Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Daniel D. Barry, a veteran who appealed a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. Barry had argued that the Board of Veterans’ Appeals should have considered his entitlement to multiple special monthly compensation (SMC) increases, rather than just one, under 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3). The Veterans Court disagreed, interpreting § 3.350(f)(3) to permit only one SMC increase, regardless of how many qualifying disabilities Barry could demonstrate.The Veterans Court had previously remanded the case for further explanation and consideration of potential additional SMC entitlement. The Board then concluded that Barry could not show entitlement to an additional SMC increase under 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(4). Barry appealed this decision to the Veterans Court, arguing that the Board erred by not considering whether he would be entitled to an additional SMC increase under 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(f)(3).The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the Veterans Court. The court held that § 3.350(f)(3) does not limit how many SMC increases can be provided; instead, it is a mandatory entitlement that can apply multiple times, subject to a statutory cap. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, including the calculation of the number of intermediate-rate SMC increases Barry should receive. View "BARRY v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

In 2006, veteran Robert Fleming began applying for disability benefits for service-connected injuries. In 2016, he entered into a contingent-fee agreement with James Perciavalle for representation before the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA awarded Fleming past-due benefits in 2017, but ruled that Perciavalle was statutorily barred from receiving fees on the non-SMC portion of the award. The VA found the pre-Act version of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) applicable based on the date on which Fleming had filed a particular notice of disagreement with the regional office regarding his PTSD benefits.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the fee denial, agreeing with the regional office that the pre-Act version of the fee provision, not the post-Act version, applies here. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) affirmed the Board’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the decision of the Veterans Court. The Federal Circuit concluded that the Veterans Court relied on an incorrect legal standard in determining which version of § 5904(c)(1) applies. The Federal Circuit also concluded that the post-Act version is the applicable one, based on the material facts that are not in dispute. The Federal Circuit found that as long as a notice of disagreement was filed on or after June 20, 2007, in the same “case” in which counsel is seeking fees, the post-Act version of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) applies. View "PERCIAVALLE v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

The case involves four veterans who appealed from judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which dismissed their petitions for writs of mandamus due to lack of jurisdiction. The veterans' disability ratings were reduced, and they sought to have their original ratings continue pending the final resolution of the validity of the reduction. The veterans argued that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) could not lawfully decrease or discontinue their payments until their appeals challenging the reduction were exhausted.The Veterans Court found that there was no basis on which it could issue a writ under the All Writs Act in aid of its jurisdiction. The Veterans Court dismissed the veterans' petitions for lack of jurisdiction. The veterans then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.The Federal Circuit Court affirmed the Veterans Court's decision. The court held that mandamus relief was not available for the veterans under the All Writs Act because there was an adequate remedy by appeal that the veterans had chosen not to invoke. The court concluded that when there is a remedy by appeal, mandamus is unavailable. The court found that the veterans could have requested relief from the VA, and if a decision had been obtained from the Board denying the requested relief, a remedy by appeal would have been available to the veterans. The court also noted that an appeal is available if three conditions are satisfied: a clear and final decision of a legal issue, the resolution of the legal issues adversely affects the party seeking review, and there is a substantial risk that the decision would not survive a remand. The court found that these conditions would have been satisfied if the veterans had appealed the question of their entitlement to interim payments while the merits of their reductions were still pending. View "LOVE v. MCDONOUGH " on Justia Law

Truman Harry Smith was convicted of felony murder and other charges related to the shooting death of Johnny Crawford. Smith claimed self-defense, stating that he shot Crawford due to fear for his life, and argued that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The jury rejected Smith's defense and he was sentenced to life in prison plus five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Smith appealed, contending that the trial court should have allowed him to testify about his PTSD diagnosis and should not have permitted the State to impeach him with a prior military charge.The trial court had denied Smith's motion for a new trial, and the Supreme Court of Georgia granted Smith's application for interlocutory appeal. Smith argued that his PTSD diagnosis should have been admissible under a hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that this exception does not apply to medical diagnoses themselves, but to statements patients make to medical professionals to aid in their diagnosis or treatment.Smith also contended that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach him with a prior military charge. The Supreme Court of Georgia found that even if it was an error to allow the State to ask about the charge, the error was harmless given the overall evidence. The court affirmed Smith's convictions and sentence. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Benito R. Chavez, a Vietnam War veteran who sought service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). After being diagnosed with chronic, moderately severe PTSD, he was granted a 100 percent disability evaluation by the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). However, after a subsequent medical examination, his disability rating was reduced to 50 percent, and later increased to 70 percent, as it was determined that his condition did not result in total occupational impairment. Chavez disagreed with this decision and appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which upheld the reduction.Chavez then appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the Board's decision should be reversed and his 100 percent rating reinstated. The Veterans Court agreed that the Board may have improperly relied on evidence developed after the rating reduction, but instead of reversing the Board’s decision, it remanded the case back to the Board for further examination.Chavez appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the Veterans Court should have reversed the Board’s decision rather than remanding the case. The government contended that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction over Chavez's appeal. The Federal Circuit rejected the government's jurisdictional argument but affirmed the decision of the Veterans Court on the merits. The Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court was fully entitled to remand the case to the Board for clarification, and therefore, the decision of the Veterans Court was affirmed. View "Chavez v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Daniel Richard Mahoney, a U.S. Navy veteran, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit after the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) denied his 2018 petition to upgrade his 1989 other than honorable discharge status. Mahoney served two periods in the Navy, the first from 1985 to 1988, which resulted in an honorable discharge, and the second from 1988 to 1989, which resulted in the other than honorable discharge. During his second period of service, Mahoney received several non-judicial punishments for unauthorized absences, drunkenness, and wrongful use of a controlled substance. He was diagnosed with alcohol dependency and received treatment, but continued to struggle with alcohol abuse.The BCNR denied Mahoney's petition to upgrade his discharge status, determining that he had failed to provide "substantial evidence" of "probable material error or injustice" to overcome the BCNR's presumption that military officers "have properly discharged their official duties." The BCNR concluded that Mahoney's PTSD did not mitigate the drug-related misconduct which led to his discharge.Mahoney then filed a complaint against Carlos Del Toro, U.S. Secretary of the Navy, in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, requesting judicial review of the BCNR's decision. The district court concluded that the BCNR's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law, and denied Mahoney's motions while granting Del Toro's cross-motion. Mahoney subsequently appealed to the First Circuit.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the BCNR's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law. The court found that the BCNR had reasonably determined that Mahoney's PTSD did not mitigate the drug-related misconduct leading to his discharge, and that his account of the positive urinalysis was not credible. The court also rejected Mahoney's argument that the BCNR had failed to apply the liberal consideration standard to his entire claim, finding that the BCNR had indeed applied the standard and had reasonably concluded that Mahoney's PTSD did not warrant changing his discharge characterization. View "Mahoney v. Del Toro" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the interpretation of the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post-9/11 GI Bill, both of which provide educational benefits to veterans. The petitioner, James Rudisill, served in the U.S. Army for nearly eight years over three separate periods, earning entitlements under both bills. He used a portion of his Montgomery benefits for his undergraduate degree and sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits for divinity school. However, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) limited his Post-9/11 benefits to the duration of his unused Montgomery benefits, arguing that by requesting Post-9/11 benefits before exhausting all of his Montgomery benefits, Rudisill could receive only 36 months of benefits in total, not the 48 months to which he would otherwise be entitled.The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the VA’s decision, but the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims reversed. The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, holding that veterans with multiple periods of qualifying service are subject to a limit on the duration of their benefits.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit. The Court held that veterans who separately accrue benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills are entitled to both benefits. Neither the Montgomery GI Bill nor the Post-9/11 GI Bill restricts veterans with two separate entitlements who simply seek to use either one. Thus, Rudisill may use his benefits, in any order, up to a 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Rudisill v. McDonough" on Justia Law

