Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Public Benefits
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Long served in the Air Force, 1969-1976 and spent most of that time as an air traffic control radar repairman, working without ear protection near active runways. In 2009, Long filed a disability compensation claim for hearing loss and tinnitus. The Department of Veterans Affairs found his hearing loss and tinnitus were service-connected, assigning a 0% disability rating for his hearing loss and a 10% disability rating for his tinnitus according to the schedular rating criteria, 38 C.F.R. 4.85. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied his request for an extra-schedular rating. Long had argued that the schedular rating criteria did not capture the functional effects of his hearing loss, including ear pain caused by his hearing aids. The Veterans Court affirmed, finding no direct causal link between Long’s ear pain and his service-connected hearing loss.The Federal Circuit vacated. A secondary condition is considered service-connected if it is “proximately due to or the result of” a service-connected disability. Direct causation is not required. The court remanded, stating that the Veterans Court engaged in impermissible fact-finding. View "Long v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Bowling and Appling were discharged from military service under conditions other than honorable. Each eventually sought veterans’ benefits. Their discharges would statutorily bar the benefits at issue unless they came within an exception that applies where an offense led to the discharge and the service member was “insane” at the time of the offense, 38 U.S.C. 5303(b). The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found the regulatory definition of “insane” not to be met either in either case. The Veterans Court rejected their argument of unconstitutional vagueness of the insanity-defining regulation on its face, though not as applied to them. The court declined to take judicial notice of material outside the record, such as a publication by advocates for veterans addressing VA actions across a range of cases over many years.The Federal Circuit affirmed. The court upheld the Veterans Court’s refusal to take judicial notice; there was no "futility" in developing the record on the constitutional issue before the Board even if the Board could not have held the regulation unconstitutional. The Board could have performed at least record-development functions and associated fact-finding functions. The facial-vagueness challenge fails on the merits. The court noted that the regulation does not call for a categorical approach to interpretation. View "Bowling v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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The U.S. military sprayed over 17 million gallons of herbicides over Vietnam during “Operation Ranch Hand,” primarily Agent Orange. Concerns about the health effects of veterans’ exposure to Agent Orange led to the Agent Orange Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 11. For veterans who served in the Republic of Vietnam during a specified period, the Act presumes exposure to an herbicide agent containing 2,4-D or dioxin, 38 U.S.C. 1116(f), and presumes a service connection for certain diseases associated with herbicide-agent exposure, such as non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and soft-tissue sarcoma. The VA subsequently issued regulations extending similar presumptions to other groups of veterans. In 2017, the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee expressed concern that additional exposures to Agent Orange may have occurred in Guam.In 2018, MVA petitioned the VA to issue rules presuming herbicide-agent exposure for veterans who served on Guam or Johnston Island during specified periods. The VA denied MVA’s petition. The Federal Circuit rejected MVA’s petitions under 38 U.S.C. 502 to set aside the VA’s denial. MVA has not shown that the VA’s determination that the evidence did not warrant presuming exposure for every single veteran who served in named areas during the relevant period was contrary to law nor that the denial “lacked a rational basis.” View "Military-Veterans Advocacy Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

