Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Alvarez, a two-year-old citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without admission or parole. In 1989 he became a lawful permanent resident. Alvarez served in the U.S. Army, 1991-2004. Alvarez has only departed the United States as a member of the Army. In 2000 Alvarez had sexual contact with a female platoon member who was so intoxicated that she was unable to consent. He provided a signed denial to the Army Criminal Investigation Division. He eventually pleaded guilty to violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: 10 U.S.C. 907, for making false official statements; 10 U.S.C. 925, sodomy; and, 10 U.S.C. 934, for two specifications of violating the general article. The judge sentenced Alvarez to a bad conduct discharge, to be reduced to the grade of E-1, and to be confined for 18 months. The sentence did not allocate the confinement to the convictions. In 2012, DHS agents arrested Alvarez. An IJ found him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 1101(a)(43)(F), as an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit remanded. The BIA committed legal error in concluding that Alvarez’s sodomy conviction was a crime “for which the term of imprisonment [was] at least one year,” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). View "Chavez-Alvarez v. Att'y Gen., United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of one count of distributing child pornography and one count of possessing child pornography. An NCIS agent investigating online criminal activity of persons in Washington state found evidence of criminal conduct by defendant, a civilian, and gave the information to civilian law enforcement officials. On appeal, defendant argued that the fruits of the NCIS investigation into his online file sharing should have been suppressed because military enforcement of civilian laws is prohibited. In United States v. Chon, the court held that the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), 18 U.S.C. 1385, prohibits Army and Air Force military personnel from participating in civilian law enforcement. The court reaffirmed Chon's holding that NCIS agents are bound by PCA-like restrictions on direct assistance to civilian law enforcement. In this case, the NCIS agent's actions amounted to direct assistance to civilian law enforcement and violated the regulations and policies proscribing direct military enforcement of civilian laws. The court found that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress where there was abundant evidence that the violation at issue has occurred repeatedly and frequently, and that the government believes that its conduct is permissible. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Dreyer" on Justia Law

Matthews enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1990. In 2006, while on active duty, he pled guilty to computer pornography and solicitation of a child. He was sentenced to 21 years plus 10 months in prison. In 2007, an administrative separation board imposed an “other than honorable” discharge on Matthews. In 2010, Matthews sought back pay from the date of his arrest and “retainer” pay, based on a total of 20 years of active duty, reached while incarcerated. He claimed he was not properly discharged, citing the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b; the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552; the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. 1034; and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706. The Claims Court of held that it lacked jurisdiction over claims founded on the four statutes because they are not money-mandating and held that Matthews failed to state claims for back pay under 37 U.S.C. 204(a) and retainer pay under 10 U.S.C. 6330(b). The statute prohibits service members from receiving pay for absences without leave that are not unavoidable; an absence due to civilian incarceration is not unavoidable. When he was arrested Matthews had not reached the 20 years of active duty service required to receive retainer pay. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Matthews v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioners, detainees who have been cleared for release but remain held at Guantanamo Bay, engaged in a hunger strike unless and until they were released. The government subsequently instituted a force-feeding protocol. Petitioners invoked the district court's habeas jurisdiction and moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the authorities from force-feeding them. Two district courts denied petitioners' request, concluding that the Military Commissions Act (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to consider such challenges brought by Guantanamo detainees. The court concluded that, under the law of this circuit, petitioners' challenges to the conditions of their confinement properly sounded in habeas corpus and were not barred by the MCA. The court concluded, however, that petitioners failed to establish their entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district courts' denials of petitioners' applications for a preliminary injunction. View "Aamer, et al. v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant was detained at Guantanamo Bay for seven years as an enemy combatant. After the Supreme Court decided that Guantanamo detainees have a constitutional right to challenge the basis of their detentions in Boumediene v. Bush, the district court granted appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The United States released appellant and he filed a complaint a year later, seeking to recover injuries sustained during his detention. At issue was whether the district court has jurisdiction over appellant's claims. The court held that 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2) barred claims brought on behalf of aliens determined by Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to have been properly detained. The court also concluded that the application of section 2241(e)(2) to appellant was constitutional. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of appellant's claims because Congress has denied the district court jurisdiction to entertain his claims under section 2241(e)(2). View "Janko v. Gates, et al." on Justia Law

