Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Kebodeaux was convicted by special court-martial of a federal sex offense. After serving his sentence and receiving a bad-conduct discharge from the Air Force, he moved to Texas where he registered with state authorities as a sex offender. Congress later enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which requires federal sex offenders to register in the states where they live, study, and work, 42 U.S.C. 16913(a). SORNA applies to offenders who, when SORNA became law, had completed their sentences. When Kebodeaux moved within Texas and failed to update his registration, the federal government prosecuted him and the district court convicted him under SORNA. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that SORNA’s registration requirements, as applied to Kebodeaux, fall within the scope of congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress did not apply SORNA to an individual who was, before its enactment, “unconditionally released,” but to an individual already subject to federal registration requirements. SORNA somewhat modified registration requirements to which Kebodeaux was already subject, to make more uniform "a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration requirements." At the time of his offense and conviction, Kebodeaux was subject to the Wetterling Act, which imposed similar registration requirements and was promulgated under the Military Regulation Clause (Art. I, s. 8, cl. 14), and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The same power that authorized Congress to promulgate the Uniform Code of Military Justice and punish Kebodeaux’s crime also authorized Congress to make the civil registration requirement at issue a consequence of conviction. Imposing a civil registration requirement that would apply upon the release of an offender like Kebodeaux is “eminently reasonable,” as is assignment of a special role to the federal government in ensuring compliance with federal sex offender registration requirements. View "United States v. Kebodeaux" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging that defendants fraudulently billed the United States for services provided to the military forces serving in Iraq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. Because the court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and the court found that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), 18 U.S.C. 3287, applied to this action, the court reversed. Because it could be appropriate for the district court to make factual findings to consider the public disclosure claim urged by defendants the court remanded so the district court could consider this issue. View "United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request for records held by the CIA pertaining to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) to carry out targeted killings. The district court affirmed the CIA's Glomar response, concluding that a response refusing to confirm or deny that the CIA had such records was justified under the circumstances of this case. The court concluded that it was not "logical or plausible" for the CIA to contend that it would reveal something not already officially acknowledged to say that the CIA "at least has an intelligence interest" in such strikes. The court held that the CIA's broad Glomar response was untenable and therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment dismissing plaintiffs' FOIA action and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union, et al v. CIA" on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity from tort suits, 28 U. S. C. 1346(b)(1), except for certain intentional torts, including battery; it originally afforded tort victims a remedy against the government, but did not preclude suit against the alleged tort-feasor. Agency-specific statutes postdating the FTCA immunized certain federal employees from personal liability for torts committed in the course of official duties. The Gonzalez Act makes the FTCA remedy against the U.S. preclusive of suit against armed forces medical personnel, 10 U. S. C. 1089(a), and provides that, “[f]or purposes of this section,” the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply to any cause of action arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of medical ... functions.” Congress subsequently enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, which makes the FTCA remedy against the government exclusive for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, 28 U. S. C. 2679(b)(1); federal employees are shielded without regard to agency or line of work. Levin, injured as a result of surgery performed at a U. S. Naval Hospital, sued the government and the surgeon, asserting battery, based on his alleged withdrawal of consent shortly before the surgery. Finding that the surgeon had acted within the scope of his employment, the district court released him and dismissed the battery claim. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Gonzalez Act served only to buttress the personal immunity granted military medical personnel and did not negate the FTCA intentional tort exception. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Gonzalez Act section 1089(e) abrogates the FTCA intentional tort exception, allowing Levin’s suit against the U.S. alleging medical battery by a Navy doctor acting within the scope of employment. The operative clause states, “in no uncertain terms,” that the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply,” and confines the abrogation to medical personnel employed by listed agencies. View "Levin v. United States" on Justia Law

