Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Moffitt served in the Army, 1944-1946, and was discharged due to injuries sustained during service. The VA awarded him a combined disability rating of 100%, which was later reduced to a combined 60% rating, effective 1953. Moffitt died in 1982. If a veteran’s death is not service-connected, the surviving spouse may qualify for dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) if the veteran received, or was “entitled to receive,” benefits for a service-connected disability that was rated totally disabling for the 10-year period prior to the veteran’s death, 38 U.S.C. 1318. Mrs. Moffitt sought DIC benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which provides that, when a veteran suffers an additional disability or death as the result of VA hospitalization, treatment, or examination, benefits shall be awarded as if such disability or death were service-connected. The Board concluded that Moffitt’s death was the result of injury incurred during hospitalization at a VA facility and posthumously granted Moffitt’s pending claim for total disability based on individual unemployability with a 1979 effective date. After several related decisions, the Board of Appeals denied Mrs. Moffitt enhanced DIC benefits, finding that regulations, amended while the claim was pending, precluded her hypothetical entitlement theory (38 C.F.R. 20.1106). The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed, applying the amendment retroactively. View "Moffitt v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Navarro served in the Army from 1958-1960. He is not a combat veteran, but served near the demilitarized zone after the Korean War. In 2005, Navarro sought service connection for PTSD. He established the condition under 38 C.F.R. 4.125(a). He provided testimony about hearing shots, seeing injured soldiers, and hearing noises while on night guard duty. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the claim in 2008. While appeal was pending, the VA amended 38 C.F.R. 3.304(f) with respect to evidence required to establish claimed in-service stressors for PTSD claims. The Veterans Court vacated. On remand, the Board found that revised 3.304(f) did not apply because Navarro had been diagnosed by a therapist, not a “VA psychiatrist or psychologist” and that Navarro was not entitled to a VA medical examination because “none of his claimed stressor events have been sufficiently corroborated by credible supporting evidence and his account of having a continuity of PTSD symptomatology since service is not deemed credible.” The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit remanded for determination of whether Navarro’s “claimed stressor[s are] consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran’s service.” If so, he is entitled to examination by a VA psychiatrist or psychologist. View "Sanchez-Navarro v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Blubaugh served in the Army, 1964-1966 and was a gunner in Vietnam. In 1988, he sought service connection for multiple medical conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The VA denied service connection, finding that his VA psychological examination did not support a diagnosis of PTSD. Blubaugh did not appeal, but in 1992, sought to reopen his claim. The VA concluded that a second examination did not support a PTSD diagnosis and noted the “absence of a definitive confirmable stressor.” In 2008, Blubaugh filed a second request to reopen. Unlike his previous submissions, this request included a statement describing his experiences in Vietnam and post-service difficulties. The VA also received, for the first time, medical documentation showing a positive diagnosis of PTSD. The VA granted service connection for PTSD and assigned a 10 percent disability rating effective 2008. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The effective date for a disability rating is generally determined by the date the disabling condition arose, or the date the claim was submitted, whichever is later. An exception for claims granted based on certain service department records that were associated with the veteran’s claims file after the claim was first decided does not apply to Blubaugh’s case. View "Blubaugh v. McDonald" on Justia Law

O’Bryan served in the Marine Corps from 1973-1976. His eye problems were not noted upon his entry into service. Upon discharge, he was listed as having 20/20 vision. In 1977, he filed a claim for service-connected optic disease. In medical examinations, he variously reported that his vision started to blur in1974 or 1976. He was legally blind due to Leber’s optic atrophy within one year of discharge. Certain conditions manifesting within one year after discharge are treated as though manifested during service, 38 U.S.C. 1112(a). O’Bryan argued that his symptoms began during service; that he is suffering from a “disease”; and that, because his condition was not noted upon entry, he is entitled to a presumption that the disease was incurred in service, 38 U.S.C. 1111. The VA regional office denied O’Bryan’s claim because Leber’s is not a “disease,” but a “hereditary disorder.” The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed. In 2010, O’Bryan attempted to reopen the case, but the Board rejected his contention that it had committed clear and unmistakable error. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the lower court misinterpreted the law on when a congenital or developmental condition is a non-compensable defect. View "O'Bryan v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Norma married veteran Glenn Dodson in 1949. They remained married until Glenn’s death in 1992 from cardiac arrhythmia due to amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). Norma did not seek Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) benefits as the “surviving spouse” of a veteran whose death resulted from a service-related injury or disease, 38 U.S.C. 1310–1318. Her eligibility for DIC benefits terminated upon her remarriage at age 64 in 1994. The Veterans Benefits Act of 2003 amended Title 38 to authorize DIC benefits for surviving spouses who remarry after attaining age 57 but before enactment of the amendment. Norma, who was over the age of 57 when she remarried in 1994, did not seek DIC benefits during the amendment’s one-year window. During that time, ALS was recognized as a condition that could be service-related, though not presumptively so. In 2008 the VA established a presumption of service connection for ALS. In 2009, Norma filed an application for DIC benefits as Glenn’s widow. The regional office denied the claim. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the Veterans Court, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the claim untimely and holding that the amendment did not contemplate shifting circumstances. View "Carroll v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Beraud served on active duty in the U.S. Navy, 1974-1977, and in the reserves until 988. In 1985, Beraud filed a claim with a VA Regional Office for a headache disorder, allegedly caused by trauma suffered while on duty. Although Beraud did not appeal the RO’s denial of his claim, he sent a letter, indicating the location of additional service medical records. The RO never responded. The RO reopened the claim, but denied it on the merits in 1990, finding that Beraud did not incur the headache disorder, or aggravation thereof, during service. The RO did not refer to Beraud’s 1985 letter, nor did it mention the medical records that were the subject of the letter. Beraud did not appeal. The RO denied two later requests to reopen, finding that Beraud had not submitted new and material evidence. In 2004, Beraud submitted an informal claim for disability compensation for the same headache disorder. This time, the RO granted Beraud service connection and assigned a 50 percent disability rating, effective 2004. In 2010, the Board denied Beraud’s appeal, finding that the decisions on his 1985, 1990, 1992, and 2002 claims were final, so that an effective date prior to 2004 could not be granted. Beraud argued that his 1985 letter constituted new evidence, giving rise to a pending, unadjudicated claim. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed. Because the VA failed to determine whether evidence Beraud timely submitted in 1985 claim was new and material under 38 C.F.R. 3.156(b), that claim remained pending, despite the subsequent final decision.View "Beraud v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Joyner served in the Marine Corps and completed a tour of duty in the Persian Gulf. During service, he was treated twice for neck pain. However, his separation from service examination indicated that his neck was “normal.” Joyner later filed a claim with the VA for disability compensation for chronic neck pain and other conditions. The VA regional office denied his claim for benefits for his neck pain. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, concluding that Joyner did not have a diagnosed neck condition and was not entitled to service connection under 38 U.S.C. 1110, a general provision that provides compensation for disabilities suffered in the line of duty. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. 1117, an additional disability compensation provision that applies to Gulf War Veterans. Pain can evidence a disability under that section. View "Joyner v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Young served as an Army combat engineer from 1965-1967, including duty in Vietnam. In 1984, Young applied for benefits with the VA Regional Office, describing “‘anxiety,’ ‘bad nerves,’ and ‘unable to adjust to society.’” The RO interpreted the claim as seeking an award of service connection due to PTSD, but denied it after Young failed to report for a VA medical examination. In 1989, a VA psychiatrist submitted a letter, stating that Young had been under his care since 1989 and was suffering from PTSD. The RO denied Young’s claim in 1989, 1990, and 1991 because the record did not establish exposure to an in-service stressor. The Board’s 1991 denial became final because Young did not appeal. Young sought to have his claim reopened. The RO denied the request in 1992, 1993, 1995, and 1997. In 1998, the RO received service department records documenting Young’s exposure to an in-service stressor for PTSD that had not been previously associated with his file and reopened Young’s claim. The agency granted him service connection with a 100% disability rating, effective to August 1992. Young sought an effective date of September 1984. The Veterans Court concluded that the effective date should be March, 1989. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Young v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Commander Cronin began active duty with the Navy in 1977. In 1978, she had a calcaneal spur in her heel. She had unsuccessful surgeries in 1979, 1993, 1994, and 1995. She was hospitalized for bipolar disorder in 1995. Beginning in 1998, medical professionals disagreed about whether she suffered from bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or some combination. She was diagnosed with chronic pain. Cronin alleged that during her service, she was subjected to physical and sexual assaults, stalking, and “extreme sexual harassment.” A social worker described these incidents as supporting a PTSD diagnosis. She had periods of limited duty. The Navy had selected Cronin for promotion, but in a 1994 letter, a Navy physician found her not fit for full duty. Her promotion was delayed. The Physical Evaluation Board assigned her a disability rating of 60% and placed her on the Temporary Disability Retired List. The Board for Correction of Naval Records upheld the promotion delay. In 1996, Cronin was formally placed on the TDRL and promoted. She was reevaluated every 18 months to continue receiving benefits. In 2000, the Board declined to find a compensable claim of PTSD or chronic pain disorder, concluded that her conditions had stabilized, and placed her on the Permanent Disability Retired List. Cronin sued in 2006. On remand, the trial court concluded that the 2003 Relief Act tolls the limitations period during time on the TDRL, so that the claims were timely, but affirmed the refusal to increase her disability rating. The Federal Circuit held that most of her claims were time barred. As to claims alleging PTSD, there was no timeliness issue, but they were properly rejected on the merits.View "Cronin v. United States" on Justia Law

Johnson served in the U.S. Army, 1970-197171. Years after leaving the service, he filed a claim for increased disability ratings for his service-connected disabilities, including rheumatic heart disease (then rated 10% disabling), and degenerative changes of the right and left knees (each knee rated 10% disabling). A VA regional office (RO) denied the claims, finding that he was not entitled to a rating of total disability based on individual unemployability. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed and denied his claim for extra-schedular consideration of the combined impact of his service-connected rheumatic heart disease and right knee disability under 38 CFR 3.321(b)(1). The Veterans Court affirmed, finding the CFR language ambiguous and deferring to the VA’s interpretation. The Federal Circuit reversed, citing plain language. Section 3.321(b)(1) entitles a veteran to consideration for referral for extraschedular evaluation based on an individual disability not adequately captured by the schedular evaluations; it also entitles a veteran to consideration for referral for extra-schedular evaluation based on multiple disabilities, the combined effect of which is exceptional and not captured by scheduler evaluations.View "Johnson v. McDonald" on Justia Law