Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Two former pilots for a major airline, who also served as reservists in the United States Air Force, brought suit against their employer. They claimed that the airline forced them out of their jobs because of their military service obligations, and that the company’s handling of their pension contributions and vacation accrual during military leave violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The pilots had been investigated by the airline for abusing military and sick leave policies, including instances where they claimed sick leave from the airline but performed military duties on those days, and for reporting false military obligations to avoid work.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment to the airline on all claims. The court found that, while the pilots established a prima facie case that their military service was a motivating factor in their resignations, the airline demonstrated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions: the pilots’ abuse of sick-leave benefits. Regarding the pension-contribution claim, the district court determined that the pilots’ rates of compensation were not reasonably certain and that the airline’s method of calculating pension contributions during military leave exceeded statutory requirements. For the vacation-time claim, the court held there was no evidence showing that pilots on comparable non-military leave accrued vacation time, as required by USERRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all counts. The appellate court held that the airline’s actions were justified by the pilots’ misuse of sick leave, the pension calculations met or exceeded legal obligations, and the vacation accrual policy did not violate USERRA because no comparable leave existed. View "McLean v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

A former United States Navy Captain was convicted by a general court-martial of attempted sexual assault of a child, attempted sexual abuse of a child, and other offenses. The events leading to the charges occurred while he was stationed at a U.S. military base in Italy, where he engaged in electronic communications with a 14-year-old girl, S.M. After the girl’s parents, who worked for the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), became aware of the contact, NCIS initiated an investigation. An NCIS agent posed as S.M. online, leading to sexually explicit exchanges and ultimately a sting operation in which the accused arrived at a house expecting to meet S.M., but was arrested.The general court-martial found the accused guilty on several specifications, and he was sentenced to eight years’ confinement and dismissed from the Navy. On appeal, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions, rejecting his argument that his intent to commit the offenses was only conditional and thus insufficient for attempt under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces denied further review.The accused then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, arguing that the military courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCMJ and that the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Italy deprived the United States of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the petition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the military courts had subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCMJ, and the petitioner’s arguments regarding conditional intent went to the merits, not jurisdiction. The court also held that the NATO SOFA did not deprive the military courts of jurisdiction and could not be enforced by the petitioner in this context. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Dorrbecker v. Howard" on Justia Law

Two claimants, a veteran and a non-attorney representative, each appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals after an unfavorable Veterans Affairs regional office decision. In both cases, the Board dismissed their appeals as untimely due to a clear miscalculation of the filing deadline. Each claimant then filed a notice of appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”), seeking to overturn the erroneous Board dismissals and to have their cases reinstated for Board review.While the appeals were pending before the Veterans Court, the Board recognized its mistake and, on its own initiative, reinstated both claimants’ cases to its active docket, giving them the relief they had initially sought in their Veterans Court appeals. For one claimant, the Board later granted the full fee award requested; for the other, the Board remanded the benefit claims, and the regional office granted most but not all of the requested benefits.The Veterans Court, sitting en banc and by panel, dismissed both appeals as moot, holding that the Board’s actions rendered further judicial relief unnecessary. The court reasoned that the claimants had already received the relief available through judicial review, so no live controversy remained. The claimants argued that the filing of a notice of appeal divested the Board of jurisdiction and rendered its subsequent actions void.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the government that the claimants lacked standing. The Federal Circuit held that, because the claimants had obtained all the specific relief sought prior to appealing to the Federal Circuit, there was no remaining injury that the court could redress. Accordingly, the court dismissed both appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "KERNZ v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Kenneth Karwacki was convicted by a special court martial of delivering peyote to fellow soldiers and received a bad-conduct discharge from military service. Later, he applied for a permit to carry a concealed firearm in Wisconsin. The state denied his application under Wis. Stat. §941.29(1m)(b), which bars firearm possession by anyone convicted of a crime elsewhere that would be a felony if committed in Wisconsin. Although the military court labeled his offense a misdemeanor, Wisconsin classified his conduct as a felony under its own laws.Karwacki brought a federal lawsuit, arguing that Wisconsin’s decision to treat his military misdemeanor conviction as a state-law felony violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution and his Second Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin entered judgment in favor of the state, rejecting Karwacki’s claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to federal court martial convictions because such proceedings are not “judicial Proceedings of any other State,” nor has Congress prescribed any effect for court martial judgments in the states. The court also concluded that Wisconsin did not fail to give effect to the court martial’s judgment, as it imposed only collateral consequences under state law. Addressing the Second Amendment, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that neither the federal nor Wisconsin’s statutory scheme is facially invalid, and that individuals convicted of distributing illegal drugs are not entitled to as-applied relief from firearms disabilities. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed. View "Karwacki v Kaul" on Justia Law

