Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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Sharifi alleges the U.S. Army took his land when it built Combat Outpost Millet in Afghanistan in 2010. The government asserted that Sharifi’s Fifth Amendment complaint was “vague and ambiguous” because it did not specifically identify the property interest that the government allegedly took, that Sharifi had not provided a legal description of the land, a deed, or other documents that would allow the government to identify the location. The Claims Court instructed Sharifi to file an amended complaint. Sharifi alleged that government records, verified by the District Governor of Arghandab, showed that his grandfather owned the land on which the Army built COP Millet: Ownership of the land passed to Sharifi and his siblings, who subdivided the land by a 2004 inheritance agreement. The government submitted six declarations, including several witness declarations and an expert declaration on Afghan law. The Claims Court dismissed Sharifi’s amended complaint for failure to show a cognizable property interest.The Federal Circuit affirmed. The government records attached to Sharifi’s amended complaint and the 2004 inheritance agreement do not constitute proof of land ownership under the laws of Afghanistan. Even accepting as true all factual allegations in Sharifi’s amended complaint, the amended complaint does not contain sufficient facts to state a plausible takings claim. View "Sharifi v. United States" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs brought a putative class action under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), alleging that they and similarly situated individuals were on active duty with the military when defendants variously foreclosed on their properties through executory proceedings in Louisiana state courts based on mortgage, privilege, or security agreements each plaintiff and putative class member had entered with one of the defendants.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motions to dismiss and Trustmark National Bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that 50 U.S.C. 3931 does not encompass Louisiana executory proceedings where, as here, the debtors confessed judgment. The court explained that the SCRA's waiver requirements were thus inapplicable because there was nothing to waive where plaintiffs were never protected under section 3931. Therefore, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the state court orders authorizing seizure and sale of their respective properties constitute default judgments under the SCRA. View "Fodge v. Trustmark National Bank" on Justia Law

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The Town of Belmont appealed a New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) decision that, pursuant to RSA 72:36-a (2012) respondent Robin M. Nordle 2013 Trust was entitled to a 100% real estate tax exemption for a homestead in Belmont. RSA 72:36-a provided that a person who met certain qualifications set forth in the statute, and “who owns a specially adapted homestead which has been acquired with the assistance of the Veterans Administration,” qualified for a property tax exemption. Louis Nordle served during the Vietnam War and was honorably discharged in 1969. In 1998, Louis and his wife, Robin Nordle, purchased a summer camp in Belmont. In 2007, the Nordles demolished the original home and built a new home. The house was later transferred to the Robin M. Nordle 2013 Trust, in which Louis had a life estate in the trust and Robin was the trustee. In 2015, the United States Department of Veterans Affairs determined that Louis was totally and permanently disabled due to his service-connected disabilities. In 2016, Louis received a “Specially Adapted Housing Grant” from the Veterans Administration (VA), and used the funds to modify his home to accommodate his disability. The town originally denied Nordle's application for tax-exempt status, determining that the “home was not ‘acquired’ or ‘purchased’ by or with the assistance of a VA loan.” In making its determination, the town relied upon advice from the New Hampshire Department of Revenue that, in order to be entitled to the property tax exemption, the VA “had to help ‘purchase’ the home not adapt it.” The BTLA reasoned that “the word ‘acquired’ in the statute had a plain meaning broader than simply ‘purchased,’” and that because Louis “obtained, and is now in possession of, a specially adapted homestead . . . only because of the financial assistance he received from the VA,” the taxpayer was entitled to the tax exemption set forth in RSA 72:36-a. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined that once the remodeling was completed, the taxpayer owned a specially adapted homestead which was “acquired with the assistance of the Veterans Administration.” and affirmed the BTLA’s determination that the taxpayer was entitled to a 100% real estate tax exemption for the homestead in Belmont. View "Appeal of Town of Belmont" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that the foreclosure sale of his house was invalid under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 U.S.C. 3953(a), 3953(c), which requires a lender to obtain a court order before foreclosing on or selling property owned by a current or recent servicemember where the mortgage obligation "originated before the period of the servicemember's military service." The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo, holding that plaintiff's mortgage obligation originated when he was in the Navy, it was not a protected obligation under section 3953(a), and his later enlistment in the Army did not change that status to afford protection retroactively. View "Sibert v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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Davis and his wife purchased a Philadelphia rental property in 1997 1997. A longtime member of the U.S. Army Reserve, Davis was called to active duty in 2004. A few months later, the Davises transferred the property to Global LLC, owned and managed by Davis, to “insulate themselves from liability” because “his wife was unable to manage the property.” In 2009, Davis and Global asked the Philadelphia Department of Revenue to reduce Global’s property tax debt, citing the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 U.S.C. 3901, which limits interest imposed on a servicemember’s delinquent property taxes during active duty to a rate of six percent and forbids additional penalties. The Department denied this request, stating that the SCRA does not apply to a business owned by a servicemember and that Davis should file an abatement petition with the Philadelphia Tax Review Board. The Review Board denied that petition. Two years later the city initiated foreclosure proceedings; the state court entered judgment in the city’s favor. Davis and Global filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. SCRA extends only to servicemembers; a corporation is not a “servicemember” under the statute. View "Davis v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

