wisconsin classified his conduct as a felony under its own laws.Karwacki brought a federal lawsuit, arguing that Wisconsin’s decision to treat his military misdemeanor conviction as a state-law felony violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution and his Second Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin entered judgment in favor of the state, rejecting Karwacki’s claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to federal court martial convictions because such proceedings are not “judicial Proceedings of any other State,” nor has Congress prescribed any effect for court martial judgments in the states. The court also concluded that Wisconsin did not fail to give effect to the court martial’s judgment, as it imposed only collateral consequences under state law. Addressing the Second Amendment, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that neither the federal nor Wisconsin’s statutory scheme is facially invalid, and that individuals convicted of distributing illegal drugs are not entitled to as-applied relief from firearms disabilities. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed. View "Karwacki v Kaul" on Justia Law

Several Iraqi citizens detained at Abu Ghraib prison during the U.S. occupation of Iraq alleged that, between October and December 2003, they were subjected to severe abuse by military police. The plaintiffs claimed that employees of CACI Premier Technology, Inc., a contractor providing interrogation services to the U.S. military, conspired with military personnel to “soften up” detainees for interrogation, resulting in torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT). While CACI’s contract required its personnel to operate under military supervision, evidence suggested inadequate oversight and that CACI employees directed some of the abusive tactics. Plaintiffs did not allege direct physical abuse by CACI interrogators, but asserted conspiracy liability.The case was initially filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, advancing claims under both the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and state law. Over time, the plaintiffs narrowed their suit to ATS claims for torture, CIDT, and war crimes, proceeding on conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting theories. The district court dismissed some claims and parties, and after two trials—one ending in mistrial—the jury found CACI liable for conspiracy to commit torture and CIDT, awarding significant compensatory and punitive damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed multiple legal challenges by CACI, including justiciability, immunity, preemption, and the state secrets privilege. The court held that application of the ATS was proper because the conduct at issue occurred within U.S.-controlled territory (Abu Ghraib during the CPA regime), was actionable under universal jurisdiction principles, and enough domestic conduct was involved. The court found that conspiracy liability and corporate liability are recognized under the ATS, and rejected CACI’s defenses and challenges regarding sovereign immunity, political question doctrine, preemption, and evidentiary rulings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment against CACI, vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of the United States on third-party claims due to sovereign immunity, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1995, a military veteran was convicted of assaulting and causing the death of his four-month-old daughter, resulting in a 15-years-to-life sentence for a violation of California Penal Code section 273ab. This was his first and only felony conviction, although he had a prior record of mostly DUI offenses. Nearly three decades later, in 2024, he petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, arguing that military service-related conditions—specifically traumatic brain injury and substance abuse—were not considered as mitigating factors at his original sentencing.The Superior Court of Solano County initially denied his habeas corpus petition, noting that relief was available through section 1170.91 and instructing him to file a separate resentencing petition. When he subsequently filed a formal resentencing petition under section 1170.91, the trial court summarily denied it without a hearing, stating he had failed to make a prima facie case for relief. The defendant appealed, asserting he was entitled to a public hearing on his petition and that his military-related conditions should have been considered.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that, even assuming the petition was sufficient to require a public hearing, any procedural error was harmless because the defendant was statutorily ineligible for resentencing. The court concluded that under section 1170.91, subdivision (c), individuals convicted of offenses listed as “super strikes” under section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)—which includes the defendant’s conviction—are categorically excluded from resentencing relief. The court affirmed the denial of the petition, holding that the statutory exclusion applies regardless of whether the conviction was a first offense or resulted from the Three Strikes law. View "P. v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence in Riverside County, California, and sought pretrial military diversion under Penal Code section 1001.80. He had served five months of active duty in the United States Marine Corps and several years in the reserves. The trial court denied his request, finding him ineligible because he had not completed at least one year of active service or one day of combat, relying on a local Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and its interpretation of legislative intent.The defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate in the Appellate Division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The People conceded that Penal Code section 1001.80 does not require a minimum of one year of service. The Appellate Division agreed, holding that the statute contains no such time requirement and remanded for the trial court to reconsider eligibility. The Appellate Division also clarified that, even if eligible, a defendant is not automatically entitled to diversion; the trial court retains discretion to assess suitability for diversion, guided by the statute’s rehabilitative purpose.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, then transferred the case for review. The court held that Penal Code section 1001.80 does not impose a minimum service duration for eligibility for military diversion, and the MOU’s one-year requirement does not apply to diversion under this statute. The court further held that trial courts must first determine eligibility under the statute and then exercise discretion to assess suitability for diversion, considering factors consistent with the statute’s rehabilitative goals. The court issued a writ directing the superior court to vacate its denial and conduct further proceedings consistent with these principles. View "Angulo v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A defendant was stopped by police in the early morning hours after being observed swerving and speeding. The officer detected signs of alcohol intoxication, and the defendant refused a chemical test, leading to a blood draw pursuant to a warrant. The defendant was charged with four misdemeanor offenses related to driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, with additional allegations of a high blood alcohol content and refusal to submit to testing. The defendant, a military veteran, moved for pretrial military diversion under California Penal Code section 1001.80, submitting evidence of his military service and documentation of alcohol use disorder and other mental health conditions allegedly resulting from his service.The Superior Court of Orange County denied the motion for military diversion, reasoning that there was no nexus between the defendant’s alcohol abuse and his military service, and that his alcohol use predated his service. The court appeared to require the defendant to show a relationship between his qualifying condition and the commission of the charged offenses. The defendant then sought a writ of mandate from the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that for misdemeanor charges, Penal Code section 1001.80 does not require a defendant to show a nexus between the qualifying condition (such as substance abuse) and the commission of the offense. The court further clarified that the burden of proof for eligibility is a “reasonable possibility” standard: the defendant must show a reasonable possibility that he is suffering from a qualifying condition as a result of military service. The court granted the writ, directed the trial court to vacate its denial, and ordered a new hearing applying the correct legal standards. View "Segura v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A former Navy sailor, Lamar Forbes, was diagnosed with HIV in 2012 and instructed by medical personnel to disclose his status before engaging in sexual activity. Between 2013 and 2015, while stationed in Virginia, Forbes had unprotected sex with four women without informing them of his HIV-positive status. He was charged under several articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including making a false official statement, sexual assault, and violating Article 134 by incorporating Virginia’s infected sexual battery statute through the Assimilative Crimes Act. Forbes pleaded guilty to some charges, and the military judge sentenced him to eight years’ confinement, reduction in paygrade, and a dishonorable discharge.Forbes appealed his sexual assault convictions to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA), arguing that his conduct did not constitute sexual assault under the UCMJ and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. He did not appeal his Article 134 or Article 107 convictions. The NMCCA affirmed, relying on precedent that failure to disclose HIV status vitiates consent, making the sexual act an “offensive touching.” The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) affirmed, holding that Forbes’s conduct met the definition of sexual assault under Article 120.On supervised release, Forbes petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for habeas relief, arguing that the military courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that their interpretation of Article 120 was an unconstitutional ex post facto expansion. The district court denied his petition, finding his challenges nonjurisdictional and procedurally defaulted, and that the military courts had fully and fairly considered his preserved claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Forbes’s challenges were nonjurisdictional, subject to procedural default rules, and that the military courts had given full and fair consideration to his preserved claims. View "Forbes v. Phelan" on Justia Law

