Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Alisha Strife, a former U.S. Army service member with disabilities, requested that her employer, Aldine Independent School District (AISD), allow her service dog to accompany her at work. Strife's disabilities include PTSD and physical impairments, and her service dog, Inde, assists her with these conditions. Strife submitted her accommodation request on August 30, 2022, but AISD took six months to approve it, during which time Strife provided multiple medical documents supporting her need for the service dog.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Strife's claims for failure to accommodate and hostile work environment. The court also granted AISD's motion for summary judgment on Strife's claims of disability discrimination, retaliation, and interference. The district court found that Strife did not suffer a physical injury during the six-month period and that she failed to allege a hostile work environment. The court also concluded that AISD had legitimate reasons for its actions and that Strife did not demonstrate that AISD's rationale was pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the hostile work environment claim, agreeing that Strife's allegations did not meet the standard for a hostile work environment. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the disability discrimination, retaliation, and interference claims, finding that AISD had legitimate reasons for its actions and that Strife did not provide sufficient evidence of pretext.However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Strife's failure-to-accommodate claim. The court found that Strife had pled sufficient facts to suggest that AISD's six-month delay in granting her accommodation request could constitute a failure to accommodate her disability. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on this claim. View "Strife v. Aldine Independent School District" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs are seven members of the South Dakota Air National Guard who also work as federal civilian employees of the Department of the Air Force. They are entitled to 15 days of paid military leave each year in their civilian roles. They allege that the Adjutant General wrongfully denied them military leave while they were serving on active duty, in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA).The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, dismissed the USERRA claims sua sponte without reaching the merits of the parties’ arguments. The court concluded that the plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of an antimilitary animus to prevail under USERRA. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to military leave. The court held that the plaintiffs do not need to show antimilitary animus because the benefit in question, military leave, is only available to members of the military. The court found that the plaintiffs' Title 10 orders converted their status from state militia members to federal service members, making them eligible for the 15 days of paid military leave under 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a)(1). The court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Christiansen v. Morrell" on Justia Law

Seven members of the South Dakota Air National Guard, who also work as federal civilian employees of the Department of the Air Force, alleged that the South Dakota Adjutant General wrongfully denied them military leave while they were serving on active duty, in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). The plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to 15 days of paid military leave each year in their civilian roles, which they were denied while on active duty.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, dismissed the USERRA claims sua sponte after a court trial, concluding that the plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of an antimilitary animus to prevail. The court did not reach the merits of the parties’ arguments and found that the plaintiffs had failed to plead or prove such animus. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to military leave. The court held that the plaintiffs did not need to show antimilitary animus because the benefit in question, military leave, is only available to members of the military. The court found that the plaintiffs' active duty under Title 10 orders was not "active Guard and Reserve duty" as defined by 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(6), and therefore, the exception in 32 U.S.C. § 709(g)(2) did not apply. Consequently, the plaintiffs were entitled to accrue military leave under 5 U.S.C. § 6323(a)(1) while serving on active duty under Title 10. The court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Christiansen v. Morrell" on Justia Law

Mr. Anthony W. Knox, a former Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and a member of the United States Air Force Reserves, brought reemployment and discrimination claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). He sought to retroactively correct the effective dates of a within-grade pay increase and a promotion. Knox was deployed on active duty from November 2002 to November 2003. During his deployment, his DEA supervisor indicated that his next within-grade increase should be effective February 23, 2003, but it was incorrectly set as April 20, 2003. Knox returned to the DEA in November 2003 and was eventually promoted to GS-13 in April 2016.The Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) granted Knox’s within-grade increase reemployment claim but denied his promotion claims and his within-grade increase discrimination claim. The Board found that the delay in Knox’s within-grade increase was an administrative error unrelated to his military service and that his promotion was discretionary, not automatic.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Board’s denial of Knox’s discrimination claims, finding substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that the delay in his within-grade increase was not due to his military service. However, the court vacated and remanded the Board’s decision on Knox’s promotion reemployment claim, stating that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard by requiring Knox to prove he was entitled to an automatic promotion. The correct standard is whether Knox may have been entitled to the promotion, considering factors such as whether the promotion was generally granted to all employees and whether it was reasonably certain that the benefit would have accrued but for his military service. View "KNOX v. DOJ " on Justia Law

The case involves two American Airlines pilots, James P. Scanlan and Carla Riner, who sued their employer for failing to pay them and provide certain benefits while they were on short-term military leave. They claimed that the airline violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which provides employees on military leave the right to receive the same employment benefits as other similarly situated employees. They also claimed that the airline breached their profit-sharing plan by failing to account for imputed earnings during periods of military leave.The District Court granted summary judgment for the airline on all claims. It held that the pilots could not prevail on their USERRA claims because short-term military leave is not comparable to jury-duty or bereavement leave when comparing duration, frequency, control, and purpose. It also concluded that, under Texas law, the profit-sharing plan unambiguously excludes imputed income from periods of military leave.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment for the airline on the breach of contract claim. However, it reversed the judgment for the airline on the USERRA claims, stating that a reasonable jury could find that short-term military leave is comparable to jury-duty leave or bereavement leave based on the three factors mentioned in the implementing regulation, and any other factors it may consider. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the USERRA claims. View "Scanlan v. American Airlines Group Inc." on Justia Law