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Since 1976, NAI has operated a flea market on 65.4 acres purchased from the Borough of Palmyra. In 2002, Palmyra began considering redevelopment, including NAI’s parcel. A site inspection uncovered the possible presence of unexploded munitions from a weapons-testing facility used by the Army during World War II. The parties entered into an access agreement, pursuant to which NAI could operate the Market on the weekends, while contractors conducted inspections and remedial work during the week. In 2008, however, an unexploded artillery shell was discovered flush with the surface of the Market’s parking lot. Because vendors often drove stakes into the ground to secure tents, this raised concerns of accidental detonation. After NAI refused to comply voluntarily, the police chief issued an emergency order, restricting access to the property. Hundreds of munitions were found on the property, both explosive and inert. NAI filed suit, claiming that the order was arbitrary under New Jersey law; violated procedural due process; and constituted a “taking” without just compensation. The Market was closed for five months before the parties entered a consent order that allowed the Market to reopen on weekends with barriers and security guards to prohibit public access to hazardous areas. The district court entered summary judgment for the borough and denied NAI attorney’s fees for its claimed victory with respect to the consent order. The Third Circuit affirmed.View "Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra" on Justia Law

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Indian Harbor sought reimbursement under the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, 106 Stat. 2315, 2371; 107 Stat. 1547, 1745 for environmental cleanup costs associated with the development of the former Marine Corps Air Station Tustin military base in southern California. The Court of Federal Claims determined that Indian Harbor failed to identify a “claim for personal injury or property” that triggered the government’s duty to indemnify and dismissed. The Federal Circuit reversed, relying on the purposes of the Act, to encourage cleanup and redevelopment of former military installations. View "Indian Harbor Ins. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Wife serves in the U.S. Air Force and executed a military power of attorney designating husband as her attorney-in-fact during her deployment overseas. Husband presented a photocopy of this instrument to the Fayette County Clerk to recording an original deed and mortgage in the real property index records. The clerk’s office rejected the copy as inauthentic and refused to record the documents. The district court dismissed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which claimed that rejection of the power of attorney violated 10 U.S.C. 1044b. That statute sets the minimal requirements for executing a military power of attorney and prohibits states from imposing additional requirements. During the pendency of appeal, the couple submitted an original military power of attorney and the documents were recorded. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The unnotarized copy of the power of attorney lacked an essential element of a military power of attorney and did not qualify for 1044b(a) protections. View "Bartholomew v. Blevins" on Justia Law

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The Georgia Parties, Gwinnett County, Georgia, and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) appealed from a grant of summary judgment in this consolidated suit arising from more than 20 years of litigation between the parties. All of the underlying cases related to the Corps' authority to operate the Buford Dam and Lake Lanier, the reservoir it created, for local water supply. On appeal, the parties raised several jurisdictional matters and asserted a number of substantive claims. The court held that the district court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction to hear certain parties because the Corps had not taken final agency action. The court also held that the district court and the Corps erred in concluding that water supply was not an authorized purpose of the Buford Project under the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), Pub. L. No. 79-525, 60 Stat. 634. The court also held that the district court erred in finding that the 1956 Act expired after 50 years. The court also provided certain instructions to the Corps on remand and the Corps shall have one year to make a final determination of its authority to operate the Buford Project under the RHA and the Water Supply Act, 43 U.S.C. 390b(a). View "In Re: MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litigation" on Justia Law