Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran, served from 2000 to 2006 and was medically retired due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In 2016, Soto applied for combat-related special compensation (CRSC) and was approved, but his retroactive compensation was limited to six years due to the Barring Act's limitations period. Soto filed a class-action lawsuit arguing that the CRSC statute should displace the Barring Act's limitations period.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Soto and the class, holding that the CRSC statute provides its own settlement mechanism, thus displacing the Barring Act. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed this decision, stating that the CRSC statute does not explicitly grant settlement authority and therefore cannot displace the Barring Act.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the CRSC statute does confer authority to settle CRSC claims, thereby displacing the Barring Act’s settlement procedures and limitations period. The Court reasoned that the CRSC statute authorizes the Secretary concerned to determine both the validity of CRSC claims and the amount due, creating a comprehensive compensation scheme. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Soto v. United States" on Justia Law

David J. Rudometkin was found guilty of several offenses by a military judge in 2018 and sentenced to seventeen years of confinement. His post-trial motion for a mistrial was denied by another military judge after the original judge was suspended for inappropriate conduct. Rudometkin then submitted FOIA requests to the Army and the Department of Defense for records related to the judges involved. The government either did not respond meaningfully or rejected the requests under FOIA exemptions.Rudometkin filed a pro se complaint in the District Court in 2020, challenging the government's withholding of records. He later amended his complaint to focus solely on records related to the appointment of the Chief Trial Judge. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government had adequately searched for records and appropriately withheld information under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. The court also denied Rudometkin’s motions to amend his complaint to include his original FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government did not establish that it properly withheld records under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege and had not shown that it released all reasonably segregable information. The court reversed and remanded on the segregability issue. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Rudometkin’s motion to amend his complaint, as his FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge was now live in a separate action. View "Rudometkin v. USA" on Justia Law

General Jeffrey Bannister enlisted in the Army in 1979 and was married to Patricia Erickson from 1980 to 1996. As part of their divorce proceedings, General Bannister agreed to elect Ms. Erickson as his Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) annuity beneficiary. In 1998, General Bannister married Trese Bannister. In 2017, he requested voluntary retirement, effective May 31, 2018, and elected Mrs. Bannister as his SBP annuity beneficiary. However, General Bannister died on May 27, 2018, before his retirement. Both Ms. Erickson and Mrs. Bannister submitted claims for the SBP annuity, and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) awarded it to Ms. Erickson based on the 1996 separation agreement.Mrs. Bannister appealed to the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) and the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), both of which upheld the decision to award the annuity to Ms. Erickson. Mrs. Bannister then appealed to the United States Court of Federal Claims, which denied her motion and granted the government's motion, concluding that 10 U.S.C. § 1448(d)(3) precluded Mrs. Bannister from receiving the annuity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 10 U.S.C. § 1448(d) governs the entitlement to General Bannister’s SBP annuity because he died on active duty before retirement. The court determined that Mrs. Bannister is the correct beneficiary under § 1448(d)(1), which defaults to the surviving spouse. The court found that the exception under § 1448(d)(3) for a former spouse did not apply because Ms. Erickson failed to submit a timely written request for a deemed election as required by § 1450(f)(3). Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims and remanded for a determination of the annuity benefits due to Mrs. Bannister. View "BANNISTER v. US " on Justia Law

In October 2022, NCIS investigators obtained a military warrant to seize but not search Joshua Lee Ray's cell phone. Despite this, they searched the phone and found evidence of child sexual abuse material. Ray moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment as the warrant did not authorize it. The district court granted the motion.The Government appealed, conceding the warrant did not authorize the search, there was no verbal authorization, and the warrant did not incorporate an affidavit requesting authorization. The Government argued the search was justified under the good faith exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government could not rely on the good faith exception because the warrant was not deficient; it simply did not authorize the search. The court emphasized that the NCIS exceeded the scope of the valid warrant, and the good faith exception did not apply to such conduct. The court affirmed the district court's decision to suppress the evidence. View "US v. Ray" on Justia Law

Larry B. Herrington, a veteran who served in the U.S. Air Force, filed a claim in September 2009 for service connection for several gastrointestinal conditions, including Barrett’s disease, chronic gastritis, reflux disease, and hiatal hernia. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regional office awarded service connection for gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) with a non-compensable evaluation. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) later awarded a 30% evaluation for GERD by analogy to the diagnostic code for hiatal hernia, Diagnostic Code (DC) 7346, but denied an evaluation in excess of 30%.The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that the Board’s selection of DC 7346 was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Mr. Herrington appealed this decision, arguing that the Veterans Court should have applied a de novo standard of review rather than the deferential standard set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the selection of an analogous diagnostic code for rating unlisted conditions involves questions of fact or the application of law to facts, which requires a deferential standard of review. The court concluded that the Veterans Court applied the correct standard of review and affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit held that the Board’s selection of DC 7346 for rating Mr. Herrington’s GERD was appropriate and supported by the evidence. View "HERRINGTON v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