An attorney entered into a fee agreement with a veteran to represent him in a claim for increased disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The agreement provided that the attorney would receive 20% of any past-due benefits awarded, and this fee would be paid directly by the VA from any such award. The veteran had previously requested an increased rating on his own, and after the attorney became involved and filed a notice of disagreement, the VA granted the increase, awarding past-due benefits. The VA initially determined the attorney was entitled to the agreed fee but failed to withhold it from the benefits paid to the veteran, resulting in an overpayment. The VA later paid the attorney and recouped the overpaid amount from the veteran’s future benefits.Subsequently, the veteran challenged the reasonableness of the attorney’s fee before the VA Office of General Counsel (OGC), which concluded that the fee was excessive considering the attorney’s limited involvement and the fact that the award was based on the veteran’s earlier request. The OGC reduced the allowed fee and ordered the attorney to refund the difference to the veteran. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed this decision. The attorney appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which also affirmed the Board’s determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under 38 U.S.C. § 7263(d), it lacked jurisdiction to review decisions by the Veterans Court regarding the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in such proceedings. The statute clearly provides that such orders by the Veterans Court are final and may not be reviewed by any other court. Therefore, the Federal Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "KENDALL v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The claimant, a veteran who served from 1986 to 1990, sought special monthly compensation (“SMC”) under federal law based on his total disability rating due to individual unemployability (“TDIU”). His TDIU was awarded because of several service-connected disabilities, including bowel and bladder incontinence, intervertebral disc syndrome, hypertension, radiculopathy, and cervical spine arthritis, resulting in a combined rating of ninety percent. He applied for SMC under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s), arguing that his TDIU and the underlying disabilities qualified him for this additional benefit.His claims for SMC were denied by the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office. He appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which found that he was not entitled to SMC because he did not have a single service-connected disability rated as totally disabling, nor was his TDIU based on one disability, as the statute required. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision, rejecting the argument that multiple disabilities could be combined to constitute “a service-connected disability rated as total” under the statute.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s). The court held that, based on the plain language of the statute, SMC eligibility requires a single service-connected disability rated as total. The court also held that the regulation allowing multiple disabilities to be combined for TDIU purposes does not satisfy the requirement for SMC under § 1114(s). The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. View "MACKEY v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Several married couples, with one spouse in each couple serving on active military duty, purchased educational materials from a business operating on military bases. The seller, George LeMay, through his company, brought lawsuits against these couples after they stopped payment, ultimately securing state-court judgments against each couple. Some judgments were later overturned, but LeMay sought to enforce the remaining judgments in Maryland using its Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The judgments were domesticated by Maryland state-court clerks without the procedural protections required by the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), such as affidavits regarding military status or appointment of counsel. The clerks also issued writs of garnishment, leading to the plaintiffs’ bank accounts being frozen. Plaintiffs eventually succeeded in vacating the judgments, but not before suffering financial harm.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against LeMay (later dismissed after settlement), the Governor of Maryland, and the Justices of the Supreme Court of Maryland, all in their official capacities. The district court found that the act of domesticating a judgment did not trigger the SCRA’s protections, but that issuing writs of garnishment did. It ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief but allowed their damages claims against the Justices to proceed, reasoning their supervisory role was sufficiently linked to the injuries. However, the district court ultimately granted summary judgment for the defendants, relying on legislative immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because their injuries were not fairly traceable to acts or omissions by the Governor or the Justices. The court concluded the plaintiffs failed to show any defendant’s action caused the injuries, and it remanded with instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Rouse v. Fader" on Justia Law