Sharp, a federal supply contractor, submitted a termination compensation claim to the Department of the Army contracting officer, and later brought a Contracts Dispute Act claim before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, claiming that, because the Army failed to exercise the entirety of the last option year under a delivery order, Sharp was entitled to premature discontinuance fees under its General Services Administration schedule contract. The ASBCA dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Federal Acquisition Regulation, does not permit ordering agency contracting officers to decide disputes pertaining to schedule contracts. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Under FAR 8.406-6, only the GSA contracting office may resolve disputes that, in whole or in part, involve interpretation of disputed schedule contract provisions. View "Sharp Elec. Corp. v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Indian Harbor sought reimbursement under the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, 106 Stat. 2315, 2371; 107 Stat. 1547, 1745 for environmental cleanup costs associated with the development of the former Marine Corps Air Station Tustin military base in southern California. The Court of Federal Claims determined that Indian Harbor failed to identify a “claim for personal injury or property” that triggered the government’s duty to indemnify and dismissed. The Federal Circuit reversed, relying on the purposes of the Act, to encourage cleanup and redevelopment of former military installations. View "Indian Harbor Ins. v. United States" on Justia Law

Pinnacle claimed that the Army unlawfully withheld many communications between Clark and the Army, in violation of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552. The district court granted summary judgment to the Army and Pinnacle appealed. The court concluded that public disclosure of the Category C documents would impair the government's ability to get this necessary information in the future and that the documents were, therefore, confidential and fell within Exemption 4 of the Act. The court found that Category B documents were protected by the common interest doctrine and qualified as intra-agency communications pursuant to Exemption 5 of the Act. The court disposed of Pinnacle's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "American Mgmt. Svcs. v. Dept. of the Army" on Justia Law

Congress enacted section 703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 10 U.S.C. 1074g(f), which subjected all prescriptions purchased at retail pharmacies by service members to the same price caps as drugs procured directly by the Department of Defense. Pursuant to this provision, the Secretary of Defense issued a regulation requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers to refund to the federal government the difference between the retail price and the price cap. The Coalition, a multi-industry interest group that represented pharmaceutical companies, filed suit challenging these actions. The court concluded that the Secretary reasonably interpreted section 703 to impose involuntary price caps and held that the statute itself imposed retroactive rebate liability on pharmaceutical manufacturers. View "Coalition For Common Sense in Government Procurement v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Harris served on active duty in the U.S. Army from 1963 to 1966 and from 1967 to 1970. In 1985, he had a VA Medical Center examination; an “Agent Orange” form associated with that examination indicates that Harris complained of “skin rashes on trunk and arms.” Another form, listing his service in Vietnam, is an “Application for Medical Benefits,” stated that it “will be used to determine your eligibility for medical benefits.” In 2002, Harris, pro se, sought service-connected disability compensation for contact dermatitis and latex allergy. The DVA regional office ultimately granted the claims and assigned an effective date of 2002. Harris sought an effective date of 1985. The Board held that the report of the Agent Orange Registry examination did not constitute a claim. The Veterans Court affirmed The Federal Circuit vacated, stating that pro se filings must be read liberally; the Veterans Court did not apply the proper legal standard for determining whether the Board had correctly determined the earliest applicable date for the claim. View "Harris v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

A VA regional office awarded King disability compensation for residuals of a left knee surgery and right knee arthritis. King later sought disability compensation for disabilities of the back and hips on a direct basis and as secondary to his service-connected knee disabilities. Records revealed no treatment for back or hip problems during King's active duty service 1973-1974. King underwent a VA spine examination in 2000. The examiner diagnosed minimal degenerative joint disease of both hips and lumbosacral spine, related to age. A private physician disagreed. In 2007, the Board of Veterans denied King's appeal. The Veterans Court remanded. Additional evidence was developed and, in 2008, the Board obtained an opinion from a Veterans Hospital Administration orthopedist that it was not likely that King’s back and bilateral hip disabilities were directly caused or permanently worsened by the service-connected knee disabilities. The Board and Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the denial. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Veterans Court erred by discounting lay testimony offered by King and his wife. The Veterans Court did not fail to consider the proffered lay evidence, so King’s appeal was merely a challenge to the weight given his evidence.View "King v. Shinseki" on Justia Law