Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Military Law
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Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint, denial of his motion for leave to amend the complaint, and rejection of his motion to transfer the case to the United States Court of Federal Claims. After plaintiff served in the Marine Corps, he received an other-than-honorable discharge stemming from conduct. Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Correction Board's denial of his request to upgrade his discharge on the basis that his misconduct resulted from his mental and physical disabilities.The DC Circuit dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction because the Federal Circuit has exclusive rights over appeals from orders granting or denying the transfer of an action to the Court of Federal Claims. The court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint, and it correctly determined that amendment to cure the jurisdictional defect would have been futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "Palacios v. Spencer" on Justia Law

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Robinson served in the Marine Corps in the 1960s, with a deployment in Vietnam. He subsequently experienced heart problems. In 20016, Robinson saw his VA cardiologist, Dr. Sadoughian, who recommended diagnostic testing, but the testing was not performed. Nine months later, Robinson returned after a week in the hospital with blood clots in his leg. Dr. Sadoughian again recommended testing. Robinson received the prescribed testing in April 2007, 14 months after his initial recommendation. The results indicated “[c]oronary artery disease with prior inferior wall myocardial infarction.” In August 2010 the VA amended its regulations to add coronary artery disease to its list of conditions that are presumptively service-connected for veterans who were exposed to certain herbicides, 38 C.F.R. 3.309(e). In 2011, the VA retroactively granted disability benefits to Robinson for that disease following a “Nehmer” review. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied Robinson’s claim for an earlier effective date because the April 2007 test results were the earliest medical evidence demonstrating that he satisfied the criteria the disability rating. Robinson argued that he should not be penalized for the delay in scheduling tests and that he would have received an earlier effective date if the VA had provided him with prompt treatment as required by section 17.33(a)(2). The Board concluded that section 17.33 applies only to treatment and has no bearing on effective date criteria. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that the record did not indicate what caused the testing delay or whether Robinson would have satisfied the disability rating requirements earlier. View "Robinson v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

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Cousin served in the Army, 1951-1953. His entrance examination showed normal findings as to his back. In service, he injured his back while lifting cans; a month later, he complained of back pain. He was diagnosed with a mild back strain and placed on medically restricted duty. In 1952, his back condition was noted to have improved, and he was removed from restricted duty. Records from 1953 note back pain before service; an x-ray showed a “pedicle defect L5” and “spondylolysis.” He was placed on a permanent profile for a “weak back.” An examination report of his discharge noted his back had been taped in 1952 and that he was then asymptomatic. In 1954, Cousin unsuccessfully sought disability compensation for his back condition. Between 1979-2009, Cousin filed three unsuccessful applications to reopen that claim. In 2012, Cousin filed another application. In 2013, the regional office granted him service connection for a back disability effective January 2012. Cousin filed a Notice of Disagreement, arguing that an earlier effective date was warranted because there was clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in the prior denials. The Veterans Court upheld the denial, finding the Board “offered a plausible explanation for why the RO may have discounted the 1953 records.” The Federal Circuit reversed. Given the proper legal interpretation of defect in the regulation then in effect and the government’s factual concessions, the regional office could not, without error, have determined that spondylolysis was a “defect.” The 1954 decision contained CUE.VA View "Cousin v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's action against the Installation Commander of Camp Shelby Joint Forces Training Center and the denial of remand. The court held that the district court did not err by finding that Colonel Michel was a federal employee under 32 U.S.C. 502(f) and 28 U.S.C. 26781, and was therefore a federal employee shielded by the Westfall Act from individual liability. The court also held that the district court appropriately credited the certifications made here when it decided to substitute the United States as the party defendant in Michel's place and deny remand. Finally, plaintiff waived her challenge of the district court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. View "Gilmore v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Miller served in the government's military and civilian sectors before retiring. Because he became an “employee” before October 1982, Miller’s credit for military service can count toward the calculation of his civil service retirement annuity, subject to 5 U.S.C. 8332(c)(2). An annuitant who does not satisfy the requirements of section 8332(c)(2)(A)–(B) but wishes to count military service toward civil service retirement must waive his military retired pay for that period and, in some circumstances, pay a deposit. 5 C.F.R. 831.301(c). The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed the Office of Personnel Management determination of the periods of Miller’s government service that were “creditable” for calculating his civil service retirement annuity. The Federal Circuit concluded that the Board erred in its decision with respect to Periods One and Two, but upheld its decision with respect to Period Three. For concurrent military and civilian service in Period One, Miller is entitled to credit toward both his military and civilian retirement. Substantial evidence does not support the Board’s finding that Miller was in leave-without-pay status during Period Two; he was in a concurrent service situation and is entitled to have Period Two credited as civilian service. Miller is deemed to have had no civilian service during Period Three and has not made a deposit or waived his military retirement pay for this period. View "Miller v. Office of Personnel Management" on Justia Law