Alisha Strife, a former U.S. Army service member with disabilities, requested that her employer, Aldine Independent School District (AISD), allow her service dog to accompany her at work. Strife's disabilities include PTSD and physical impairments, and her service dog, Inde, assists her with these conditions. Strife submitted her accommodation request on August 30, 2022, but AISD took six months to approve it, during which time Strife provided multiple medical documents supporting her need for the service dog.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Strife's claims for failure to accommodate and hostile work environment. The court also granted AISD's motion for summary judgment on Strife's claims of disability discrimination, retaliation, and interference. The district court found that Strife did not suffer a physical injury during the six-month period and that she failed to allege a hostile work environment. The court also concluded that AISD had legitimate reasons for its actions and that Strife did not demonstrate that AISD's rationale was pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the hostile work environment claim, agreeing that Strife's allegations did not meet the standard for a hostile work environment. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the disability discrimination, retaliation, and interference claims, finding that AISD had legitimate reasons for its actions and that Strife did not provide sufficient evidence of pretext.However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Strife's failure-to-accommodate claim. The court found that Strife had pled sufficient facts to suggest that AISD's six-month delay in granting her accommodation request could constitute a failure to accommodate her disability. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings on this claim. View "Strife v. Aldine Independent School District" on Justia Law

Michael Poffenbarger, a First Lieutenant in the Air Force Reserve, filed a lawsuit challenging the Air Force’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, claiming it violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First Amendment. He sought a religious exemption, which was denied, and subsequently refused the vaccine. As a result, he received a letter of reprimand and was placed on inactive status, losing pay and retirement points. Poffenbarger sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including restoration of lost pay and points.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio initially granted a preliminary injunction preventing the Air Force from taking further punitive action against Poffenbarger. In a related case, Doster v. Kendall, the same court certified a class of affected service members and issued similar injunctions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed these injunctions, but the Supreme Court later vacated the decision on mootness grounds after Congress directed the rescission of the vaccine mandate. The district court then dismissed Poffenbarger's case as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that Poffenbarger’s claim for lost drill pay and retirement points was barred by federal sovereign immunity. The court explained that RFRA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not unequivocally include claims for money damages against the federal government. Since Poffenbarger’s claim sought retrospective compensation for a previous legal wrong, it constituted money damages, which are not covered by RFRA’s waiver. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case. View "Poffenbarger v. Kendall" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Department of Defense's (DoD) authority to impose time-in-service requirements for expedited naturalization of noncitizen servicemembers under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Historically, the DoD certified noncitizens' honorable service for naturalization without a time-in-service requirement. However, in 2017, the DoD issued a policy requiring a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service or one year for reservists before certifying honorable service. In 2020, a group of noncitizen servicemembers challenged this policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the policy arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and that the DoD's role in certifying honorable service was purely ministerial. The court vacated the time-in-service requirement and enjoined the DoD from withholding certification based on the policy. The DoD appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the DoD rescinded the challenged policy and did not introduce a replacement. The court determined that the case was moot due to the rescission of the policy and dismissed the appeal. The court also vacated the district court's judgment, finding no indication that the DoD rescinded the policy to evade review and emphasizing the need to clear the path for future litigation on the issue. View "Samma v. DOD" on Justia Law

Edward Amezquita, a U.S. Navy veteran, appealed a decision denying service connection for his left shoulder disability. Prior to his service entrance examination in June 2003, Amezquita had undergone Bankart repair surgery on his left shoulder due to a motor vehicle accident. The service entrance examination noted the surgery but stated he was asymptomatic with no physical limitations. Amezquita served from July 2003 to March 2005. Shortly before his separation, he reported a shoulder injury, which was diagnosed as a sprain. In June 2005, he filed a claim for service connection for his left shoulder disability, which was denied by the VA in September 2005, citing no evidence of aggravation due to service.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied Amezquita’s claim in August 2021, finding that the presumption of soundness did not apply because his preexisting condition was noted upon service entry. The Board analyzed the claim under the aggravation standard and found no evidence of in-service aggravation. Amezquita appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that his asymptomatic condition should not be considered a noted defect. The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision, relying on precedent that an asymptomatic condition can be noted as a preexisting defect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Veterans Court’s interpretation that an asymptomatic condition can be noted as a preexisting defect under 38 U.S.C. § 1111. The court dismissed Amezquita’s arguments regarding the factual determination that his condition was resolved upon service entry, as it lacked jurisdiction to review factual findings. The decision was affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "AMEZQUITA v. COLLINS " on Justia Law

The veteran served in the U.S. Army from March 1944 to May 1945 and was diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma in 1978. He received radiation therapy at a VA facility, which successfully treated the lymphoma but led to his death in early 1979 due to pulmonary complications. The veteran’s wife, Hatfield, filed a claim for dependency and indemnity benefits, which was denied by the Regional Office (RO) for lack of service connection. Hatfield appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (the Board), asserting that the veteran’s death was due to negligent VA medical care. In 1980, the Board denied the appeal, finding the VA provided adequate care and the veteran’s reaction was a recognized complication of radiation therapy.Hatfield later filed an application to reopen her claim in 2010, arguing entitlement to compensation under a 2004 regulation requiring informed consent for VA-administered medical care. The Board denied the application, but the Veterans Court reversed, granting benefits from August 1, 2010, due to the VA’s failure to obtain informed consent. In 2020, Hatfield filed a motion to revise the 1980 Board decision, claiming clear and unmistakable error (CUE) for not considering informed consent under 38 U.S.C. § 4131. The Board denied the motion, and the Veterans Court affirmed, stating there was no indication in 1980 that failure to obtain informed consent amounted to a compensable negligence claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Veterans Court’s decision. The court held that Hatfield did not demonstrate that the 1980 Board committed CUE, as there was no undebatable error in the application of the law at that time. The court found no evidence that the failure to obtain informed consent under 38 U.S.C. § 4131 was considered a compensable negligence claim under 38 U.S.C. § 351 in 1980. View "HATFIELD v. COLLINS " on Justia Law