Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government Law
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James Mallard and Tonya Mallard (now Tonya Mallard Burkart) were divorced on in 2001. Incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce was the Child Custody and Support and Property Settlement Agreement executed by the parties. A significant portion of the financial settlement that Burkart received in the property settlement agreement consisted of forty percent of Mallard's "disposable military retirement pay" for ten years. Following the divorce, Mallard elected to adopt a sixty-percent disability rating as part of his retirement pay. Mallard did not provide any of these disability benefits to Burkart. When Mallard filed a Petition for Modification of Judgment of Divorce in chancery court pursuant to child-support and custody matters, Burkart filed a counterpetition for contempt, asserting that Mallard had structured his retirement in such a way as to defeat her forty-percent interest in the total retirement pay. The chancellor determined that Burkart was entitled to forty percent of the disability benefits, but he declined to find Mallard in contempt. Mallard appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since federal law preempts state law, state courts are precluded from allocating military disability benefits to a nonmilitary spouse; therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mallard v. Burkart" on Justia Law

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In 2009, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs sued Frank S. Smith, Jr. in the Jefferson Circuit Court, stating a claim of ejectment and sought possession of Mr. Smith's house in Bessemer. The mortgage to Mr. Smith's home was assigned to the Secretary, and the Secretary had sold the house at a foreclosure sale in 2007. The auctioneer who sold the house executed an auctioneer's deed conveying the house to the Secretary. The Secretary demanded that Mr. Smith vacate the house, but Mr. Smith failed to leave. The trial court granted summary judgment, asserting as a matter of law he was entitled to possession of the house. Mr. Smith opposed the summary-judgment motion by filing a pleading titled 'Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.' In his response, Mr. Smith argued, among other things, that the Secretary had failed to establish that he was entitled to possession of the house because, Frank said, the affidavit filed with the Secretary's motion did not comply with Rule 56(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. Mr. Smith appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals which reversed the summary judgment and remanded the action for further proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Smith should have moved to strike the offending affidavit in the Secretary's summary judgment motion in his response: "an objection to the inadmissible evidence alone is not sufficient." The Court vacated the appellate court's decision and affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Smith, Jr. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law