In the case at hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed an employment discrimination case. The plaintiff, LuzMaria Arroyo, a military reservist, brought a lawsuit against her employer, Volvo Group North America, LLC, alleging discrimination based on her military status and her post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After a jury ruled in Arroyo's favor and awarded her $7,800,000 in damages, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Volvo on Arroyo’s Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claim, and ordered a new trial on the remaining Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) claim, where the jury found for Volvo. Arroyo appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Arroyo was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA as she failed to comply with Volvo's attendance policy, an essential job function. Arroyo's positive job performance reviews did not negate her violation of the attendance policy. The court also found no conflict with its previous decision in Arroyo I, which had reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Volvo on the ADA and USERRA claims.Further, the court upheld the district court's decision for a new trial on the USERRA claim. The court agreed that the jury’s verdict as to the ADA claim was influenced by passion and prejudice that also tainted the jury’s determination of USERRA liability. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude evidence of Arroyo’s PTSD in the new trial, as PTSD alone was not sufficient to raise a cognizable discrimination claim under USERRA. View "Arroyo v. Volvo Group North America, LLC" on Justia Law

A collective-bargaining agreement between the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the United States Maritime Alliance (USMX), an association of carriers and other employers, earmarks all container loading and unloading work on the East and Gulf Coasts for the union’s members. So when USMX-affiliated ships docked at a new South Carolina terminal that used non-union lift operators, the union sued USMX and its carrier members for damages. Soon enough, USMX’s carrier members stopped calling at that terminal. At issue is whether the ILA’s lawsuit—and a separate provision of its contract with USMX—violate the National Labor Relations Act. The National Labor Relations Board held that they don’t, and the South Carolina State Ports Authority petitioned for review.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Board and denied the petition. The court agreed that USMX and the ILA haven’t made an agreement that violates Section 8(e). Moreover, the court explained that the Board rationally held that the ILA’s lawsuit against USMX sought to preserve its coastwide jurisdiction over loading and unloading work, so it didn’t violate the Act. And the Board and ALJ correctly concluded that Section 7(b) of the Master Contract didn’t constitute an illegal hot-cargo provision, whether by its text or by tacit agreement. View "South Carolina State Ports Authority v. NLRB" on Justia Law

After serving in the United States Navy, Plaintiff became eligible to receive education benefits under the G.I. Bill, which he used to pursue a bachelor’s degree. Plaintiff also sought tuition assistance from his employer, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), under the company’s Employee Education Program, but OPPD denied Plaintiff’s request because his G.I. Bill benefits fully covered his tuition expenses. Plaintiff sued, claiming that OPPD’s denial of company-provided tuition assistance based on his receipt of G.I. Bill benefits amounted to unlawful discrimination under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The district court granted summary judgment in OPPD’s favor, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff y has “failed to present sufficient evidence to make” the requisite “threshold showing” that his status as a military veteran was “a motivating factor” in OPPD’s decision to deny him EEP benefits. His discrimination claim under USERRA thus fails, and the district court properly granted summary judgment in OPPD’s favor. View "Andrew Kelly v. Omaha Public Power District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Air Force veteran, appeals from a decision of the Physical Disability Board of Review (“Board”) declining to increase his disability rating, which would entitle him to greater benefits. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments that the Board was required to conduct a physical examination before making its decision and that its decision was arbitrary and capricious.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that by arguing that he could not be taken off the List or have his temporary 50% rating lowered until the Air Force conducted a physical examination—an examination that necessarily could not occur until years after his retroactive placement on the List—Plaintiff pushes for an interpretation that would effectively grant a retroactive 50% rating for years to all individuals whose disabilities are reviewed by the Board and fall under Section 4.129. But that defies the purpose of the Board: to ensure accurate disability determinations at the time of a member’s discharge, “based on the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented to the” Board. The court, therefore, rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Board was required to order a new physical examination before making its determination. Ultimately, the court concluded that its decision was supported by substantial evidence, with a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” View "Blair Coleman v. Frank Kendall" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (collectively, the Officers) worked as police officers for the City of Hoover, Alabama. They also served as military reservists. Over a two-decade span, the Officers were summoned to active-duty service a combined thirteen times. While away, Hoover did not provide the Officers the same holiday pay and accrued benefits that it gave employees on paid administrative leave. This disparate treatment prompted the Officers to sue Hoover under USERRA. And it led the district court to grant summary judgment for the Officers. On appeal, Hoover argued that the Officers are not similar to employees placed on paid administrative leave. Second, Hoover asserted that military leave is not comparable to paid administrative leave.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Hoover violated Section 4316(b)(1)(B) by not providing the Officers the same benefits on military leave that it afforded similar employees on paid administrative leave. The court concluded that the DOL’s interpretation of Section 4316(b)(1)(B) deserves deference. Thus, to the extent Congress spoke to the meaning of “status” and “pay,” the legislative history suggests that it did so in a way that defeats Hoover’s interpretation. Further, the court reasoned that had the Officers been placed on paid administrative leave instead of military leave, they would have received holiday pay and accrued benefits for each period of service, including those shorter than sixteen months. So, the district court should have found the two forms of leave comparable in duration. However, the court affirmed because the district court reached the correct conclusion. View "Thaddaeus Myrick, et al v. City of Hoover, Alabama" on Justia Law