Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Lieutenant Ernest Mitchell, a U.S. Navy officer, was serving as the Command Duty Officer aboard the USS Howard when he left the ship without authorization to move his car prior to the ship’s relocation. He failed to inform his commanding officer or transfer his duties to another qualified person during his absence. This incident, along with prior documented deficiencies in communication and adherence to standards, led to a series of disciplinary actions. These included his detachment from the ship for cause, findings by a Board of Inquiry of violations under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, delay and eventual removal from a promotion list, and denial of his efforts to remove adverse records and secure his promotion.After exhausting administrative remedies, Mitchell filed suit against the Secretary of the Navy in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the Navy’s actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, determining that the Navy’s actions were reasonable and supported by a satisfactory explanation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo, applying a highly deferential standard to the military’s factfinding. The appellate court rejected Mitchell’s argument that he was entitled to promotion by operation of law under 10 U.S.C. § 624(d), holding that the statute does not mandate automatic appointment if the Executive decides against it. The court also found that the Board for Correction of Naval Records did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding Mitchell demonstrated substandard performance over an extended period. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy. View "Mitchell v. Phelan" on Justia Law

Several Iraqi citizens detained at Abu Ghraib prison during the U.S. occupation of Iraq alleged that, between October and December 2003, they were subjected to severe abuse by military police. The plaintiffs claimed that employees of CACI Premier Technology, Inc., a contractor providing interrogation services to the U.S. military, conspired with military personnel to “soften up” detainees for interrogation, resulting in torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT). While CACI’s contract required its personnel to operate under military supervision, evidence suggested inadequate oversight and that CACI employees directed some of the abusive tactics. Plaintiffs did not allege direct physical abuse by CACI interrogators, but asserted conspiracy liability.The case was initially filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, advancing claims under both the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and state law. Over time, the plaintiffs narrowed their suit to ATS claims for torture, CIDT, and war crimes, proceeding on conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting theories. The district court dismissed some claims and parties, and after two trials—one ending in mistrial—the jury found CACI liable for conspiracy to commit torture and CIDT, awarding significant compensatory and punitive damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed multiple legal challenges by CACI, including justiciability, immunity, preemption, and the state secrets privilege. The court held that application of the ATS was proper because the conduct at issue occurred within U.S.-controlled territory (Abu Ghraib during the CPA regime), was actionable under universal jurisdiction principles, and enough domestic conduct was involved. The court found that conspiracy liability and corporate liability are recognized under the ATS, and rejected CACI’s defenses and challenges regarding sovereign immunity, political question doctrine, preemption, and evidentiary rulings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment against CACI, vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of the United States on third-party claims due to sovereign immunity, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

A United States Army veteran who served in Vietnam from 1969 to 1972 sought increased disability compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After his retirement from a construction consulting career, the veteran was granted service-connected disability compensation for PTSD, and his rating was eventually increased to 50 percent. In 2021, the veteran applied for a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b), asserting that his PTSD rendered him unable to secure or follow substantially gainful employment.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the TDIU claim, finding that the veteran’s education, training, and work history demonstrated adaptability, and that he was physically and mentally capable of performing certain jobs with limited social interaction. The Board listed warehouse worker, assembly line worker, and custodian as illustrative occupations he could perform. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board’s denial, reasoning that the Board was not required to identify actual jobs in the market and that any error in doing so was harmless, relying on precedent that TDIU determinations do not require analysis of specific job market opportunities.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court may have committed legal error in its harmless-error analysis, specifically by misreading precedent and by applying a rigid rule inconsistent with the proper harmless-error standard. The court vacated the Veterans Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, instructing it to reconsider the challenge regarding the Board’s use of illustrative jobs in its TDIU denial. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "JANICH v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Gene Cleveland Battieste, a veteran, underwent surgery at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi in 2006. Although he had consented to surgery on certain cervical vertebrae, an additional procedure was performed on his C2 vertebra without his knowledge or consent. Following the surgery, Mr. Battieste experienced post-operative complications, including infection and increased pain. He applied for VA disability benefits in 2008, which were ultimately approved in 2020. The 2020 decision by the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals was the first time Mr. Battieste or his family learned of the unauthorized surgery and the VA’s failure to provide proper informed consent or adequate post-operative care. Mr. Battieste died in 2022.In November 2022, the administrator of Mr. Battieste’s estate filed an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which the VA denied. In May 2024, a lawsuit for medical negligence was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Mississippi’s medical malpractice statute barred any action brought more than seven years after the alleged negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-36(2)’s seven-year period is a statute of repose, not merely a statute of limitations. The court found that Mississippi’s intermediate appellate courts consistently interpret the seven-year provision as an absolute bar to claims, and the statute’s structure and language support this reading. Because the suit was filed more than seven years after the surgery, the court held the claim was time-barred and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Battieste v. United States" on Justia Law

