Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Vazquez-Claudio is a Vietnam veteran. Following his service, Vazquez-Claudio filed a claim with the VA seeking disability compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder. In 2005, after finding that his PTSD was service- connected, the VA granted his request for benefits with an effective date in June, 1994. The VA rated Mr. Vazquez-Claudio’s PTSD as 50 percent disabling, Vazquez-Claudio appealed, arguing entitlement to a 70 percent rating. He had been unable to work since 1994, when he left his job as a police officer as the result of an emotional breakdown following a prisoner’s suicide. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that other than occasional suicidal ideation, social isolation, and some difficulty adapting to stressful situations, none of his symptoms corresponded to impairment greater than 50 percent. The Veterans Court agreed, stating that “[t]he issue before the Board was not how many ‘areas’ Mr. Vazquez-Claudio has demonstrated deficiencies in but, rather, ‘the frequency, severity, and duration of the psychiatric symptoms, the length of remissions, and Mr. Vazquez-Claudio’s capacity for adjustment during periods of remission.’” The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Vazquez-Claudio v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Veterans sought disability compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) allegedly caused by sexual assaults that occurred during service. Their service records do not reflect any reports of the alleged sexual assaults. The VA Regional Office, Board of Veterans’ Claims, and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims rejected the claims in part on the ground that the service records did not include reports of the alleged assaults, and because the veterans stated that the assaults were never reported to military authorities. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the absence of a service record documenting an unreported sexual assault is not pertinent evidence that the sexual assault did not occur; the Board and Veterans Court may not rely on failure to report an in-service sexual assault to military authorities as pertinent evidence that the sexual assault did not occur. View "AZ v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2671-80, seeking compensatory damages for loss of property and personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence and malice of the VA. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the VA's motion to dismiss where the Veterans Judicial Review Act (VJRA), 38 U.S.C. 511, and in the alternative, the United States' sovereign immunity, barred the district court from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. View "King v. US Dept. of Veterans Affairs, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., alleging that the VA negligently withheld benefits. Determining that the court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, the court concluded that resolving plaintiff's claim would require the district court to determine whether the VA acted negligently in the benefits determination. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. 511(a) and the district court properly dismissed the case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Jones v. United States" on Justia Law

During the Iraq War, the U.S. military established the Radwaniyah Palace Complex as a base of operations. Staff Sergeant Maseth was stationed there and assigned to live in a barracks building that predated the war and was known to have significant electrical problems. In 2008, Staff Sergeant Maseth died by electrocution while taking a shower in the barracks. The shower was electrified by an ungrounded, unbonded water pump. Maseth’s estate and his parents sued KBR, a military contractor hired to perform maintenance services at the barracks. The district court dismissed, holding that the case was nonjusticiable and, alternatively, that the claims were preempted by the federal policy embodied in the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant activities exception, 28 U.S.C. 2680(j). The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the claims are not preempted by the combatant activities exception and reasoning that the political question issue requires a preliminary determination of which state’s law controls. View "Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Flora is the widow of Donald, a World War II veteran, honorably discharged in 1945 after being diagnosed with diabetes mellitus. At that time the VA found his diabetes to be service-connected and gave him a disability rating of 40%. Beginning in 1950, Donald was hospitalized at various times for complications and declining health as a result of his diabetes and repeatedly, unsuccessfully, requested increases in his disability rating. In 1961, the Director of the Compensation and Pension Service found “clear and unmistakable error” and increased the rating to 60%, effective 1961. Ultimately, Donald’s disability rating was increased to 100%, effective 1965. Donald died in 1969, from complications of diabetes. Flora was granted dependency and indemnity compensation, 38 U.S.C. 1310, and filed a claim under 38 U.S.C. 1311(a)(2), which provides that a surviving spouse may qualify for increased benefits if the veteran received “or was entitled to receive . . . compensation for a service-connected disability that was rated totally disabling for a continuous period of at least eight years immediately preceding death.” The VA denied the claim in 2003. Flora pursued appeals, which were ultimately rejected by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Kernea v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former members of the armed forces, brought suit against defendants, two former Secretaries of Defense, alleging that they were victims of rape and sexual misconduct by fellow servicemembers during their military careers. Plaintiffs sought money damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The court held that no Bivens action will lie where special factors counsel hesitation in creating an implied right of action and special factors clearly counsel hesitation in implying a cause of action for injuries arising out of military service. The court concluded that judicial abstention was the proper course in this case pursuant to Chappell v. Wallace, United States v. Stanley, and Feres v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Cioca v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

