Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Aldridge served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps, 1984-1992, and was denied a disability rating higher than 10% for patellofemoral syndrome on his knees in 2013. The Board of Veterans Appeals informed Aldridge that he had 120 days to file a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court, 38 U.S.C. 7266(a), by April 23, 2014. The Veterans Court received his notice on October 27, 2014. Aldridge acknowledged that his appeal was late, but argued that deaths in his family and his resulting depressive state prevented him from timely filing. His mother died on September 27, 2013; his daughter gave birth to a stillborn child on December 16; and his sister died on January 14, 2014. He asked the court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. The court determined that Aldridge had failed to demonstrate that his family’s losses “themselves directly or indirectly affected the timely filing of his appeal,” noting that Aldridge closed the estates of his deceased mother and sister, became his father’s primary caregiver, maintained his job at a Veterans Affairs hospital, and attempted to hire a lawyer during the time at issue. The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the Veterans Court’s application of a legal standard that required proof of causation. View "Aldridge v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Liberty’s 325 patent, issued in 2010, is “directed to a projectile structured to be discharged from a firearm and designed to overcome the disadvantages and problems associated with conventional firearm projectiles such as, but not limited to lead or steel jacketed projectiles.” The patent grew out of the U.S. military’s “Green Ammunition Program,” developed in response to concerns that lead-based ammunition was polluting military training ranges. The 325 patent sought to address “problems of lethality” with the conventional Army “green” ammunition. The Claims Court held that ammunition rounds used by the Army embody the claims of the patent, violating 28 U.S.C. 1498. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court erred in construing claim terms: reduced area of contact; intermediate opposite ends. When the terms are construed correctly, the Army rounds do not embody the claimed invention. The court affirmed the Claims Court's rejection of a breach of contract claim based on a non-disclosure agreement signed by the named inventor of the 325 patent and an Army official during negotiations for a possible contract. The Army official did not have authority to enter into an NDA on behalf of the government. View "Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2015, Jones, a veteran, filed 16 appeals with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), alleging that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301–4333, when it did not select him for various job vacancies. An administrative judge consolidated the appeals and ultimately denied relief in an Initial Decision. That Decision became the Final Decision of the MSPB when Jones did not timely file a petition for review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, first holding that it had jurisdiction, rejecting an argument that there was no . final MSPB decision from which Jones could appeal. The AJ properly found that neither direct nor circumstantial evidence supported Jones’s USERRA claim and failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his military service was a motivating factor in HHS’s decision not to hire him for the subject job vacancies. View "Jones v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Zafer, an Ankara, Turkey, contractor, and the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) entered into a firm-fixed-price contract to construct the MILCON Support Facility at the Bagram Air Force Field in Afghanistan. Zafer was responsible for delivering materials to the site, and assumed the risk “for all costs and resulting loss or profit.” After issuing notice to proceed, USACE recognized that it could not make the project site available immediately and increased the contract price and set a new completion date. In November 2011, Pakistan closed its border from the seaport city of Karachi along the land routes into Afghanistan in response to a combat incident with the U.S. and NATO. The route remained closed for 219 days, Zafer notified USACE that the closure would greatly impact its delivery of materials and requested direction on how to proceed. USACE replied that the closure was “purely the act of Pakistan governmental authorities,” that the U.S. government was “not responsible” and denied further compensation. Zafer subsequently, repeatedly, asked for payment for additional costs. In 2013, Zafer submitted an unsuccessful request for an equitable adjustment. The contracting officer found no evidence supporting a constructive change claim. The Claims Court granted USACE summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Zafer failed to designate specific facts to establish a constructive change claim based on either a constructive acceleration theory or on a government fault theory. View "Zafer Taahhut Insaat v. United States" on Justia Law

Hudgens injured his right knee while serving on active duty in the U.S. Army. In 2003, Hudgens had partial knee replacement surgery; in 2006, he sought VA benefits. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied him a disability rating of greater than 10 percent for degenerative joint disease in the right knee and denied him entitlement to a compensable disability rating for instability in the right knee for a prior time period. The Veterans Court vacated those decisions; held that Hudgens was not entitled to compensation for his prosthetic knee replacement under 38 C.F.R. 4.71a, Diagnostic Code 5055; and remanded for determination of whether his knee replacement could be rated by analogy to that code. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Hudgens may be compensated under DC 5055 based on his partial knee replacement. Hudgens’s interpretation of DC 5055 is consistent with the beneficence inherent in the veterans’ benefits scheme and with the majority of Board decisions that have interpreted the regulation. View "Hudgens v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The Navy's Diego Garcia facility, a 10.5-square-acre Indian Ocean atoll, 1,800 miles east of Africa and 1,200 miles south of India, had no commercial or civilian infrastructure. In 2005, the Navy sought bids on a firm fixed-price contract for Diego Garcia support services, ranging from information technology to refuse collection. For contractor vehicles and equipment, “contractor-furnished fuel,” was to be provided by the Navy at the prevailing Department of Defense rate. DG21 submitted a bid and, for contractor-furnished fuel, arrived at “a significantly lower number of gallons than” reflected in the solicitation. DG21 indicated that if fuel rates varied from historical rates by 10% or more, it would request an equitable adjustment. The Navy clarified that the solicitation was fixed-price, “DG21 assumes the full risk of consumption and/or rate changes. Please price ... accordingly.” The Navy questioned the lack of an escalation clause. DG21 did not change its estimate or pricing, but removed the equitable adjustment reference. DG21’s $455,292,490 proposal was accepted. During the contract term, fuel prices rose dramatically, reaching a maximum of more than double the historical rate indicated in the solicitation. In 2011, DG21 requested an equitable adjustment, characterizing the fuel cost as a $1,171,475.90 contract “change” under FAR 52.243-4. The contracting officer and the Board of Contract Appeals rejected the request. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The cost increase was not a change to the contract triggering FAR 52.243-4; the contract allocated that risk to DG21. View "DG21, LLC v. Mabus" on Justia Law

Sneed, who served on active duty 1964-1968, suffered service-connected disabilities. In 2001, Sneed suffered a spinal cord contusion from a fall, leaving him quadriplegic. In 2003, he died of smoke inhalation while living in a home for paralyzed veterans. His widow sought dependency and indemnity compensation, 38 U.S.C. 1310, alleging that Sneed’s service-connected spondylosis and spinal stenosis contributed to quadriplegia and that his service-connected PTSD and hearing loss prevented him from exiting during the fire. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed denial,mailing notice on April 5. Sneed’s notice of appeal was due 120 days after that mailing. On April 13, Sneed contacted attorney Eagle, requesting representation. According to Sneed, at the request of Eagle’s secretary, she transmitted case materials to and had oral communications with that office. On August 2, Sneed received a letter from Eagle, stating that the claim “does not meet the criteria,” declining representation, and stating that notice of appeal was due "no later than August 5.” The correct deadline was August 3. Several lawyers declined her case. Sneed filed notice on September 1, explaining her circumstances. The Veterans Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. On remand, Sneed argued attorney abandonment, warranting equitable tolling. The Veterans Court held, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that equitable tolling was not warranted absent an agreement between Eagle and Sneed and that Sneed did not act diligently. View "Sneed v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Miller served on active duty, 2003-2007, and has a VA disability rating of 60 percent. Since 2008, Miller has been employed as an FDIC Economic Analyst. He was hired at the GS-9 level and has risen to the GS-12 level. In 2012 the FDIC posted vacancy announcements for a CG-13 Financial Economist position: one open to all citizens and another for status candidates. Miller applied under both procedures and was one of three finalists. Three FDIC employees participated in the interviews, rating each candidate’s answers to questions on bank failure prediction models as Outstanding, Good, or Inadequate. All of the candidates received some "inadequate" ratings. No candidate was selected; the vacancy was cancelled. Miller filed a Department of Labor complaint, stating that the cancellation was in bad faith to avoid hiring a veteran or having to request a “pass over” from the Office of Personnel Management. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied his petition under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act, finding that the allegation of non-selection in violation of veterans’ rights was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, but that Miller had not established a violation because the FDIC “conducted a thorough, structured interview of each of the candidates” and “none of the interviewees possessed the requisite skills and knowledge for the position.” The Federal Circuit affirmed; substantial evidence indicated that cancellation was predicated on a lack of appropriately qualified candidates. View "Miller v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Veterans’ Groups challenged regulations issued in 2014 by the Department of Veterans Affairs pursuant to its notice-and-comment rulemaking authority. The Final Rule amended the VA’s adjudication and appellate regulations to require that all claims for compensation “[f]or disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty . . . during a period of war” and related appeals originate on standard VA forms. The VA’s prior regulation provided that “[a]ny communication or action, indicating an intent to apply for . . . benefits[,] . . . may be considered an informal claim,” 38 C.F.R. 3.155(a). The Federal Circuit denied the petitions and found the Final Rule valid because it accords with applicable rulemaking procedures and is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. The Rule does not contravene Congress’s mandate that the VA has a duty to develop veterans’ claims. View "Veterans Justice Grp., LLC v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Veterans’ Groups challenged regulations issued in 2014 by the Department of Veterans Affairs pursuant to its notice-and-comment rulemaking authority. The Final Rule amended the VA’s adjudication and appellate regulations to require that all claims for compensation “[f]or disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty . . . during a period of war” and related appeals originate on standard VA forms. The VA’s prior regulation provided that “[a]ny communication or action, indicating an intent to apply for . . . benefits[,] . . . may be considered an informal claim,” 38 C.F.R. 3.155(a). The Federal Circuit denied the petitions and found the Final Rule valid because it accords with applicable rulemaking procedures and is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. The Rule does not contravene Congress’s mandate that the VA has a duty to develop veterans’ claims. View "Veterans Justice Grp., LLC v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law