A married couple jointly petitioned for dissolution of their marriage in Alaska, reaching a written agreement to divide their assets, including the husband’s military benefits and the marital home. At the time of the dissolution, the husband was receiving monthly payments from the Coast Guard, which were described in the petition as “retirement benefits.” Both parties confirmed in court that the agreement was voluntary and fair, and the husband agreed to pay half of his military benefits to his spouse directly. The superior court master found the agreement satisfied statutory requirements and recommended approval, which the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kodiak, then incorporated into the dissolution decree.After the decree was issued, the husband began labeling payments as both “retirement” and “disability pay.” Upon learning from Coast Guard officials that his payments were actually Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) and not divisible as marital property under federal law, he filed motions challenging the enforceability of the decree, arguing that federal law barred division of his benefits and raising claims of mistake, fraud, and coercion. The Superior Court denied his motions, finding he had voluntarily consented to the division and that his challenges were untimely under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), as more than one year had passed since the decree. The court also addressed an ancillary dispute regarding removal of the husband’s name from the mortgage of the marital home, ultimately finding both parties responsible for delays and declining to order a forced sale.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the appeal. It held that even if the decree divided benefits contrary to federal law, this did not render the judgment void or entitle the husband to relief under Civil Rule 60(b). The husband’s claims of mistake, fraud, or coercion were time-barred, and no extraordinary circumstances justified relief. The court further determined the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in resolving the mortgage issue. The judgment was affirmed. View "Million v. Hubert" on Justia Law

Three individuals living with well-managed HIV, whose infections are controlled by daily medication and who have undetectable viral loads, sought to join or rejoin the U.S. Army. They were denied enlistment based on Department of Defense and Army policies that list HIV infection as a disqualifying medical condition, alongside numerous other chronic or communicable diseases. A nonprofit organization, Minority Veterans of America, also supported their challenge. The plaintiffs argued that these policies violate their equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment and are arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The court issued a permanent injunction barring the Military from denying accession to asymptomatic HIV-positive individuals with undetectable viral loads, prohibiting enforcement of HIV-specific policy provisions, and ordering reevaluation of prior decisions made under these policies. The district court concluded that the Military’s justifications—based on medical, cost, and diplomatic concerns—were irrational, arbitrary, and capricious.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the judgment. Applying rational basis review with heightened deference to military judgments, the Fourth Circuit found that the Military’s policies were rationally related to legitimate military purposes, including maintaining deployable, medically fit servicemembers, minimizing complications from chronic conditions, controlling costs, and addressing diplomatic issues with foreign host nations. The court distinguished this case from Roe v. Department of Defense, which concerned policies for current servicemembers rather than initial entry. The Fourth Circuit held that the Military’s HIV accession policy did not violate the Fifth Amendment or the APA and reversed the district court’s judgment, remanding with instructions to enter judgment for the Military. View "Wilkins v. Hegseth" on Justia Law

A veteran who served in the U.S. Navy sought service-connected disability benefits for several medical conditions, including asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), and an enlarged prostate. He claimed that GERD and prostate issues were secondary to COPD, which he alleged was caused by exposure to lead paint during his military service. The veteran submitted medical articles and sworn statements supporting the connection between lead exposure and these conditions in February 2022 during an appeal for asthma and COPD. When he later appealed the denial of benefits for GERD and prostate conditions, he attached an addendum to his Notice of Disagreement (NOD) directing the Board of Veterans’ Appeals to consider the previously submitted evidence.After the regional office denied his claim, the veteran sought higher-level review, which was also denied. He then appealed to the Board, selecting an appeal track that allowed submission of additional evidence without a hearing. The Board denied his appeal, stating that no “new and relevant” evidence had been presented and refusing to consider the February 2022 evidence because it had been submitted before the NOD for the current claim. The Board reasoned that evidence must be submitted anew with each NOD to be considered. The veteran appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision, relying on Cook v. McDonough to hold that evidence submitted between the agency decision and the NOD was excluded from consideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo and held that the veteran satisfied the evidentiary submission requirement by clearly and timely referencing the prior submission in his NOD addendum. The court reversed the Veterans Court's decision, concluding that the Board must consider the evidence previously submitted and clearly incorporated by reference with the NOD. View "CASH v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