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The Army took photographs of detainees at military detention facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq after September 11, 2001. The ACLU sought records related to the treatment of detainees with a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted to the Department of Defense (DoD) and filed suit in 2004, after receiving no response. The district court ordered the government to produce or identify all responsive documents and ordered the release of the photographs with redactions, rejecting arguments that the photographs could be withheld under three FOIA exemptions. A third party released the photographs without authorization. During the pendency of an appeal, the government identified additional photographs potentially responsive to the FOIA request and attempted to withhold them under the same three exemptions. The district court again rejected these arguments. The Second Circuit reversed, in favor of DoD. The Protected National Security Documents Act of 2009 (PNSDA), 123 Stat. 2142, permits the government to withhold disclosure of any photograph “taken during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, through January 22, 2009.” Regardless of whether PNSDA is an exemption under FOIA, the Secretary of Defense’s certification, following an extensive, multi-step review process including recommendations of several senior U.S. military commanders, and the information provided by the DoD, satisfied PNSDA. View "American Civil Liberties Union v. United States Department of Defense" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that his discharge by a VA hospital and its employees intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him and tortiously interfered with his business relationships. The court held that the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) preempted plaintiff's FTCA tort claims relating to his discharge for alleged whistleblowing. Therefore, plaintiff could not bring his claim for lack of jurisdiction. View "Griener v. United States" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment for Dollar General in an action brought by plaintiff, after returning from military service, alleging that the company denied him reemployment as required under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). The court held that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to plaintiff's resignation; a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff's application for the store manager position at the Bryant store was sufficient to give a reasonable employer adequate notice that he was a returning service member seeking reemployment; Dollar General was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's USERRA claim because he was not obligated to seek reemployment through the leave coordinator; and judicial estoppel did not bar plaintiff's USERRA claim. View "Scudder v. Dolgencorp, LLC" on Justia Law

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Section 511(a) of the Veterans' Judicial Review Act barred the Community's action against the VA for failing to reimburse the Community for the care it provided to veterans at tribal facilities. In this case, the Community sought review of the VA's determination that two provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act did not require the VA to reimburse the Community absent a sharing agreement. The panel held that such a determination fell under the jurisdictional bar of section 511(a) because it was plainly a question of law that affected the provision of benefits by the Secretary of the VA to veterans, and the relief requested could clearly affect the provision of benefits. The panel also held that the presumption in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985), did not apply to section 511(a). Finally, the Community's argument that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1362 was waived. View "Gila River Indian Community v. US Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

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Arthur served on active Army duty, 1940-1945, as a prisoner of war of the German government for 25 months. He was service-connected for several disabilities and had VA claims pending when he died in 2011. Winters pursued those as a substituted claimant and her own claims for accrued benefits as his surviving spouse. In 2013, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied some claims and granted service-connected benefits for others, found that the awards were inextricably intertwined with Winters’s accrued benefits claim, and remanded for initial disability ratings and to readjudicate the accrued-benefits claim. The Board determined that a subsequent letter in which Winters sought earlier dates “d[id] not constitute [a] motion for revision,” directed the letter to the Regional Office, but did not notify Winters of its determination so that the 120-day appeal period did not start to run. In 2014, the Board denied Winters’s claims for entitlement to an earlier effective date and for accrued benefits. In 2016, the Veterans Court dismissed an appeal of the 2013 decision for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the 2014 decision as premature because the 2013 decision was not final. Winters sought attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d) for that decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of her application. The court lacked jurisdiction to award EAJA fees relating to an appeal over which it did not have jurisdiction. With respect to the 2014 Board decision, Winters was not a “prevailing party.” View "Winters v. Wilkie" on Justia Law