Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Respondents Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak bin ‘Atash, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi are being tried by military commission at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for their roles in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In July 2024, they entered into pretrial agreements to plead guilty in exchange for the government not seeking the death penalty. However, on August 2, 2024, then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III withdrew from these agreements.The military commission judge and the United States Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) refused to recognize the Secretary’s withdrawal, ruling that the respondents had begun to perform under the agreements. The CMCR denied the government’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition, and the military judge scheduled the entry of the respondents’ pleas. The government then sought relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Secretary of Defense had the legal authority to withdraw from the pretrial agreements. The court found that the respondents had not begun performance of promises contained in the agreements, as their actions did not constitute the beginning of performance under the agreements' terms. The court concluded that the government had no adequate alternative remedy and that the equities warranted the issuance of writs of mandamus and prohibition. Consequently, the court granted the government’s petition, vacated the military judge’s order preventing the Secretary’s withdrawal, and prohibited the military judge from conducting hearings to enter guilty pleas under the withdrawn agreements. View "In re: United States of America" on Justia Law

Ammar al-Baluchi, a Pakistani national, has been detained at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo Bay since 2006. He is accused of supporting the September 11, 2001, attacks as a senior member of al-Qaeda. In 2008, al-Baluchi filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. In 2022, he moved to compel the government to convene a Mixed Medical Commission to assess his eligibility for repatriation due to alleged torture and resulting serious health issues. The district court denied his request, ruling that detainees captured during non-international armed conflicts are not entitled to such examinations under the Third Geneva Convention or Army Regulation 190-8.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially stayed al-Baluchi’s habeas case pending the outcome of his military commission trial. After temporarily lifting the stay to consider his motion for a Mixed Medical Commission, the court denied the motion, leading al-Baluchi to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s nonfinal order. The court found that al-Baluchi did not demonstrate that the denial of his motion had the practical effect of denying injunctive relief or that it caused serious or irreparable harm requiring immediate review. The court noted that even if a Mixed Medical Commission found al-Baluchi eligible for repatriation, the government retained discretion to delay repatriation until the completion of his military commission proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Al-Baluchi v. Hegseth" on Justia Law

David J. Rudometkin was found guilty of several offenses by a military judge in 2018 and sentenced to seventeen years of confinement. His post-trial motion for a mistrial was denied by another military judge after the original judge was suspended for inappropriate conduct. Rudometkin then submitted FOIA requests to the Army and the Department of Defense for records related to the judges involved. The government either did not respond meaningfully or rejected the requests under FOIA exemptions.Rudometkin filed a pro se complaint in the District Court in 2020, challenging the government's withholding of records. He later amended his complaint to focus solely on records related to the appointment of the Chief Trial Judge. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government had adequately searched for records and appropriately withheld information under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. The court also denied Rudometkin’s motions to amend his complaint to include his original FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government did not establish that it properly withheld records under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege and had not shown that it released all reasonably segregable information. The court reversed and remanded on the segregability issue. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Rudometkin’s motion to amend his complaint, as his FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge was now live in a separate action. View "Rudometkin v. USA" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Department of Defense's (DoD) authority to impose time-in-service requirements for expedited naturalization of noncitizen servicemembers under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Historically, the DoD certified noncitizens' honorable service for naturalization without a time-in-service requirement. However, in 2017, the DoD issued a policy requiring a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service or one year for reservists before certifying honorable service. In 2020, a group of noncitizen servicemembers challenged this policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the policy arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and that the DoD's role in certifying honorable service was purely ministerial. The court vacated the time-in-service requirement and enjoined the DoD from withholding certification based on the policy. The DoD appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the DoD rescinded the challenged policy and did not introduce a replacement. The court determined that the case was moot due to the rescission of the policy and dismissed the appeal. The court also vacated the district court's judgment, finding no indication that the DoD rescinded the policy to evade review and emphasizing the need to clear the path for future litigation on the issue. View "Samma v. DOD" on Justia Law

