Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Before enactment of the 2008 Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act, if a veteran seeking DVA benefits died while his claim was pending, the veteran’s survivor could not take the place of the veteran and continue prosecuting the claim. The survivor had to file a claim for accrued benefits, 38 U.S.C. 5121, proceeding from the beginning of the process, regardless of how far the veteran’s claim had progressed. The Act, 38 U.S.C. 5121A, authorizes eligible survivors to be “substituted as the claimant for the purposes of processing the claim to completion.” The Federal Circuit rejected a challenge to regulations intended to implement the Act, which require that a request to substitute be filed with the agency of original jurisdiction (DVA regional office) within one year of the claimant’s death; the prospective substitute is required to submit evidence of his eligibility to substitute; and, if the claimant died while his appeal was pending before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the Board must dismiss the appeal without prejudice so that the agency of original jurisdiction can address the substitution request. If the agency of original jurisdiction grants the request to substitute, then the case returns to the same place on the Board’s docket that it held at the time of the veteran’s death. View "Nat'l Org. of Veterans Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Cogburn served in the Army, 1968-1971, including 12 months in Vietnam. In 1974, Cogburn sought VA disability compensation and pension benefits based on a severe nervous condition. A 1975 denial of his pension claim did not address the disability claim. He did not appeal. In 1983, Cogburn again sought disability compensation and pension benefits. He was diagnosed with Post-PTSD after a VA examination that failed to connect Cogburn’s PTSD to stressors from military service; the VA granted a non-service connection pension but denied service connection. In 1985, the Board of Veterans’ Appeal concluded that the record did not identify any in-service traumatic events, noting that Cogburn repeatedly failed to attend VA examinations to determine if service-connected stressors caused his PTSD. The Board determined that “the preponderance of the medical evidence suggests that the veteran’s post service emotional and adjustment difficulties are manifestations of schizophrenia.” There was no opportunity for further review. In 2002, Cogburn claimed that his 1974 disability compensation claim was never adjudicated. The RO determined that the claim was adjudicated as a claim for PTSD and had been implicitly denied in the 1985 decision. In 2012, on remand, the Board affirmed the finding of implicit denial. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed; the implicit denial rule applies to both formal and informal claims. Its use does not violate the VA due process regulation's notice provision.. View "Cogburn v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Dean, a preference-eligible veteran, applied for a position as a “Recent Graduate” Wage and Hour Specialist within the Department of Labor. The announcement stated that the position “is a part of the Pathways Employment Program,” open only to “[e]ligible recent graduates from qualifying educational institutions” and separately identified job qualifications (which did not include a minimum educational requirement) and program eligibility, which required a “degree or certificate from a qualifying educational institution within the previous two years,” or previous six years for certain veterans; 34 veterans met the requirements. Dean was not considered because he had not graduated within the timeframe. Dean filed an unsuccessful Veterans Employment Opportunities Act (VEOA) appeal. The Board cited 5 U.S.C. 3302(1), authorizing the President to except positions from the competitive service, and 5 U.S.C. 3308, limiting OPM’s ability to include minimum educational requirements for positions in the competitive service that are subject to examination. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that that the Board had jurisdiction under section 3330a of the VEOA because sections 3302(1) and 3308 are statutes relating to veterans’ preference, and that Dean’s veterans’ preference rights under those sections were not violated. View "Dean v. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Mulder served in the Army for three separate periods between 1982 and 1994, accumulating about two years of honorable service. In 1998, the VA assigned Mulder a 50% disability rating for two service-connected conditions. Mulder was arrested and charged with felonies. Because Mulder was unable to post bail on July 11, 2005, he remained in custody pending trial. On May 19, 2006, Mulder pleaded no contest and a conviction was entered. On June 16, 2006, the court ordered that Mulder serve an initial term of confinement of eight years, six months, followed by six years of supervised release, with credit for the 384 days he had been in custody, specifying May 19, 2006, as the “Date(s) Convicted.” The VA must reduce benefits payments if the recipient is incarcerated for a period in excess of 60 days for conviction of a felony, 38 U.S.C. 5313(a)(1), beginning on the sixty-first day of such incarceration. In July 2007, the VA notified Mulder that his felony conviction and resulting incarceration required it to reduce his disability compensation, effective July 19, 2006. The Board, the Veterans Court, and the Federal Circuit agreed with the VA’s use of the date of the plea and conviction in calculating the reduction. View "Mulder v. McDonald" on Justia Law

During the Vietnam War, herbicides were applied near the Korean DMZ in 1968-1969. The 2003 Veterans Benefits Act authorized benefits for children with spina bifida born to certain veterans, 38 U.S.C. 1821. In 2004, the VA amended its Manual to provide benefits for “individuals born with spina bifida who are the children of veterans who served with specific units … between September 1, 1967 and August 31, 1971” conceding that certain veterans who served in April 1968 to July 1969 were exposed to herbicides. The final rule, effective February, 2011, was applicable “to all applications for benefits that are received by VA on or after February 24, 2011 and to all applications … pending before VA,” the Veterans Court, or the Federal Circuit on February 24, 2011. McKinney filed a claim in 2010 for service connection based on exposure to Agent Orange during his DMZ service, which began in August 1969. The VA denied his claim. The period of presumed exposure expired one month before McKinney’s service. The VA finalized the 2011 regulation, which extended the presumed exposure period, and granted McKinney’s claim under that regulation, but denied him an effective date earlier