Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants - AFGE, several AFGE locals that represent Air Reserve Technicians (ARTs), and ART Mark Winstead - challenged three Air Force instructions requiring ARTs to wear military uniforms while performing civilian duties. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal because the exclusive remedial scheme of the CSRA precluded AFGE's claims.View "American Federation of Government Employees, et al v. Secretary of the Air Force" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. The district court held that plaintiff's claims under the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-35, were barred by the four-year federal "catch-all" statute of limitations. The court held that section 1658(a) applied to plaintiff's claims because the language of that section unambiguously applied to civil actions arising under laws which, like USERRA, were enacted after December 1, 1990, and USERRA's successor statute did not apply retroactively. The court also held that plaintiff did not file this action within four years of its accrual, notwithstanding his tolling arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "Baldwin v. City of Greensboro" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, alleging that after fulfilling his two-week training obligation with the Army Reserve, he was terminated in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-4335, and Texas Government Code 613.001-613.023. The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing to apply collateral estoppel to the ALJ's finding in a state administrative proceeding where a finding that plaintiff was discharged due to a disagreement about military service was not the equivalent of a finding that the County was motivated by his military status to discharge him; the court did not analyze the possible collateral estoppel effects of the ALJ's decision on a section 4312 claim because no one has briefed it; and the technical failure to plead all the currently presented defenses did not prevent consideration of them. The court also concluded that section 613.021 established venue in state court and had no effect on the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment. View "Bradberry v. Jefferson County, Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Secretary of the Department of the Army, alleging age discrimination and retaliation claims. As a threshold matter, the court concluded that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., federal sector provision applied here, and the court need not decide whether a federal plaintiff must prove but-for-causation or some lesser standard under 29 U.S.C. 633a because plaintiffs' complaint stated a claim for relief under the heightened, but-for standard in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court plaintiffs have stated a claim for which relief could be granted under section 633a where plaintiffs were within the protected class under the ADEA, plaintiffs were qualified for the two newly-created positions at issue; plaintiffs were not selected for the positions; a "substantially younger" employee was selected for one of the positions instead; and one of the officials with decision-making authority over the younger employee's selection said that the department needed "new blood." Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' age discrimination claims and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Leal, et al. v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, LLC as an active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) group leader. In 2008, Plaintiff, member of the U.S. Navy, was called to active duty. During Plaintiff's tour of duty, Pfizer restructured its API department, eliminating the API group leader position and replacing it with two separate classifications, API team leader and API service coordinator. After being discharged from active military service, Plaintiff was appointed to the API service coordinator position. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Pfizer, asserting Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act claims and pendant state law claims, alleging, inter alia, that Pfizer violated his rights by failing to provide him with an opportunity to apply for the API team leader position. The district court concluded that because the API team leader was not an automatic promotion, the escalator principle and reasonable certainty test did not apply to Plaintiff's claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's judgment and remanded, holding that the escalator principle and reasonable certainty test apply regardless of whether the promotion at issue is automatic or non-automatic. View "Rivera-Melendez v. Pfizer Pharms., LLC" on Justia Law

Antonellis, a member of the Navy Reserve since 1986, is a member of boththe Selected Reserve, a paid unit, and the Individual Ready Reserve, which is unpaid. From 2009 through 2011, Antonellis submitted 69 applications, but he was not assigned to any Selected Reserve billet and was instead assigned to a Volunteer Training Unit in the Individual Ready Reserve. He performed those duties without pay. In 2011 Antonellis filed suit under the Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. 206(a), asserting that, based on his outstanding service record and the standards described in the Commander’s guidance letter, he “has been clearly entitled to a pay billet” and that the decision not to assign him to a Selected Reserve pay billet was arbitrary. He sought more than $64,700 in back pay. The Claims Court dismissed the claim as nonjusticiable, because there were no standards by which it could review the Navy’s assignment decisions. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Antonellis v. United States" on Justia Law

Harkness, a reserve Commander in the Navy Chaplain Corps, was denied a promotion to the rank of Captain by an annual selection board. The Secretary of the Navy denied his request to convene a special selection board (SSB) to review that decision. Harkness filed suit, claiming that promotion policies and procedures for chaplains violated the Establishment Clause. The district court dismissed, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies required by 10 U.S.C. 14502(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that non-promoted officers must first petition the Secretary to convene an SSB. The Secretary must weigh certain factors, including whether an administrative error caused the original selection board not actually to consider the officer, or whether a material error caused the original board to mistakenly fail to recommend promotion. If the Secretary determines that an SSB is not warranted, the officer can seek review of that denial in federal court. The language of Harkness’s request apparently challenged only the composition of the board and fell short of giving the Secretary a meaningful opportunity to respond to Harkness’s constitutional contention. View "Harkness v. United States" on Justia Law

Federal employees who are members of the National Guard are entitled to up to 15 days of annual military leave “without loss in pay, time, or performance or efficiency rating,” 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). Before a 2000 amendment, the Office of Personnel Management interpreted the section as providing 15 calendar days of leave, rather than 15 workdays; federal employees who attended reserve training on non-work days were charged military leave. The Federal Circuit held that even before 2000, federal agencies were not entitled to charge employees military leave on non-workdays. Tierney worked at the DEA, 1974-2001, and was a member of the Air National Guard. He filed a Merit Systems Protection Board claim that the DEA charged him military leave for reserve duty on 44 non-workdays, so that he took annual leave or unpaid leave for military duty. An AJ ordered DEA to compensate Tierney for 17 days. The full Board reversed, finding that the Military Leave Summary and Tierney’s testimony were based solely on his military records and on speculation that DEA improperly charged military leave on intervening non-workdays and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that DEA charged him military leave on non-workdays or that he used annual leave for reserve duties. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Tierney v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Respondent filed an action under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(A), alleging that his former employer had submitted hundreds of false claims for payment under its federal contracts. At issue was whether a federal agency's written response to a request for records under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. 552, constituted a "report" within the meaning of the public disclosure bar. The Court held that a federal agency's written response to a FOIA request for records constituted a "report" within the meaning of the FCA's public disclosure bar where a "report," in this context, carried its ordinary meaning; where the Labor Department's three written responses in this case, along with the accompanying records produced to respondent's wife, were "reports" within the public disclosure bar's ordinary meaning; where the Court was not persuaded by assertions that it would be anomalous to read the public disclosure bar to encompass written FOIA responses; and whether respondent's suit was "based upon... allegations or transactions" disclosed in the reports at issue was a question to be resolved on remand. View "Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's employment was terminated by Minco as part of a reduction in force, he brought this action under the Uniformed Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. The court concluded that the jury's finding that plaintiff's position of employment would have been terminated had he not left for military service was entirely consistent with USERRA's text and its implementing regulations. Plaintiff did not properly preserve his remaining contention. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Milhauser v. Minco Products, Inc." on Justia Law