This appeal and cross-appeal relate to the district court's orders releasing video recordings made at Guantanamo Bay, depicting military personnel removing a detainee, Abu Wa'el (Jihad) Dhiab, from his cell, transporting him to a medical unit, and force-feeding him to keep him alive while he was on a hunger strike. The government classified these recordings as "SECRET" because disclosing them could damage the national security, but the district court determined that the public had a constitutional right to view the recordings because the detainee's attorney filed some of them under seal, at which point the recordings became part of the court's record. The government appealed, arguing that the public has no such constitutional right. The Intervenors cross-appealed, arguing that several categories of redactions the court approved prior to public release were too extensive. The court concluded that Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court did not apply to this case and neither the intervenors nor the public at large have a right under the First Amendment to receive properly classified national security information filed in court during the pendency of Dhiab's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court further explained that, even if the intervenors had a qualified First Amendment right of access to the Dhiab recordings, the court would still reverse the district court's decision, because the government identified multiple ways in which unsealing these recordings would likely impair national security. Because the recordings will remain sealed, the intervenors' cross-appeal about the extent of the redactions was dismissed as moot View "Dhiab v. Trump" on Justia Law

After the FLRA ordered the Air Force to bargain collectively with its civilian employees over access to an on-base shopette, the Air Force challenged the decision arguing that the issue is not a proper subject of bargaining. The court agreed with the Air Force that Congress has given the military unfettered discretion to determine whether civilians may patronize commissaries and exchanges, though for reasons that are slightly different from those offered by the Air Force. Given the relevant legislative directives, the court cannot imagine that Congress intended to empower a civilian agency like the Federal Labor Relations Authority to second-guess the military’s judgment about non-military access to commissaries and exchanges. In this case, by requiring negotiation over the Shoppette proposal, the Authority has similarly second-guessed the Secretary’s judgment in deciding how best to use a military benefit to achieve military purposes. Therefore, the court held that civilian access to commissaries and exchanges is not a proper subject of collective bargaining because Congress has vested the military with “unfettered discretion” over the matter. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the Authority's order. View "USAF v. FLRA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired Major in the Marine Corps and a certified NJROTC instructor, filed suit after he was decertified to contest his removal from the NJROTC program. The district court granted summary judgment to the Navy. The court found no merit in plaintiff's contention that the regulation on which the Navy relied to revoke his certification is unconstitutionally vague; that the Navy denied him due process because it failed to accord him adequate notice and opportunity to be heard when determining whether he should be permitted to continue to serve as a NJROTC instructor; and that the Navy’s decertification decision was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Crooks v. Mabus, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner is the alleged mastermind of the bombings of the U.S.S. Cole and the French supertanker the M/V Limburg, as well as the attempted bombing of the U.S.S. The Sullivans. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus to dissolve the military commission convened to try him and appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to preliminarily enjoin that trial. The court concluded that the district court did not err as a matter of law by extending the abstention principles established in Schlesinger v. Councilman, which dealt with courts-martial, to petitioner's pretrial challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of a military commission. The court also concluded that the district court's ultimate decision to abstain based on the unique circumstances to petitioner's case was appropriate. Because petitioner cannot show that his conduct clearly and indisputably took place outside the context of hostilities, the court denied his petition for mandamus relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In Re: Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Al-Nashir" on Justia Law

After the United States detained Mohammed Jawad at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base for more than six years until he was released and returned to his native Afghanistan, Jawad filed suit alleging that they subjected him to torture while he was in their custody. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Jawad’s complaint because the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear his claims. Section 7(a) of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2), strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most claims against the United States arising out of the detention of aliens like Jawad captured during the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The court rejected Jawad's reasons why the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) finding that he was an "enemy combatant" does not satisfy the section 7(a) requirements. The court also rejected Jawad's remaining claims. View "Jawad v. Gates" on Justia Law

Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Association and Military-Veterans Advocacy filed suit challenging the VA's policy requiring "blue-water" veterans to prove on a case-by-base basis that they were exposed to Agent Orange during their military service in order to be considered for certain benefits. Plaintiffs argued that the policy was arbitrary and capricious and otherwise unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2). Plaintiffs sought injunctive and mandamus relief to prevent the VA from denying the presumption of Agent Orange exposure to blue-water veterans. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing 38 U.S.C. 511(a), which bars review in district court of VA decisions “under a law that affects the provision of” veterans benefits. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Congress stripped the district court of jurisdiction over the claims at issue. View "Blue Water Navy Vietnam v. McDonald" on Justia Law