Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Harris served on active duty in the U.S. Army from 1963 to 1966 and from 1967 to 1970. In 1985, he had a VA Medical Center examination; an “Agent Orange” form associated with that examination indicates that Harris complained of “skin rashes on trunk and arms.” Another form, listing his service in Vietnam, is an “Application for Medical Benefits,” stated that it “will be used to determine your eligibility for medical benefits.” In 2002, Harris, pro se, sought service-connected disability compensation for contact dermatitis and latex allergy. The DVA regional office ultimately granted the claims and assigned an effective date of 2002. Harris sought an effective date of 1985. The Board held that the report of the Agent Orange Registry examination did not constitute a claim. The Veterans Court affirmed The Federal Circuit vacated, stating that pro se filings must be read liberally; the Veterans Court did not apply the proper legal standard for determining whether the Board had correctly determined the earliest applicable date for the claim. View "Harris v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

A VA regional office awarded King disability compensation for residuals of a left knee surgery and right knee arthritis. King later sought disability compensation for disabilities of the back and hips on a direct basis and as secondary to his service-connected knee disabilities. Records revealed no treatment for back or hip problems during King's active duty service 1973-1974. King underwent a VA spine examination in 2000. The examiner diagnosed minimal degenerative joint disease of both hips and lumbosacral spine, related to age. A private physician disagreed. In 2007, the Board of Veterans denied King's appeal. The Veterans Court remanded. Additional evidence was developed and, in 2008, the Board obtained an opinion from a Veterans Hospital Administration orthopedist that it was not likely that King’s back and bilateral hip disabilities were directly caused or permanently worsened by the service-connected knee disabilities. The Board and Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed the denial. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Veterans Court erred by discounting lay testimony offered by King and his wife. The Veterans Court did not fail to consider the proffered lay evidence, so King’s appeal was merely a challenge to the weight given his evidence.View "King v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Youngman, fiduciary for deceased veteran Richardson, sought payment of accrued benefits of about $350,000 that had been awarded to Richardson before his death. Payment had been delayed while the Kansas state courts were accrediting Youngman as successor fiduciary for Richardson, who had been adjudged incompetent several years earlier. Richardson died after the accreditation but before payment. The VA denied payment. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. Periodic monetary benefits to which an individual was entitled at death are to be paid to the veteran's spouse, children, or dependent parents and, in “all other cases, only so much of the accrued benefits may be paid as may be necessary to reimburse the person who bore the expense of last sickness and burial” 38 U.S.C.5121(a). Richardson had only cousins as heirs. The Federal Circuit affirmed. While 38 U.S.C. 5502 allows a fiduciary to stand in the shoes of a veteran, it does not grant the fiduciary rights beyond those of the veteran himself. Richardson died without any heirs in the categories qualifying under 5121, so his unpaid benefits died with him. View "Youngman v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Hillyard suffered a head injury and was hospitalized for two weeks while serving in the U.S. Army. Hillyard filed a single claim for service connection for a mental condition, which he attributed to his in-service head injury. The Veterans Administration denied his claim and the Board affirmed and subsequently denied Hillyard’s request for revision. The Veterans Court affirmed. Hillyard later filed a second request for revision alleging clear and unmistakable error (CUE) by the Board in failing to consider and apply 38 U.S.C. 105(a) and 1111, a different CUE allegation from the one he made in his first request. The Board dismissed the second request for revision with prejudice, concluding 38 C.F.R. 20.1409(c) permitted only one request for revision to be filed. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The interpretation of Rule 1409(c) proffered by the VA is consistent with the language of the regulation and is in harmony with the VA’s description of the regulation in its notice of rule-making. View "Hillyard v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Palmquist, a veteran, injured in a helicopter crash that caused residual brain injury, was entitled to preference in federal employment, 5 U.S.C. 2108(3)(C), 3309(1), 3313(2)(A). The VA hired him as a medical support assistant. Aichner was his supervisor. Palmquist applied for promotion but did not receive an interview. He believed that the VA had not honored his preference, and told Aichner that he was going to complain to the equal employment opportunity specialist and his congressman. He did so. Aichner and Palmquist maintained a generally positive relationship for the next two years, but Palmquist was sometimes preoccupied, left the unit during working hours to do personal business, distracted other employees, and used his computer for personal purposes. Palmquist sought a new position. An interview went well. Interviewers warned Palmquist against unsolicited post-interview contact, but he e-mailed both to reiterate his qualifications. Aichner gave a generally favorable recommendation, but the recommendation was one factor in Palmquist not getting the job. The court rejected his claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701-796. The First Circuit affirmed. The Act does not entitle a plaintiff to relief