Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Flora is the widow of Donald, a World War II veteran, honorably discharged in 1945 after being diagnosed with diabetes mellitus. At that time the VA found his diabetes to be service-connected and gave him a disability rating of 40%. Beginning in 1950, Donald was hospitalized at various times for complications and declining health as a result of his diabetes and repeatedly, unsuccessfully, requested increases in his disability rating. In 1961, the Director of the Compensation and Pension Service found “clear and unmistakable error” and increased the rating to 60%, effective 1961. Ultimately, Donald’s disability rating was increased to 100%, effective 1965. Donald died in 1969, from complications of diabetes. Flora was granted dependency and indemnity compensation, 38 U.S.C. 1310, and filed a claim under 38 U.S.C. 1311(a)(2), which provides that a surviving spouse may qualify for increased benefits if the veteran received “or was entitled to receive . . . compensation for a service-connected disability that was rated totally disabling for a continuous period of at least eight years immediately preceding death.” The VA denied the claim in 2003. Flora pursued appeals, which were ultimately rejected by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Kernea v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Massie served on active duty in the Army, 1968-1970 and was awarded VA benefits for varicose veins and related surgery, initially at 10% and increased to 50%, disability effective in 1990. In, 2001, Massie sought an increased disability rating. He submitted a letter from a VA physician who had treated Massie for “multiple medical problems” including “chronic venous insufficiency” that had “persisted in spite of prior surgical treatment with vein stripping” and that left Massie with significant pain when he was on his feet for any period of time. The regional office increased Massie’s rating to 100%, as of the 2001 date of his filing. The Veterans Court determined that the physician’s letter, dated 1999, did not qualify as an informal claim that would entitle Massie to an earlier effective date for the 100% rating. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the letter was not a “report of examination” because it did not describe the results of a “specific, particular examination” and did not suggest that Massie’s condition had worsened. View "Massie v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Louis Burden, a Vietnam veteran, served on active duty in the Army from 1948 until 1968. He married Michele in a ceremonial marriage in April, 2004. Two months later, Burden died. In August 2004, Michele applied for dependency and indemnity compensation. A VA regional office denied her claim because she had not been married to Burden for at least one year prior to his death, 38 U.S.C. 1102(a). Michele asserted that she and Burden had been living in a common law marriage for five years prior to his death. The board acknowledged that she had provided some evidence to support her claim, but concluded that it did not constitute the “clear and convincing proof” required to establish a valid common law marriage under Alabama law. The Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit upheld the denial. State law, including state law evidentiary burdens, applies in determining the validity of a purported common law marriage View "Burden v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Yonek served on active duty in the Navy from 1973 to 1977 and in 1991-1992. In 1991, Yonek aggravated a preexisting injury to his right shoulder, leaving the motion of his arm permanently limited. The VA regional office granted service connection for the injury, assigning a rating of 10 percent. Over the next 17 years, Yonek underwent at least 15 examinations, measuring his range of motion for flexion, elevation of the arm in a forward direction, and abduction, elevation of the arm outward from the side of the body. The results showed a range of motion of anywhere between 80 and 180 degrees in flexion and 60 and 180 degrees in abduction. In 1999, the RO increased the rating to 20 percent, concluding that motion was limited to a point at or below shoulder level but past the midpoint between the side and the shoulder (between 45 and 90 degrees). The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied his appeal. The Veterans Court held that diagnostic code 5201 only allows a single disability rating for each injured shoulder even though Yonek’s shoulder manifests limitation of motion with respect to both flexion and abduction. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the schedule in 38 C.F.R. 4.71a only allows a single disability rating. View "Yonek v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Bartlett, who served on active duty from 1943 to 1963, submitted a claim in 2002 to increase his rating for service-connected Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals issued its first final decision in 2005, increasing Bartlett’s rating from 30% to 100% and remanded to the regional office. After that decision, but before a decision on remand, Bartlett entered into a fee agreement with attorney Cameron, calling for a contingent fee of 20 percent of any past due VA benefits awarded on the basis of his claims. The regional office then increased Bartlett’s disability to 100%, effective April 2002, when Bartlett filed his claim. Cameron sought fees for the past-due benefits award. The regional office denied entitlement to attorney fees, finding that, because the decision was the Board’s first final decision in this claim, 38 U.S.C. 5904(c)(1) precluded entitlement to fees based on benefits arising from the decision. Cameron also appealed the assigned effective date. The regional office assigned a new date, approximately 15 months earlier, granted Bartlett $45,995.93 in past-due benefit, and set aside attorney fees for Cameron: 20% of the additional award occasioned by the change in the effective date. The Board, the