Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner served in active military duty from 1972 to 1979, and in the National Guard before and after active service. He also worked as a laborer in a supply company and in coal mines and as a carpenter. In 1997, he claimed entitlement to TDIU, which provides a veteran with a total disability rating when his disability rating is below 100% if the veteran is at least 60% disabled, meets other disability rating criteria, and is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disabilities. 1 C.F.R. 4.16(a). The VA rejected the claim and, on three remands, petitioner underwent a total of five VA medical examinations. In 2007, the Board denied the claim. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. The VA was not obligated to obtain an industrial survey from a vocational expert in order to evaluate whether petitioner was employable in a job other than his former occupation (i.e., a job that did not involve heavy manual labor). View "Smith v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

The World War II veteran died in 2004, during litigation of whether a hip injury was service-related. The VA dismissed a pending appeal as moot and rejected the widow's request to be substituted. The Federal Circuit reversed. The widow filed her own claim for accrued benefits. The motion to substitute was denied, but the widow was awarded accrued benefits and sought $87,802.17 in attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412. The veterans' court determined that the widow had the right, as representative of the estate, to recover fees for attorney hours expended prior to his death, but had no right to recover fees for work performed after her husband’s death. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that attorney work performed after the veteran's death was directly related to his claim; it was his claim, not the widow's claim, that was being litigated. View "Padgett v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

In 1968, petitioner sustained a gunshot wound to his thigh. In 1995 he was granted service connection for the thigh wound, shrapnel wounds on forehead, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Petitioner appealed the rating, referring to pain and the inability to stand. The Veterans' Court remanded for an examination to determine muscle injury. The rating did not change; the board and the court affirmed, rejecting an argument that a change in diagnostic code to represent an injury to a different muscle group was an impermissible severance of service connection under 38 U.S.C. § 1159, which provides that service connection in force for ten or more years shall not be severed, except upon proof of fraud or that the veteran did not have the requisite service or discharge. The Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that a diagnostic code is most similar to the level of disability element of a claim for benefits and is not protected by the statute. The disability remains the same and remains service-connected. View "Read v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

The veteran, active in the Navy 1968-1971, reported traumatic events during a 1991 psychiatric evaluation. In 1993-1994 he sought benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder, again reporting an incident involving the death of a friend. In 1999 the VA awarded 100% disability, effective as of 1993. The veteran's complaints about how his claim was handled led to an OIG inspection in 2004, which disclosed that the veteran was not present at the accident that killed his friend. The veterans' court upheld a decision to severe benefits on the basis of fraud. The veteran had already receive about $320,000 and was subsequently convicted of fraud and sentenced to 48 months in prison and ordered to pay restitution. The federal circuit affirmed the veterans' court. The veteran had only claimed one stressor, so the VA was not required to investigate other possible stressors before terminating benefits. The VA properly followed its own procedures after determining that the matter exceeded the jurisdictional cap under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, 31 U.S.C. 3801. The Act is not an exclusive remedy and the veteran was afforded due process.

Records indicate that the veteran's knee was injured in 1949 while he was playing football with a military team. Treatment at a field hospital in Germany included x-rays that revealed no bone or joint injury. The knee was not treated again until 1999, when the veteran claimed service-related disability. X-rays at a VA clinic showed minimal degeneration consistent with osteoarthritis. On remand, for the VA's failure to assist the veteran, instructions to the VA hospital stated "NO EXAM" and indicated a file review, but did state that an exam was allowable if necessary. The Veterans' Court upheld a second denial of benefits. The Federal Circuit affirmed; the Veterans Court acted correctly in not requiring the Board to state reasons why the medical examinersâ reports were competent and sufficiently informed. The court noted that the veteran did not raise his concerns about the instructions with the Board and that it cannot review a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case under 38 U.S.C. 7292.

The district court rejected a challenge to 5 U.S.C. 3328, which bars males who have knowingly and willfully failed to register for the draft by age 26 from employment by the executive branch. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for entry of a judgment denying relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs, who were dismissed or resigned from federal employment after discovery of their failure to register, is under the Civil Service Reform Act. Although the claims implicate constitutional violations, Congress intended to consolidate employee removal actions in a single forum. The Merit System Protection Board cannot grant relief by invalidating the statute, but a court could do so on review of board action. The court characterized the constitutional challenges as "unpromising."