Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Kennedy enrolled at George Washington University (GWU) in 2003. He obtained a Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) scholarship in 2005, agreeing to complete Officer Candidate School (OCS), a requirement which is not waivable. The scholarship provided that if Kennedy failed to complete the requirements, he could become liable to reimburse the program. Kennedy subsequently suffered trauma and began to act abnormally. During his OCS course, his platoon commander recommended that Kennedy be disenrolled as emotionally unstable. In June 2006, a Commanding Officer’s Board disenrolled Kennedy from OCS without opportunity to return. NROTC stopped funding Kennedy’s education. In February 2007, the Assistant Secretary approved disenrollment with recoupment of $50,675. After graduation from GWU in 2007, Kennedy graduated from law school, was admitted to the bar, and filed suit. The Claims Court directed the case to the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR), a civilian body that exists to correct Naval Records. The BCNR upheld Kennedy’s disenrollment, but held that Kennedy should be relieved from reimbursement because he had been dissuaded from appearing at a hearing. The Claims Court held that Kennedy’s disenrollment was lawful and that his breach-of-contract claims for monetary relief lacked merit. The Federal Circuit reversed. Given the government’s concession that Kennedy’s due process rights were violated when he was dissuaded from attending his hearing, the Claims Court erred in concluding that Kennedy’s disenrollment was inevitable. The court directed the case be returned to the BCNR. View "Kennedy v. United States" on Justia Law

The Budget Control Act of 2011 established spending limits for federal agencies and required automatic spending cuts (sequestration) if certain deficit reduction legislation was not enacted. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 required the President to issue a sequestration order near the middle of fiscal year 2013. Under President Obama’s sequestration the Department of Defense (DOD) 2013 budget was cut by approximately 37 billion dollars, to be absorbed over six months. The DOD reprogrammed funds, reduced facility maintenance, eliminated some military training exercises, and furloughed civilian workers. Calhoun is a non-excepted civilian Doctrine Defense Specialist for the Army Cyber Command (ACC). ACC Commander Lt. Gen. Hernandez, the deciding official, delegated that authority to his Chief of Staff, Col. Sanborn. Calhoun received a Notice of Proposed Furlough. Calhoun replied, including budget proposals she asserted would prevent furloughs. In responses to Calhoun, Col. Sanborn stated that he had read her submissions and that “[t]he furlough guidance … is clear.” Calhoun was furloughed for six nonconsecutive days. An administrative judge found that delegation to Col. Sanborn did not violate DOD policy; that Col. Sanborn appropriately considered Calhoun’s reply; and that evaluation of the merits of her proposals was beyond the scope of his review. The Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation because Col. Sanborn considered Calhoun’s written reply and because a summary of her oral reply would not have altered the furlough decision. View "Calhoun v. Department of the Army" on Justia Law

After the FLRA ordered the Air Force to bargain collectively with its civilian employees over access to an on-base shopette, the Air Force challenged the decision arguing that the issue is not a proper subject of bargaining. The court agreed with the Air Force that Congress has given the military unfettered discretion to determine whether civilians may patronize commissaries and exchanges, though for reasons that are slightly different from those offered by the Air Force. Given the relevant legislative directives, the court cannot imagine that Congress intended to empower a civilian agency like the Federal Labor Relations Authority to second-guess the military’s judgment about non-military access to commissaries and exchanges. In this case, by requiring negotiation over the Shoppette proposal, the Authority has similarly second-guessed the Secretary’s judgment in deciding how best to use a military benefit to achieve military purposes. Therefore, the court held that civilian access to commissaries and exchanges is not a proper subject of collective bargaining because Congress has vested the military with “unfettered discretion” over the matter. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the Authority's order. View "USAF v. FLRA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a retired Major in the Marine Corps and a certified NJROTC instructor, filed suit after he was decertified to contest his removal from the NJROTC program. The district court granted summary judgment to the Navy. The court found no merit in plaintiff's contention that the regulation on which the Navy relied to revoke his certification is unconstitutionally vague; that the Navy denied him due process because it failed to accord him adequate notice and opportunity to be heard when determining whether he should be permitted to continue to serve as a NJROTC instructor; and that the Navy’s decertification decision was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Crooks v. Mabus, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Army Reservist and fifth grade teacher, filed suit against the Board. Plaintiff claimed that she was improperly reemployed in violation of Section 4313 of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4313, because her mental state rendered her unqualified, and the Board’s allegedly hostile work environment triggered or exacerbated her disability. Plaintiff was reemployed by the Board after her deployment, but eventually terminated based on her deficient performance. The Board later discovered that plaintiff was disabled due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The district court granted summary judgment to the Board. The court affirmed the judgment because Section 4313 cannot serve as a basis for claims involving acts occurring after reemployment, and because plaintiff has no available remedies. View "Butts v. Prince William County School Board" on Justia Law