than February 2011, so that he received benefits for the post-2011 portion of his claim. The Federal Circuit upheld the VA’s decision to assign the 2011 regulation a prospective effective date. View "McKinney v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In 2000, Herbert, a Navy veteran, sought disability benefits for PTSD, which he alleged was connected to a typhoon that his ship encountered travelling to Japan in 1956. Ship logs and letters confirm that the USS Mount McKinley weathered a bad storm around that time. A 2002 VA medical examination revealed no PTSD; the Regional Office denied the claim. Herbert filed notice of disagreement, but his hearing did not occur until 2008. Herbert underwent a 2004 examination at the VA’s Veterans Center and a 2006 examination by a private psychologist that both produced diagnoses of PTSD. A 2006 VA examination and a 2007 examination conducted at the VA’s behest did not. The Board of Appeal denied service connection finding Herbert not credible in testifying to witnessing others go overboard. The Veterans Court remanded. A VA examiner concluded that experiencing the typhoon itself was an adequate stressor to support a PTSD diagnosis, but that Herbert’s symptoms did not meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD” In 2011, Herbert had another private medical examination, which diagnosed PTSD based on the storm alone. In 2012, the Board rejected Herbert’s claim, finding him “not credible in reporting his psychiatric symptoms or the stressors.” The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Herbert v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Mr. and Ms. Haynes divorced in 1995. Mr. Haynes died in 2000. Ms. Haynes sought Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1310, as a “surviving spouse.” Because Ms. Haynes was not married to Mr. Haynes at the time of his death, the VA Regional Office denied the claim. Ms. Haynes later requested that the Regional Office reopen her claim on the presentation of new documentation showing a decision by the Army Board of Correction of Military Records to award Ms. Haynes an annuity as a “former spouse” under the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act , 10 U.S.C. 1447(10), which permits former spouses to receive annuities. The Regional Office denied the request. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals agreed, while acknowledging Ms. Haynes’ argument that because the basis for her divorce was physical abuse, she should not be required to demonstrate marriage at the time of Mr. Haynes’ death in order to receive DIC benefits. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. Although Mr. Haynes’ abusive actions were documented, the statute requires validly married spouses at the time of the veteran’s death. View "Haynes v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Toomer served in the Army, 1971 to 1974. He sought benefits for degenerative disc disease, claiming connection to a 1972 in-service back strain from lifting heavy objects. In 2004, a VA Regional Office denied the claim. In 2009, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, relying on a 2007 VA examination. Although Toomer was treated for a back strain in 1972, there was no evidence from subsequent clinical visits that his current pain was connected to that injury: a 1972 x-ray was normal; after January 1973, there were no complaints of back pain during service; and there were potential post-service injuries, considering his occupation as a construction worker. The Decision was mailed on June 2, 2009. On July 27, Toomer informed the VA that he had not received it. On August 4, the VA mailed another copy, noting that the veteran has “120 days from the date this decision was mailed to you (as shown on the first page of this decision) to file a Notice of Appeal,” On October 28, more than 120 days from the decision date, but within 120 days of the August letter, Toomer appealed to the Veterans Court, which dismissed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that even if it disagreed with that court’s finding that dates on the correspondence were not misleading, and did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances,” revisiting this finding was beyond its jurisdiction. View "Toomer v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Wingard, a 20-year veteran, died in 2005, from causes unrelated to his military service. His daughter sought a burial-plot or interment allowance (38 U.S.C. 2303) and burial benefits (38 U.S.C. 2302(a)(1)), which provides for burial benefits only in the case of a deceased veteran “who at the time of death was in receipt of compensation . . . or was in receipt of pension.”. The Board of Veterans Appeals granted an interment allowance, but denied burial benefits. In 1989, the Department had assigned Wingard a 0% disability rating for a service-connected hernia that had been treated and showed no sign of recurrence. Wingard’s disability rating remained at 0%l. He never received disability compensation, had no claims pending, and never received a Veterans-related pension. The Veterans Court held that 8 U.S.C. 7252(b) did not preclude review and that sections 1110 and 1155 allowed the Department to find some disabilities noncompensable and assign a 0% rating. The court did not address whether “in receipt of compensation,” included “entitled to receive compensation.” The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that Congress has barred the Veterans Court and Federal Circuit from conducting such review, which must be conducted through a direct review of rulemaking determinations under 38 U.S.C. 502. View "Wingard v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Mrs. Dixon was the spouse of a veteran. A 1996 an Order of Support issued by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Virginia ordered Mr. Dixon to pay Mrs. Dixon child support of $443.00 per month and spousal support of $1000.00 per month. Mrs. Dixon states that the Order required the Department of Veterans Affairs to garnish these sums from Mr. Dixon’s disability payments. Mr. Dixon did not make these payments. On Mr. Dixon’s death in 2004, Mrs. Dixon filed a claim with the VA Regional Office requesting the payments that she claims should have been paid to her from Mr. Dixon’s VA disability benefits, 1996-2004. The Veterans Court rejected the claim, finding that the VA was never served with legal process instructing garnishment, as required by 42 U.S.C. 659(i)(5); that Mrs. Dixon incorrectly asserted that the VA previously made partial payments pursuant to the Order; and that the $500 monthly payments she received were, instead made pursuant to 38 C.F.R. 3.452 (apportionment of veteran’s benefits if the veteran is not residing with his spouse or children). The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Dixon v. McDonald" on Justia Law