Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Rodney Wright, a totally disabled veteran, sought additional compensation for his adult daughter, B.W., under 38 U.S.C. § 1115(1)(F) after she elected to receive benefits from the Survivors’ and Dependents’ Educational Assistance (DEA) program. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) ceased paying Wright additional compensation for B.W. once she began receiving DEA benefits, citing 38 U.S.C. § 3562(2), which bars increased rates or additional amounts of compensation when a dependent elects DEA benefits.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied Wright’s request for additional compensation, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the Board’s decision. The Veterans Court held that section 3562 permanently barred Wright from receiving additional compensation under section 1115 once B.W. elected to receive DEA benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The Federal Circuit held that the nonduplication provision of section 3562 bars a disabled veteran from receiving additional compensation under section 1115(1)(F) once the veteran’s child begins receiving DEA benefits. The court also determined that this bar is permanent and does not lift after the exhaustion of DEA benefits. The court rejected Wright’s argument that the bar should only apply to concurrent receipt of benefits, finding no statutory basis for such an interpretation. The court concluded that section 3562 imposes a permanent bar on a veteran’s receipt of additional compensation under section 1115(1)(F) once the veteran’s child elects to receive DEA benefits. View "WRIGHT v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Respondents Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak bin ‘Atash, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi are being tried by military commission at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for their roles in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In July 2024, they entered into pretrial agreements to plead guilty in exchange for the government not seeking the death penalty. However, on August 2, 2024, then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III withdrew from these agreements.The military commission judge and the United States Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) refused to recognize the Secretary’s withdrawal, ruling that the respondents had begun to perform under the agreements. The CMCR denied the government’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition, and the military judge scheduled the entry of the respondents’ pleas. The government then sought relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Secretary of Defense had the legal authority to withdraw from the pretrial agreements. The court found that the respondents had not begun performance of promises contained in the agreements, as their actions did not constitute the beginning of performance under the agreements' terms. The court concluded that the government had no adequate alternative remedy and that the equities warranted the issuance of writs of mandamus and prohibition. Consequently, the court granted the government’s petition, vacated the military judge’s order preventing the Secretary’s withdrawal, and prohibited the military judge from conducting hearings to enter guilty pleas under the withdrawn agreements. View "In re: United States of America" on Justia Law

Annette R. Deal served in the U.S. Navy and Army and filed a claim for compensation for Cushing’s syndrome and a nervous condition in 1991, which was denied in 1992. She received treatment within the appeal period, resulting in a 1993 medical record being added to her file. The VA did not address whether this record met the requirements to be considered new and material evidence until 2021. Mrs. Deal did not appeal the 1992 decision. She filed another claim in 1995, which was partially granted, and a third claim in 2003, leading to a 2016 decision granting service connection for her psychiatric disorder with an effective date of August 1, 2003.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals granted an effective date of March 10, 1995, for her psychiatric disorder, ruling that new and material evidence was presented in 1997. However, it denied an effective date of October 1991, ruling that the 1993 record was not material. Mrs. Deal appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which affirmed the Board’s decision, finding a plausible basis for ruling that the 1993 record was not material.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. Mrs. Deal argued that the VA’s failure to address the 1993 record before the 2016 decision meant her 1991 claim remained open, entitling her to an earlier effective date. The court disagreed, stating that the VA’s delay does not automatically entitle a claimant to an earlier effective date unless the evidence is determined to be new and material. The court affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision, holding that the 1993 record was not material and the 1992 decision was final. View "Deal v. Collins" on Justia Law

Travis Bearden, a firefighter and paramedic for the City of Ocean Shores, joined the U.S. Army Reserves in 2013. He took periodic absences for military service, receiving paid military leave from the city. The dispute centers on military leave Bearden took between 2019 and 2021. During his first and second leaves from October 2019 to August 2020, Bearden was kept on the schedule and provided paid military leave for his scheduled workdays until his paid leave was exhausted in February 2020. The city then placed him on leave without pay status. For his third leave from August 2020 to May 2021, the city did not provide Bearden any paid military leave for the October 2020-September 2021 military fiscal year, arguing he had no scheduled workdays.Bearden filed a complaint in federal court in January 2021, asserting the city violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) by denying him accrued leave, including paid military leave under RCW 38.40.060. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding Bearden was not entitled to paid military leave during his third leave because he was not scheduled to work on any day during the October 2020-September 2021 military fiscal year. Bearden appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of Washington’s paid military leave statute.The Washington Supreme Court held that public employees are entitled to 21 days of paid military leave for required military service during each military fiscal year, regardless of whether they are scheduled to work by the employer due to the length of their military service absence. The court emphasized that the statute’s plain language and purpose support this entitlement, and the scheduling of workdays does not limit the annual entitlement to paid military leave. View "Bearden v. City of Ocean Shores" on Justia Law

Ammar al-Baluchi, a Pakistani national, has been detained at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo Bay since 2006. He is accused of supporting the September 11, 2001, attacks as a senior member of al-Qaeda. In 2008, al-Baluchi filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. In 2022, he moved to compel the government to convene a Mixed Medical Commission to assess his eligibility for repatriation due to alleged torture and resulting serious health issues. The district court denied his request, ruling that detainees captured during non-international armed conflicts are not entitled to such examinations under the Third Geneva Convention or Army Regulation 190-8.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially stayed al-Baluchi’s habeas case pending the outcome of his military commission trial. After temporarily lifting the stay to consider his motion for a Mixed Medical Commission, the court denied the motion, leading al-Baluchi to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s nonfinal order. The court found that al-Baluchi did not demonstrate that the denial of his motion had the practical effect of denying injunctive relief or that it caused serious or irreparable harm requiring immediate review. The court noted that even if a Mixed Medical Commission found al-Baluchi eligible for repatriation, the government retained discretion to delay repatriation until the completion of his military commission proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Al-Baluchi v. Hegseth" on Justia Law