Lieutenant Ernest Mitchell, a U.S. Navy officer, was serving as the Command Duty Officer aboard the USS Howard when he left the ship without authorization to move his car prior to the ship’s relocation. He failed to inform his commanding officer or transfer his duties to another qualified person during his absence. This incident, along with prior documented deficiencies in communication and adherence to standards, led to a series of disciplinary actions. These included his detachment from the ship for cause, findings by a Board of Inquiry of violations under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, delay and eventual removal from a promotion list, and denial of his efforts to remove adverse records and secure his promotion.After exhausting administrative remedies, Mitchell filed suit against the Secretary of the Navy in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the Navy’s actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, determining that the Navy’s actions were reasonable and supported by a satisfactory explanation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo, applying a highly deferential standard to the military’s factfinding. The appellate court rejected Mitchell’s argument that he was entitled to promotion by operation of law under 10 U.S.C. § 624(d), holding that the statute does not mandate automatic appointment if the Executive decides against it. The court also found that the Board for Correction of Naval Records did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding Mitchell demonstrated substandard performance over an extended period. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy. View "Mitchell v. Phelan" on Justia Law

Several Iraqi citizens detained at Abu Ghraib prison during the U.S. occupation of Iraq alleged that, between October and December 2003, they were subjected to severe abuse by military police. The plaintiffs claimed that employees of CACI Premier Technology, Inc., a contractor providing interrogation services to the U.S. military, conspired with military personnel to “soften up” detainees for interrogation, resulting in torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT). While CACI’s contract required its personnel to operate under military supervision, evidence suggested inadequate oversight and that CACI employees directed some of the abusive tactics. Plaintiffs did not allege direct physical abuse by CACI interrogators, but asserted conspiracy liability.The case was initially filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, advancing claims under both the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and state law. Over time, the plaintiffs narrowed their suit to ATS claims for torture, CIDT, and war crimes, proceeding on conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting theories. The district court dismissed some claims and parties, and after two trials—one ending in mistrial—the jury found CACI liable for conspiracy to commit torture and CIDT, awarding significant compensatory and punitive damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed multiple legal challenges by CACI, including justiciability, immunity, preemption, and the state secrets privilege. The court held that application of the ATS was proper because the conduct at issue occurred within U.S.-controlled territory (Abu Ghraib during the CPA regime), was actionable under universal jurisdiction principles, and enough domestic conduct was involved. The court found that conspiracy liability and corporate liability are recognized under the ATS, and rejected CACI’s defenses and challenges regarding sovereign immunity, political question doctrine, preemption, and evidentiary rulings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment against CACI, vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of the United States on third-party claims due to sovereign immunity, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

A United States Army veteran who served in Vietnam from 1969 to 1972 sought increased disability compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After his retirement from a construction consulting career, the veteran was granted service-connected disability compensation for PTSD, and his rating was eventually increased to 50 percent. In 2021, the veteran applied for a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b), asserting that his PTSD rendered him unable to secure or follow substantially gainful employment.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the TDIU claim, finding that the veteran’s education, training, and work history demonstrated adaptability, and that he was physically and mentally capable of performing certain jobs with limited social interaction. The Board listed warehouse worker, assembly line worker, and custodian as illustrative occupations he could perform. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board’s denial, reasoning that the Board was not required to identify actual jobs in the market and that any error in doing so was harmless, relying on precedent that TDIU determinations do not require analysis of specific job market opportunities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court may have committed legal error in its harmless-error analysis, specifically by misreading precedent and by applying a rigid rule inconsistent with the proper harmless-error standard. The court vacated the Veterans Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, instructing it to reconsider the challenge regarding the Board’s use of illustrative jobs in its TDIU denial. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "JANICH v. COLLINS " on Justia Law