In these three appeals, enemy combatants held by the United States at Bagram Airfield Military Base in northwest Afghanistan sought access to the writ of habeas corpus. Over three years ago, the court concluded that enemy combatants held at Bagram could not invoke the Suspension Clause to challenge their detentions. In these appeals, the court dismissed the petitions for want of jurisdiction where, because the Suspension Clause did not run to Bagram, section 7 of the 2006 Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, did not effect any unconstitutional suspension of the writ. The court remanded Hamidullah's petition to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether he is in the sole custody of the government of Pakistan. View "Maqaleh, et al. v. Panetta, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a noncitizen "enemy combatant" undergoing proceedings before a military commission at Guatanamo Bay, sought a declaratory judgment that the commission lacked jurisdiction to hear the charges against him because the alleged acts occurred in Yemen, where he argued no war or hostilities existed in 2000 or 2002. The court held, pursuant to Hamad v. Gates, that Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. 2241(e), deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit. The court rejected plaintiff’s claims challenging the constitutionality of the Act. View "Al-Nashiri v. MacDonald" on Justia Law

The FBI investigated Alwan, an Iraqi living in Bowling Green, after his fingerprints appeared on an improvised explosive device in Iraq, and introduced Alwan to a confidential source (CHS), who recorded their conversations. CHS convinced Alwan that he was part of a group supporting Jihad. Alwan assisted in sending what he believed to be money and weapons to the Mujahidin several times and eventually asked to lead the fictional terrorist cell. CHS instructed Alwan to recruit others. Hammadi agreed to join, stating that he had participated in IED attacks on American troops and had been arrested, but bribed his way free and fled to Syria. In Syria, he applied for refugee status to immigrate to the U.S. and answered “no” when asked if he had engaged in terrorist activity. Hammadi had moved to Bowling Green on the recommendation of Alwan, whose family he knew from Iraq and whom he had met in Syria. The two transported $100,000 from CHS to a truck, believing that it would find its way to Iraq, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A. They hid rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, plastic explosives, and sniper rifles in another truck, for transport to terrorists, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B. They loaded Stinger missiles into another truck and plotted to murder a U.S. Army Captain. Hammadi pleaded guilty to 10 terrorism and two immigration offenses. Rejecting claims of entrapment and sentencing manipulation, the district court imposed a life sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Hammadi would not qualify for a departure under either theory.View "United States v. Hammadi" on Justia Law

Abdul Razak Ali was captured in 2002 by U.S. and Pakistani forces and detained as an enemy combatant. When captured at a guesthouse in Pakistan, Ali was with an al Qaeda-associated terrorist leader named Abu Zubaydah. Ali subsequently challenged the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Based on Ali's presence at the guesthouse with Abu Zubaydah, his participation in Abu Zubaydah's training program, his admission to traveling to Afghanistan to fight in the war against U.S. and Coalition forces, and other evidence connecting Ali to Abu Zubaydah fighters, the district court concluded that it was more probable than not that Ali was in fact a member of Abu Zubaydah's force. The court concluded that the facts justify the President's decision to detain Ali as an enemy combatant under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. Pub. L. No. 107-40, section 2(a), 115 Stat. 224. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Ali's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. View "Ali v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant moved to dismiss his federal grand jury indictment, charging him with one count of possessing child pornography, on double jeopardy grounds because he had been subject to nonjudicial proceedings (NJP) with the Coast Guard. At issue was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited civilian criminal prosecution of a servicemember who previously received NJP without being informed of or waiving his statutory right to reject such punishment and demand a court-martial instead. The court concluded that the inquiry for the Double Jeopardy Clause was whether the defendant actually was previously placed in jeopardy, not whether he might have been placed in jeopardy if other procedures had been followed. Therefore, the court held that defendant's prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court also rejected defendant's alternative argument, reversing and remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Stoltz" on Justia Law