Veterans’ Court, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Cameron v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Federal employees who are members of the National Guard are entitled to up to 15 days of annual military leave “without loss in pay, time, or performance or efficiency rating,” 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). Before a 2000 amendment, the Office of Personnel Management interpreted the section as providing 15 calendar days of leave, rather than 15 workdays; federal employees who attended reserve training on non-work days were charged military leave. The Federal Circuit held that even before 2000, federal agencies were not entitled to charge employees military leave on non-workdays. Tierney worked at the DEA, 1974-2001, and was a member of the Air National Guard. He filed a Merit Systems Protection Board claim that the DEA charged him military leave for reserve duty on 44 non-workdays, so that he took annual leave or unpaid leave for military duty. An AJ ordered DEA to compensate Tierney for 17 days. The full Board reversed, finding that the Military Leave Summary and Tierney’s testimony were based solely on his military records and on speculation that DEA improperly charged military leave on intervening non-workdays and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that DEA charged him military leave on non-workdays or that he used annual leave for reserve duties. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Tierney v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Pirkl served in the Navy, 1947-1949. Effective in 1949, the VA awarded him disability benefits for paranoid schizophrenic reaction, evaluated as 10% disabling. A regional office increased his disability rating to 100%, effective in 1952. In 1953, the office reduced the rating to 70%. Pirkl did not appeal. In 1956, the office reduced Pirkl’s rating to 50%, based on a newly acquired medical examination and changes in Pirkl’s employment status. Pirkl did not appeal. In 1966, the office reduced the rating to 30%. The Board of Appeals affirmed. In 1991, Pirkl was awarded a 100% disability rating, effective 1988. In 2001, Pirkl unsuccessfully sought to revise the 1953, 1956, and 1966 rating decisions based on clear and unmistakable error (CUE). In 2005, Pirkl filed Notice of Disagreement with respect to the 1953 rating. The Board found CUE. The regional office awarded a 100% rating for 1952 to 1957, when the 1956, decision made effective a 50% rating. The Board dismissed Pirkl’s claim for 100% disability for the entire period between 1952 and August 30, 1988. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that the Board did not consider the effect of certain regulations governing a reduction of a total disability rating. View "Pirkl v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Walker served in the U.S. Army Air Force, 1943 to 1945, as a four-engine airplane pilot and flight instructor. The VA Regional Office denied his 2007 disability claim for bilateral hearing loss. Walker appealed to the Board of Veterans Appeals, including sworn statements from his son and wife that his hearing loss began in service and continued throughout his life. Walker was examined by a VA audiologist. Walker’s service medical records were not available due to a fire. The audiologist concluded that the hearing loss was “less likely as not caused primarily by military service as a pilot,” that age could not be excluded as the primary etiology, and that Walker was exposed to recreational noise by hunting game without use of hearing protection. The Board concluded that Walker failed under the three-element test to establish service connection for his hearing loss. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Walker v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Viegas served in the U.S. Army, 1965-1967. After leaving the service, he was injured in a diving accident, resulting in “incomplete” quadriplegia. In 2004, Viegas participated in a prescribed aquatic therapy session at a VA medical center. He used a restroom in the VA facility. The grab bar he used to lift himself into his wheelchair came loose from the wall and he fell to the ground. As a result of the fall, Viegas sustained injuries to his upper and lower extremities. Viegas’ medical condition deteriorated after his fall. Prior to his fall, Viegas could sometimes walk with a walker, but since the accident he can only stand with assistance. Viegas sought disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151. A VA regional office denied the claim. The board affirmed, stating that such benefits are available only if additional disability results from injury that was part of the natural sequence of cause and effect flowing directly from the actual provision of hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination furnished by the VA and such additional disability was directly caused by that VA activity. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Veterans Court misinterpreted the causation requirement. View "Viegas v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

The court consolidated appeals by veterans claiming that their current disabilities are connected to injuries sustained during military service. In both cases, the veterans’ medical records contained at least one physician’s report opining that the claimed disabilities were service-connected and at least one ambiguous or inconclusive report declining to confirm such a nexus. The Department of Veterans Affairs relied on inconclusive opinions in denying the veterans entitlement to service-connected disability benefits, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed. Finding that the medical examination did not comply with the Board’s instructions and that the Board failed to explain its reasons and bases for denying service connection, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims remanded. The Federal Circuit affirmed that remand, rather than reversal, was appropriate. View "Deloach v. Shinseki" on Justia Law