Yonek served on active duty in the Navy from 1973 to 1977 and in 1991-1992. In 1991, Yonek aggravated a preexisting injury to his right shoulder, leaving the motion of his arm permanently limited. The VA regional office granted service connection for the injury, assigning a rating of 10 percent. Over the next 17 years, Yonek underwent at least 15 examinations, measuring his range of motion for flexion, elevation of the arm in a forward direction, and abduction, elevation of the arm outward from the side of the body. The results showed a range of motion of anywhere between 80 and 180 degrees in flexion and 60 and 180 degrees in abduction. In 1999, the RO increased the rating to 20 percent, concluding that motion was limited to a point at or below shoulder level but past the midpoint between the side and the shoulder (between 45 and 90 degrees). The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied his appeal. The Veterans Court held that diagnostic code 5201 only allows a single disability rating for each injured shoulder even though Yonek’s shoulder manifests limitation of motion with respect to both flexion and abduction. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the schedule in 38 C.F.R. 4.71a only allows a single disability rating. View "Yonek v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity from tort suits, 28 U. S. C. 1346(b)(1), except for certain intentional torts, including battery; it originally afforded tort victims a remedy against the government, but did not preclude suit against the alleged tort-feasor. Agency-specific statutes postdating the FTCA immunized certain federal employees from personal liability for torts committed in the course of official duties. The Gonzalez Act makes the FTCA remedy against the U.S. preclusive of suit against armed forces medical personnel, 10 U. S. C. 1089(a), and provides that, “[f]or purposes of this section,” the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply to any cause of action arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of medical ... functions.” Congress subsequently enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, which makes the FTCA remedy against the government exclusive for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, 28 U. S. C. 2679(b)(1); federal employees are shielded without regard to agency or line of work. Levin, injured as a result of surgery performed at a U. S. Naval Hospital, sued the government and the surgeon, asserting battery, based on his alleged withdrawal of consent shortly before the surgery. Finding that the surgeon had acted within the scope of his employment, the district court released him and dismissed the battery claim. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Gonzalez Act served only to buttress the personal immunity granted military medical personnel and did not negate the FTCA intentional tort exception. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Gonzalez Act section 1089(e) abrogates the FTCA intentional tort exception, allowing Levin’s suit against the U.S. alleging medical battery by a Navy doctor acting within the scope of employment. The operative clause states, “in no uncertain terms,” that the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply,” and confines the abrogation to medical personnel employed by listed agencies. View "Levin v. United States" on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity from tort suits, 28 U. S. C. 1346(b)(1), except for certain intentional torts, including battery; it originally afforded tort victims a remedy against the government, but did not preclude suit against the alleged tort-feasor. Agency-specific statutes postdating the FTCA immunized certain federal employees from personal liability for torts committed in the course of official duties. The Gonzalez Act makes the FTCA remedy against the U.S. preclusive of suit against armed forces medical personnel, 10 U. S. C. 1089(a), and provides that, “[f]or purposes of this section,” the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply to any cause of action arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of medical ... functions.” Congress subsequently enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, which makes the FTCA remedy against the government exclusive for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, 28 U. S. C. 2679(b)(1); federal employees are shielded without regard to agency or line of work. Levin, injured as a result of surgery performed at a U. S. Naval Hospital, sued the government and the surgeon, asserting battery, based on his alleged withdrawal of consent shortly before the surgery. Finding that the surgeon had acted within the scope of his employment, the district court released him and dismissed the battery claim. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Gonzalez Act served only to buttress the personal immunity granted military medical personnel and did not negate the FTCA intentional tort exception. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Gonzalez Act section 1089(e) abrogates the FTCA intentional tort exception, allowing Levin’s suit against the U.S. alleging medical battery by a Navy doctor acting within the scope of employment. The operative clause states, “in no uncertain terms,” that the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply,” and confines the abrogation to medical personnel employed by listed agencies. View "Levin v. United States" on Justia Law