Carroll was hired by the Delaware River Port Authority in 1989 as a police officer. From 1989-2009, he served six years as a Navy corpsman and 10 years in the Pennsylvania National Guard. When not on active military duty, Carroll maintained his Port Authority employment, achieving the rank of corporal in 2004. Carroll was deployed to Iraq in 2009, where he sustained injuries leading to cervical spondylosis, degenerative disk disease, bilateral torn rotator cuffs, brain injury, and high-frequency hearing loss. Carroll was in rehabilitation until his 2013 honorable discharge. Carroll has not worked for the Port Authority since his deployment. In 2010 and 2012, while on active duty but in rehabilitation, Carroll unsuccessfully applied for a promotion. Carroll sued under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301, alleging discrimination based on military service. After discovery, the court certified an interlocutory appeal on the question of whether Carroll must plead and prove that he was objectively qualified for promotion to sergeant in order to sustain his discrimination suit. The Third Circuit stated that plaintiffs need not plead or prove that they are objectively qualified in order to meet their initial burden under USERRA; instead, employers may raise a plaintiff’s lack of qualifications as a nondiscriminatory justification for declining to promote the plaintiff, notwithstanding military service. View "Carroll v. Delaware River Port Authority" on Justia Law

In 1964, appellant Robert Cassinelli and respondent Janice Cassinelli were married; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received zero. As a result, the trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest. However, it could properly order Robert to reimburse Janice for her lost community property interest; doing so would not have violated either federal law or finality principles. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order awarding Janice the same amount on a different theory. View "Marr. of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-4334. Plaintiff claimed that he was fired from his job after providing notice of his deployment to Afghanistan in the United States Navy Reserve. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the plain text of USERRA does not preclude the compelled arbitration of disputes arising under its provisions. Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to establish that the legislative history evinces Congress’s intent to prevent the enforcement of the arbitration agreement he signed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration and dismissing the complaint. View "Ziober v. BLB Resources" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' review was whether one spouse’s unilateral election (after a settlement agreement and judgment of dissolution) to change from one type of military benefit (retirement that was taxable and community property) to another type of military benefit (combat-related special compensation that was not taxable and separate property) could defeat the community property interest of the other spouse set forth in the marital settlement agreement. The Court determined that one spouse could not, by invoking a condition wholly within his control, defeat the community interest of the other spouse. The trial court here correctly determined that "the post-judgment election" by appellant Philip Chapman did not relieve him of his agreement to pay respondent Judy Chapman $475 per month for her community property share of his military retirement. The Court reversed the trial court’s order, however, because the remedy the court selected was improper. The trial court imposed a constructive trust on the funds received by Philip as combat-related special compensation benefits. But the remedy of a constructive trust was available only for wrongful conduct. View "Marriage of Chapman" on Justia Law

Aldridge served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps, 1984-1992, and was denied a disability rating higher than 10% for patellofemoral syndrome on his knees in 2013. The Board of Veterans Appeals informed Aldridge that he had 120 days to file a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court, 38 U.S.C. 7266(a), by April 23, 2014. The Veterans Court received his notice on October 27, 2014. Aldridge acknowledged that his appeal was late, but argued that deaths in his family and his resulting depressive state prevented him from timely filing. His mother died on September 27, 2013; his daughter gave birth to a stillborn child on December 16; and his sister died on January 14, 2014. He asked the court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. The court determined that Aldridge had failed to demonstrate that his family’s losses “themselves directly or indirectly affected the timely filing of his appeal,” noting that Aldridge closed the estates of his deceased mother and sister, became his father’s primary caregiver, maintained his job at a Veterans Affairs hospital, and attempted to hire a lawyer during the time at issue. The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the Veterans Court’s application of a legal standard that required proof of causation. View "Aldridge v. McDonald" on Justia Law