Sedric Ward, an Army reservist, worked at the Shelby County Jail. In 2015, the County fired Ward but later entered into a settlement agreement in which Ward released “any and all claims whatsoever” related to his termination. Despite this, Ward later sued the County under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The central issue was whether the settlement agreement effectively released Ward’s claim under the Act.The district court ruled in favor of Ward, asserting that the release’s scope—namely, “any and all claims whatsoever”—did not reach his USERRA claim. The case went to trial, and the jury found in Ward’s favor. The district court eventually ordered the County to pay Ward more than $1.5 million.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasoning. The appellate court found that the release provision in the settlement agreement clearly encompassed Ward’s USERRA claim. However, the court also noted that USERRA imposes a second requirement for the release of a claim under the Act. Specifically, the Act requires that the agreement “establish” rights that are “more beneficial” for the servicemember than the ones he gives up. The court found that whether a particular settlement agreement provides greater benefits than a USERRA claim is for the servicemember to decide. Given the circumstances, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Ward’s decision to enter into the agreement reflected a considered decision on his part, or instead that it reflected only desperation. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ward v. Shelby County" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jeffrey Boone, was charged with using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing child pornography, distributing child pornography, and possessing child pornography. The minor in question was Boone's four-year-old daughter. Boone pleaded guilty to all three counts. The evidence against Boone included images and videos of his sexual abuse of his daughter, which he had shared via Kik Messenger. The FBI was alerted to Boone's activities by an online covert employee who had received the explicit images from Boone.Boone's case was heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The Presentence Investigation Report grouped Boone's three counts together and assigned a total offense level of 43, factoring in enhancements based on the victim's age and other offense characteristics. The report recommended a five-level increase due to Boone's pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct. Boone did not object to the report. The district court imposed an 840-month sentence, comprised of consecutive terms of 360 months on Count 1 and 240 months each on Counts 2 and 3, followed by a lifetime of supervised release.Boone appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. He argued that the district court erred at sentencing by applying a pattern-of-activity enhancement and considering his military service as an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor. The Court of Appeals affirmed Boone's sentence, finding no procedural or substantive error in the district court's decision. The court noted that Boone had invited the error he was alleging by expressly agreeing to the application of the pattern-of-activity enhancement. The court also found that the district court had acted within its discretion in considering Boone's military service as an aggravating factor. View "United States v. Boone" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the dispute between Daniel Bader, a military officer who previously held the rank of Colonel but had attained the rank of Brigadier General at the time of his application for retirement in 2012, and the United States. Bader was found to have violated ethical standards set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 207(c) and 5 C.F.R. § 2635, which led to his retirement at the rank of Colonel, affecting his rate of retirement pay. Bader brought suit in the Court of Federal Claims seeking compensation for his allegedly lost pay. The court, however, ruled against him, finding no error in the decision to retire him at the lower rank of Colonel.Bader appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that he was unfairly penalized for holding both a military and civilian employment concurrently, which was permissible. He also contended that he was acting in accordance with multiple ethics opinions that he believed permitted his actions, and that his employer's operation through an Other Transactions Authority allowed him to engage in the conduct he was penalized for.The Appeals Court, however, affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that Bader's simultaneous employment in military and civilian capacities did not exempt him from ethical obligations. His reliance on ethics opinions didn't change the fact that he used his government position to benefit his private employer. The court also clarified that the Other Transactions Authority doesn't exempt government employees from generally applicable ethics regulations. Therefore, Bader's retirement at the rank of Colonel was deemed appropriate given his violations of ethical standards. View "BADER v. US " on Justia Law