Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the tragic death of Tyler Gergler, a recruit in the Marine Corps' Delayed Entry Program. Gergler died in a car accident while driving to a Marine Corps event, despite being ill. His parents, Raynu Clark and Jason R. Gergler, alleged that Sergeant Mitchell Castner, Gergler's recruiter, negligently pressured their son to drive to the event despite his illness, which led to the fatal accident. They argued that since Castner's actions were within the scope of his Marine Corps employment, the Government was liable for their son's death.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The Government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the United States has sovereign immunity for discretionary acts of government agents. They contended that when Castner pressured Gergler to drive, he was acting as Gergler's recruiter, a discretionary function, and thus, sovereign immunity barred the lawsuit. The District Court agreed with the Government's argument and dismissed the case on the grounds that Castner had discretion and was exercising that discretion.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, ruling that the United States and its agents enjoy sovereign immunity from suit. The court found that Castner had discretion to urge Gergler to attend the event and that his function of preparing Marine recruits for training was discretionary. The court also rejected the parents' arguments that Castner's conduct was so egregious that it goes beyond policy consideration and that a narrow carve-out for easy precautions should apply. The court concluded that the United States is immune from suit when its agents commit alleged torts within the discretion accorded by their job function, and Sergeant Castner's actions were within his discretionary function of preparing Marine recruits for training. View "Clark v. Secretary United States Navy" on Justia Law

The case involves two American Airlines pilots, James P. Scanlan and Carla Riner, who sued their employer for failing to pay them and provide certain benefits while they were on short-term military leave. They claimed that the airline violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which provides employees on military leave the right to receive the same employment benefits as other similarly situated employees. They also claimed that the airline breached their profit-sharing plan by failing to account for imputed earnings during periods of military leave.The District Court granted summary judgment for the airline on all claims. It held that the pilots could not prevail on their USERRA claims because short-term military leave is not comparable to jury-duty or bereavement leave when comparing duration, frequency, control, and purpose. It also concluded that, under Texas law, the profit-sharing plan unambiguously excludes imputed income from periods of military leave.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment for the airline on the breach of contract claim. However, it reversed the judgment for the airline on the USERRA claims, stating that a reasonable jury could find that short-term military leave is comparable to jury-duty leave or bereavement leave based on the three factors mentioned in the implementing regulation, and any other factors it may consider. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the USERRA claims. View "Scanlan v. American Airlines Group Inc." on Justia Law

Travers served in the Naval Reserve. He also works for FedEx and fulfilled his Reserve duties during his leaves from work. Travers received no compensation from FedEx for those absences because the company does not pay employees for military leave. FedEx does pay employees who are absent for other reasons, like jury duty, illness, and bereavement. Relying on the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Travers challenged FedEx’s decision; 38 U.S.C. 4316(b)(1) entitles employees taking military leave to the “other rights and benefits” their employers give to employees taking similar kinds of leave. The district court dismissed Travers’s complaint, concluding that paid leave was not a “right and benefit” under USERRA.The Third Circuit vacated. USERRA directs employers to provide the benefit of compensation when they choose to pay other employees for comparable forms of leave. USERRA describes a process for evaluating an employer's alleged disparate treatment of service members on military leave. It does not create a class of rights and benefits. This is not a dispute about whether USERRA guarantees paid military leave; it concerns whether section 4316(b)(1) allows Travers to allege that FedEx extends a right and benefit in the form of pay to employees who miss work for non-military reasons, but then denies pay to those absent for military service. View "Travers v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

Dual-status military technicians are “Federal civilian employees” but must maintain National Guard membership and wear the appropriate military uniform while performing civilian technician duties. They must meet certain military requirements.Newton worked as a National Guard dual-status technician, 1980-2013, also serving as a New Jersey Army National Guard member, receiving separate military pay. In 2013, Newton retired from both. He received a pension from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service for his National Guard service and an annuity paid by the Office of Personnel Management for his dual-status technician service. The Social Security Administration (SSA) notified Newton that he qualified for retirement benefits, subject to a reduction under the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP), 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(7)(A), because he received a separate pension payment “based in whole or in part upon" earnings not subject to Social Security tax, his civil service annuity. Newton argued that his civil service pension triggered an exception to the WEP for uniformed service.The Third Circuit held that Newton’s benefits are subject to a WEP reduction. Newton has always received two separate salaries and now receives two separate pensions. At most, Newton’s OPM civil service pension is based on service he provided while also serving in the National Guard, but not for “service as a member of a uniformed service.” View "Newton v. Commissioner Social Security" on Justia Law

After their three-year-old adopted son died, U.S. Army Major John Jackson and his wife, Carolyn, were convicted of conspiracy to endanger the welfare of a child and endangering the welfare of a child. The New Jersey law offenses were “assimilated” into federal law under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 13(a), which “borrows” state laws to fill gaps in federal law for crimes committed on federal enclaves. The Jacksons’ crimes occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. (Picatinny Arsenal Installation). Using the offense guidelines for assault, U.S.S.G. 2A2.3, and aggravated assault, U.S.S.G. 2A2.2, the Probation Office calculated both defendants’ Guidelines range as 210-262 months. The government calculated a range of 292-365 months. The court declined to calculate the applicable sentencing ranges under the U.S.S.G., reasoning that there was no “sufficiently analogous” offense guideline, sentenced Carolyn to 24 months of imprisonment plus supervised release, and sentenced John to three years of probation plus community service and a fine. The Third Circuit vacated the sentences, adopting an “elements-based” approach, but concluding that the assault guideline is “sufficiently analogous” to the Jacksons’ offenses. The district court failed to make the requisite findings with respect to the Guidelines calculation and the statutory sentencing factors. While the court could consider what would happen if the Jacksons had been prosecuted in state court, it focused on state sentencing practices to the exclusion of federal sentencing principles. The sentences were substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law