when retaliation for complaints about disability discrimination is a motivating factor in, but not the “but-for” cause of, adverse employment action. View "Palmquist v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Thompson served in the Navy from October 1973 to January 1975. During active service, he was treated for psychiatric symptoms, attributed to immature personality disorder. Over the following years, he was hospitalized sporadically based upon complaints of a nervous disorder and an inability to get along with others. In 1984 he was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. He was hospitalized for schizophrenia several times between 1984 and 1991. In 2006, a VA Regional Office issued a rating decision finding no service connection with respect to any acquired psychiatric disorder. Before the Veterans Court reached the merits of an appeal, the parties filed a joint motion for partial remand citing a 2009 intervening decision. The motion was granted. Thompson then moved for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Veterans Court denied the motion, holding that he was not a prevailing party under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Thompson v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Reeves served as a heavy mortar crewman during combat offensives, 1942-1945, and was awarded three Bronze Stars. In 1981, Reeves filed a claim seeking service-connected disability benefits, with a medical opinion, stating that Reeves had bilateral, nerve-type hearing loss in 1962, attributable to noise exposure or to treatment with quinine for malaria. He also submitted records of an audiogram and statements from officers with whom he had served. The board denied the claim, stating that hearing loss documented in 1962 was too remote from active service. Reeves did not appeal. In 2004, the board granted an application to re-open, citing new evidence of treatment from 1946 to 1954, and awarded him service-connected disability benefits, effective 2002. In 2006, Reeves sought revision to an earlier effective date. The board denied the motion. The Veterans Court affirmed, rejecting an assertion that the evidence of record in 1983 was such that the board had no choice but to resolve in his favor that his hearing disability was incurred in service. Reeves died in 2011; the Federal Circuit substituted his widow and reversed. The Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. 1154(b) in rejecting the clear and unmistakeable error claim. View "Reeves v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Duchesneau served on active duty in the Army, July 1996 to January 1999. In 2000, a VA Regional Office granted service connection for her right shoulder bursitis with a 10 percent disability rating. In 2003 she sought an increased disability rating, but the RO denied her claim. The Board affirmed. The veterans' court rejected her claim for two separate disability ratings under a single diagnostic code, set aside the Board's decision as to a single appropriate disability rating under DC 5201 and remanded to the Board to clarify the precise extent of her right shoulder limitation. The Federal Circuit rejected an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the veterans' court decision was not a final judgment. View "Duchesneau v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Morris served on active duty for two months in 1964. His entrance examination and examination upon separation revealed no psychiatric abnormality. In 1966 Morris sought disability compensation for a psychiatric disorder, claiming that in basic training, he had suffered abuse from his sergeant, which caused him to experience nervous breakdown. The VA Regional Office denied the claim. In 1986, the RO concluded that additional evidence did not constitute new and material evidence. Following another denial, Morris presented evidence that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and a VA physician's opinion that it had its onset during service. The Board denied the claim. On remand in 1992, the Board concluded that evidence supported the claim but that its 1988 decision was final. In 1993, the RO awarded service connection for schizophrenia effective from 1987. In 1996, the Board denied a claim that the award should be retroactive to 1966. The Veterans Court rejected an argument that the 1988 Board failed to apply correctly 38 U.S.C. 105(a), 1110, and 1111, noting no evidence that the Board incorrectly considered his condition a personality disorder. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Under 38 C.F.R. 3.303(c), personality disorders are not diseases or injuries within the meaning of 1110 and are not compensable. View "Morris v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Petitioner served in the Army for about 30 months, 1981-1983 and suffered injury to her knees and wrist. The VA regional office assigned a 10 percent rating to her left wrist with an effective date of 1986. In 1987, her right arm was injured as a result of medical care she received from the VA. In 1990, her injury to right knee and shoulder were each rated at 20 percent and her left knee at 30 percent. In 1996, she was unable to continue working as a bookkeeper and brought a claim for total disability based on individual unemployability. The regional office rated her service-connected disabilities at 70 percent, but denied a total rating based on unemployability under 38 C.F.R. 4.16(a). The regional office and Board of Veterans’ Appeals rejected her 2004 application for review. The Secretary conceded that the regional office committed error by incorrectly computing petitioner’s rating. The Veterans Court found no “clear and unmistakeable error” and that the error was harmless because the RO had made an unemployability determination that satisfied the requirements for a 4.16(a) analysis. The Federal Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because there was no issue of the interpretation of 4.16(a)View "Githens-Bellas v. Shinseki" on Justia Law