David Hamill served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 2009 to 2013 and was discharged under “Other Than Honorable” conditions. After his discharge, he sought disability compensation for PTSD and other conditions, but the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) denied his application in 2014, citing that his discharge status barred him from most benefits. He did not appeal. In 2017 and again in 2021, Hamill filed new claims for disability benefits, which the VA interpreted as attempts to reopen his character of discharge determination. The VA ultimately granted service connection for PTSD in 2021, but did not address his discharge status, leaving Hamill without an appealable decision on that issue. Hamill’s attorney later requested an adjudication of his discharge characterization, but the VA replied that he should seek a change through the Service Department.Hamill then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for a writ of mandamus to compel the VA to adjudicate his character of discharge claim. The Secretary moved to dismiss the petition as moot after the VA sent a letter in February 2023 explicitly finding no new and material evidence to reopen the discharge determination. Hamill also requested class certification, arguing the petition was not moot due to certain exceptions. A divided panel of the Veterans Court dismissed Hamill’s petition, concluding it was moot based on the implicit denial doctrine, which held that the 2021 VA decision implicitly denied his claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and held that under the Appeals Modernization Act (AMA), the VA can no longer implicitly deny claims; decisions must explicitly identify adjudicated issues. The court vacated the Veterans Court’s order dismissing Hamill’s petition and remanded the case for further proceedings, including consideration of mootness exceptions. Costs were awarded to Hamill. View "HAMILL v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

A veteran sought compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for a neck injury, initially filing his claim in 2007. The VA denied the claim, and in 2008, the veteran, with the help of a non-attorney representative, filed a notice of disagreement (NOD) to appeal the denial. In 2012, the veteran retained an attorney, who entered into a contingency fee agreement and subsequently filed an additional claim on the veteran’s behalf for service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The attorney also submitted new evidence and arguments to support both the neck injury claim and a claim for total disability based on individual unemployability (TDIU), referencing both the neck injury and PTSD.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals later found the neck injury was service connected and remanded the neck claim to the VA Regional Office for a rating decision, while referring the TDIU claim to the Regional Office, as it had not been addressed previously. The Regional Office ultimately granted past-due benefits for the neck injury, PTSD, and TDIU, but awarded attorney’s fees to the attorney only for the portion of benefits related to the neck injury—finding that the PTSD claim was not part of the appealed case under the relevant statute. The Board affirmed this determination, and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims also affirmed, concluding that the PTSD claim was not connected to the original NOD regarding the neck injury.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (2012), attorney’s fees may only be paid for services provided after an NOD is filed, and only for the “case” addressed by that NOD. The court affirmed that the PTSD claim was not part of the same case as the neck injury claim appealed in the 2008 NOD, and therefore attorney’s fees were not authorized for services related to the PTSD claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court. View "HOLSTEIN v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

A veteran who suffered a traumatic brain injury from an improvised explosive device while deployed sought financial assistance under the Traumatic Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance (TSGLI) program after experiencing a stroke within two years of the injury. The Army denied his claim, determining the stroke was a physical illness or disease, not a qualifying traumatic injury as defined by the relevant statute and regulations. The veteran then petitioned the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to amend its rules to include coverage for illnesses or diseases caused by explosive ordnance, arguing these conditions are analogous to those already covered under existing exceptions for injuries resulting from chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.The VA initially denied the rulemaking petition but agreed to further review as part of a program-wide assessment. After several years, extensive consultation with medical experts, and consideration of the petition and supporting materials, the VA issued a final denial. It concluded that expanding coverage to delayed illnesses or diseases linked to explosive ordnance would be inconsistent with TSGLI’s purpose, which focuses on immediate injuries, would deviate from the insurance model underlying the program, and could threaten its financial stability. The VA also found insufficient evidence of a direct causal relationship between explosive ordnance, traumatic brain injury, and downstream illnesses like stroke.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the VA’s denial under the highly deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the VA provided a reasoned explanation addressing the petitioner’s arguments and the record, and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. The petition for review was therefore denied. View "MCKINNEY v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS " on Justia Law