The defendant, a military veteran, was convicted in 2017 of multiple firearm-related offenses, including possession of assault weapons and ammunition as a felon, as well as possessing a forged driver’s license. The convictions stemmed from his involvement in acquiring and storing firearms and ammunition, despite being prohibited from doing so due to his criminal record. The defendant’s background included significant childhood trauma, military service, and subsequent mental health and substance abuse issues, which were not considered at his original sentencing. While incarcerated, he received mental health treatment and engaged in rehabilitation efforts.After his conviction and sentencing to 20 years in prison, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, which allows veterans to seek reduced sentences if their mental health conditions related to military service were not considered at sentencing. The Superior Court of Orange County found the defendant eligible for relief, acknowledging a connection between his mental health disorders and military service. However, the court denied resentencing, reasoning that there was no evidence linking his mental health issues to the commission of his offenses and refusing to consider his rehabilitative conduct in prison.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an irrelevant factor—requiring a nexus between the defendant’s mental health condition and his offenses—and by failing to consider relevant factors, such as the defendant’s rehabilitation while incarcerated and changes in the law favoring mitigation. The appellate court reversed the order denying resentencing and remanded the matter for a new resentencing hearing under section 1170.91, subdivision (b). View "People v. Hayde" on Justia Law

Respondents Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak bin ‘Atash, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi are being tried by military commission at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for their roles in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In July 2024, they entered into pretrial agreements to plead guilty in exchange for the government not seeking the death penalty. However, on August 2, 2024, then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III withdrew from these agreements.The military commission judge and the United States Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) refused to recognize the Secretary’s withdrawal, ruling that the respondents had begun to perform under the agreements. The CMCR denied the government’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition, and the military judge scheduled the entry of the respondents’ pleas. The government then sought relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Secretary of Defense had the legal authority to withdraw from the pretrial agreements. The court found that the respondents had not begun performance of promises contained in the agreements, as their actions did not constitute the beginning of performance under the agreements' terms. The court concluded that the government had no adequate alternative remedy and that the equities warranted the issuance of writs of mandamus and prohibition. Consequently, the court granted the government’s petition, vacated the military judge’s order preventing the Secretary’s withdrawal, and prohibited the military judge from conducting hearings to enter guilty pleas under the withdrawn agreements. View "In re: United States of America" on Justia Law

In October 2022, NCIS investigators obtained a military warrant to seize but not search Joshua Lee Ray's cell phone. Despite this, they searched the phone and found evidence of child sexual abuse material. Ray moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment as the warrant did not authorize it. The district court granted the motion.The Government appealed, conceding the warrant did not authorize the search, there was no verbal authorization, and the warrant did not incorporate an affidavit requesting authorization. The Government argued the search was justified under the good faith exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government could not rely on the good faith exception because the warrant was not deficient; it simply did not authorize the search. The court emphasized that the NCIS exceeded the scope of the valid warrant, and the good faith exception did not apply to such conduct. The court affirmed the district court's decision to suppress the evidence. View "US v. Ray" on Justia Law

Victor Silvers was convicted of the premeditated murder of his estranged wife, Brittney Silvers, who was an active member of the United States Army, and was shot and killed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Silvers was also found guilty of attempted murder, domestic violence, violation of a protection order, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and the use of a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to life in prison.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky took judicial notice that Fort Campbell was within the United States' special maritime and territorial jurisdiction. Silvers challenged this, arguing that the jury should have determined the jurisdictional status. He also moved to exclude a juror who wore a shirt supporting military veterans and had served in the Navy, claiming potential bias. Additionally, Silvers argued that his mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in taking judicial notice of the jurisdictional status of Fort Campbell, as it was a legal question rather than a factual one for the jury. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to deny Silvers's motion to exclude the juror, as the juror assured impartiality and the voir dire process was deemed adequate. Finally, the court upheld Silvers's mandatory life sentence, citing binding Supreme Court precedent and the Sixth Circuit's own precedent, which did not find such sentences to be cruel and unusual punishment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed both Silvers's conviction and his sentence. View "United States v. Silvers" on Justia Law