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George joined the Marine Corps in 1975 without disclosing his history of schizophrenic episodes. His medical examination noted no mental disorders. George suffered an episode during training. The Marines medically discharged him. George applied for veterans’ disability benefits based on his schizophrenia, 38 U.S.C. 1110. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied his appeal from a regional office denial in 1977. In 2014, George asked the Board to revise its final decision. When the VA denies a benefits claim, that decision generally becomes “final and conclusive” after the veteran exhausts the opportunity for direct appeal. George sought collateral review under an exception allowing revision of a final benefits decision at any time on grounds of “clear and unmistakable error,” 38 U.S.C. 5109A, 7111. He claimed that the Board applied a later-invalidated regulation to deny his claim without requiring the VA to rebut the statutory presumption that he was in sound condition when he entered service.The Veterans Court, Federal Circuit, and Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. The invalidation of a VA regulation after a veteran’s benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief based on clear and unmistakable error. Congress adopted the “clear and unmistakable error doctrine” developed under decades of prior agency practice. The invalidation of a prior regulation constitutes a “change in interpretation of law” under historical agency practice, not “clear and unmistakable error.” That approach is consistent with the general rule that the new interpretation of a statute can only retroactively affect decisions still open on direct review. The fact that Congress did not expressly enact the specific regulatory principle barring collateral relief for subsequent changes in interpretation does not mean that the principle did not carry over. View "George v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Groves served in the Army on active duty, 1970-1971, including service in Vietnam. In 1990, a VA regional office awarded Groves benefits for PTSD, shell fragment wounds, and a nerve injury. In 1998, Groves sought education benefits through the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VRE) program. Groves never attended the initial VRE evaluation—due at least in part to the isolated nature of his town and his asserted inability to travel—notwithstanding the VA counseling officer’s attempts to accommodate Groves over a period of years. During the ensuing proceedings, Groves twice sent the VA letters in which he stated that he “enjoin[ed]” further action on the claims.“The Board of Appeals ultimately denied Groves entitlement to VRE benefits, finding that his letters did “not constitute[] withdrawal[s] of the appeal, such that there [was] no basis for the Board to not proceed.” The Veterans Court affirmed, finding that the Board lacked authority to adjudicate Groves’s appeal under “Hamilton,” which required an automatic stay when requested by a veteran but that any error was harmless. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Veterans Court legally erred in finding that the Board was compelled to grant an automatic indefinite stay of proceedings; it should have determined whether Groves had established good cause for a stay and, if so, the appropriate duration and conditions of the stay. View "Groves v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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On active Army duty in the 1970s, Kennedy fell from a lawnmower and injured his knee. Although no disability was noted at his discharge, Kennedy received service connection for his knee injury in 2000. He later received service connection for depression secondary to his knee injury. In 2005, Kennedy died; his death certificate listed “melanoma, metastatic” as the immediate cause of death and listed “other significant conditions contributing to death,” including diabetes, hypertension, and “depression disorder.” Mrs. Kennedy three times unsuccessfully sought Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC), 38 C.F.R. 3.114. The VA found no evidence that Kennedy’s death was related to military service.In 2013, VA “Fast Letter 13-04, “Simplified Processing of Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) Claims,” instructed personnel to grant “service connection for the cause of death when the death certificate shows that the service-connected disability is [a] . . . contributory cause of death.” In 2015, the VA granted Mrs. Kennedy DIC, effective July, 2015. The Board of Appeals denied her appeal of the effective date, explaining that Fast Letter 13-04 was a “change[] to VA procedural manuals and guidance provisions,” not a liberalizing law or liberalizing VA issue. The Veterans Court affirmed, reasoning that Fast Letter 13-04 does not constitute a VA issue approved by the Secretary because it does not bind the Agency. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Kennedy forfeited her argument that the Veterans Court erred in its interpretation of “VA issue.” View "Kennedy v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Slaughter served on active duty in the Navy, 1975-1995. In 2008, a VA Regional Office determined that Slaughter, who is righthanded, suffered right ulnar nerve entrapment as a result of his service and awarded a 10% disability rating under 38 C.F.R. 4.124a, Diagnostic Code (DC) 8516. Slaughter pursued a higher rating. VA examiners eventually additionally diagnosed Slaughter with a median nerve injury, not service-connected. In 2018, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals increased Slaughter’s rating for right ulnar nerve entrapment to 40%, finding that it could not distinguish the symptoms of his service-connected ulnar nerve entrapment from those of his non-service-connected median nerve injury and attributing the entirety of the disability to the service-connected injury. The Board determined that it would be inappropriate to rate Slaughter under DC 8512, which provides ratings for injuries to the lower radicular group, because only the ulnar nerve entrapment was service-connected.The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. While the Veterans Court placed too heavy a burden on Slaughter to show prejudice, that error was harmless because the Board correctly interpreted section 4.124a. The section provides that “[c]ombined nerve injuries should be rated by reference to the major involvement, or if sufficient in extent, consider radicular group ratings” and refers to service-connected injuries, not to a combination of service-connected and non-service-connected injuries. View "Slaughter v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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The 2010 Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act required the VA to establish two programs to help individuals who provide eligible veterans with personal care services. One program provided assistance to family caregivers, 38 U.S.C. 1720G(a); the other provided assistance to general caregivers, section 1720G(b). The VA promulgated implementing regulations, 38 C.F.R. 71 (2015). In 2018, Congress amended the Act.; the VA MISSION Act expanded the class of veterans who qualify as eligible under the family caregivers program. The program now applies to all veterans regardless of their service dates, and there are new avenues for a veteran to qualify as eligible for benefits. The VA overhauled its regulations that attempted to clarify, streamline, and regularize implementation of the Act.Objectors challenged six definitions in 38 C.F.R. 71.15 and a residency requirement imposed in 38 C.F.R. 71.10(b). The Federal Circuit addressed standing; rejected challenges to the definitions of “three or more activities of daily living,” “serious injury,” “inability to perform one or more activities of daily living,” and “monthly stipend rate”; and to the imposition of a geographic residence requirement. View "Veteran Warriors, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs." on Justia Law

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Wolfe, who was enrolled in VA health care, obtained emergency treatment at a non-VA health care facility, incurring expenses of $22,348.25. Her employer-sponsored healthcare contract covered most of the expenses. She was responsible for a copayment of $202.93 and coinsurance of $2,354.41. The VA denied reimbursement of those expenses; 38 U.S.C. 1725(c)(4(D) bars reimbursement for “any copayment or similar payment.” Wolfe filed a Notice of Disagreement; rather than await the outcome of her appeal, Wolfe also filed a mandamus petition. The Veterans Court certified her requested class and granted her petition, invalidating a VA regulation prohibiting the reimbursement of deductibles and coinsurance for being within the category of “similar payments,” and requiring the VA to re-adjudicate claims denied under the invalidated regulation.The Federal Circuit reversed. Deductibles are excluded from reimbursement under the correct interpretation of the statute and other adequate remedies (appeal) were available with respect to coinsurance, so mandamus was inappropriate. Coinsurance is the type of partial coverage that Congress did not wish to exclude from reimbursement. View "Wolfe v. McDonough" on Justia Law

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Martinez-Bodon served on active duty in the Army, 1967-1969. In 2016, he sought benefits for diabetes and for anxiety secondary to his diabetes. At his VA psychiatric examination, he reported: “I can’t sleep well, my right eye trembles too much and that bothers me and I get very anxious about it.” He denied having other symptoms. The VA examiner found that these symptoms did not meet the “criteria for a mental condition as per DSM–5” and concluded that she could not establish a relationship between Martinez-Bodon’s diabetes and anxiety.The VA granted him a service connection for diabetes but denied him a service connection for a mental condition. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed. The Court of Veterans Claims rejected an argument that even without a formal diagnosis, his symptoms constitute a disability for service-connection purposes under Federal Circuit precedent defining “disability.” The Federal Circuit affirmed that 38 C.F.R. 4.125(a) and 4.130, “require a DSM–5 diagnosis as a precondition to compensate mental conditions.” View "Martinez-Bodon v. McDonough" on Justia Law