Anthony Stuart, a Navy veteran, appealed a decision by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) that denied him credit for his military service in computing his civilian retirement annuity. Stuart served in the Navy during three periods between 1974 and 1991 and was placed on the Permanent Disability Retirement List in 1994 with a 60% disability rating. He later entered federal civilian service and retired in 2015. Stuart did not waive his military retired pay to receive credit for his military service toward his Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) annuity.The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) initially decided that Stuart’s military service was not creditable toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay. OPM explained that by statute, Stuart could not receive both military retired pay and FERS credit for his military service unless his military retired pay was awarded for specific reasons, which did not apply to him. Stuart sought reconsideration, but OPM affirmed its decision. Stuart then appealed to the MSPB, where an administrative judge upheld OPM’s decision, and the full Board affirmed, modifying the initial decision to clarify the analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the MSPB’s decision. The court held that under 5 U.S.C. § 8411(c)(2), Stuart’s military service could not be credited toward his FERS annuity because he was receiving military retired pay and did not meet any statutory exceptions. The court rejected Stuart’s argument that his military retired pay, calculated based on his disability percentage, was not “based on” his military service. The court found that the statute clearly barred double crediting of military service for both military retired pay and a civilian retirement annuity. View "STUART v. OPM " on Justia Law

Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran, served from 2000 to 2006 and was medically retired due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In 2016, Soto applied for combat-related special compensation (CRSC) and was approved, but his retroactive compensation was limited to six years due to the Barring Act's limitations period. Soto filed a class-action lawsuit arguing that the CRSC statute should displace the Barring Act's limitations period.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Soto and the class, holding that the CRSC statute provides its own settlement mechanism, thus displacing the Barring Act. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed this decision, stating that the CRSC statute does not explicitly grant settlement authority and therefore cannot displace the Barring Act.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the CRSC statute does confer authority to settle CRSC claims, thereby displacing the Barring Act’s settlement procedures and limitations period. The Court reasoned that the CRSC statute authorizes the Secretary concerned to determine both the validity of CRSC claims and the amount due, creating a comprehensive compensation scheme. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Soto v. United States" on Justia Law

David J. Rudometkin was found guilty of several offenses by a military judge in 2018 and sentenced to seventeen years of confinement. His post-trial motion for a mistrial was denied by another military judge after the original judge was suspended for inappropriate conduct. Rudometkin then submitted FOIA requests to the Army and the Department of Defense for records related to the judges involved. The government either did not respond meaningfully or rejected the requests under FOIA exemptions.Rudometkin filed a pro se complaint in the District Court in 2020, challenging the government's withholding of records. He later amended his complaint to focus solely on records related to the appointment of the Chief Trial Judge. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government had adequately searched for records and appropriately withheld information under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. The court also denied Rudometkin’s motions to amend his complaint to include his original FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government did not establish that it properly withheld records under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege and had not shown that it released all reasonably segregable information. The court reversed and remanded on the segregability issue. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Rudometkin’s motion to amend his complaint, as his FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge was now live in a separate action. View "Rudometkin v. USA" on Justia Law

General Jeffrey Bannister enlisted in the Army in 1979 and was married to Patricia Erickson from 1980 to 1996. As part of their divorce proceedings, General Bannister agreed to elect Ms. Erickson as his Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) annuity beneficiary. In 1998, General Bannister married Trese Bannister. In 2017, he requested voluntary retirement, effective May 31, 2018, and elected Mrs. Bannister as his SBP annuity beneficiary. However, General Bannister died on May 27, 2018, before his retirement. Both Ms. Erickson and Mrs. Bannister submitted claims for the SBP annuity, and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) awarded it to Ms. Erickson based on the 1996 separation agreement.Mrs. Bannister appealed to the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) and the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), both of which upheld the decision to award the annuity to Ms. Erickson. Mrs. Bannister then appealed to the United States Court of Federal Claims, which denied her motion and granted the government's motion, concluding that 10 U.S.C. § 1448(d)(3) precluded Mrs. Bannister from receiving the annuity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 10 U.S.C. § 1448(d) governs the entitlement to General Bannister’s SBP annuity because he died on active duty before retirement. The court determined that Mrs. Bannister is the correct beneficiary under § 1448(d)(1), which defaults to the surviving spouse. The court found that the exception under § 1448(d)(3) for a former spouse did not apply because Ms. Erickson failed to submit a timely written request for a deemed election as required by § 1450(f)(3). Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims and remanded for a determination of the annuity benefits due to Mrs. Bannister. View "BANNISTER v. US " on Justia Law

In October 2022, NCIS investigators obtained a military warrant to seize but not search Joshua Lee Ray's cell phone. Despite this, they searched the phone and found evidence of child sexual abuse material. Ray moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment as the warrant did not authorize it. The district court granted the motion.The Government appealed, conceding the warrant did not authorize the search, there was no verbal authorization, and the warrant did not incorporate an affidavit requesting authorization. The Government argued the search was justified under the good faith exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government could not rely on the good faith exception because the warrant was not deficient; it simply did not authorize the search. The court emphasized that the NCIS exceeded the scope of the valid warrant, and the good faith exception did not apply to such conduct. The court affirmed the district court's decision to suppress the evidence. View "US v. Ray" on Justia Law