Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

After the United States detained Mohammed Jawad at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base for more than six years until he was released and returned to his native Afghanistan, Jawad filed suit alleging that they subjected him to torture while he was in their custody. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Jawad’s complaint because the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear his claims. Section 7(a) of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2), strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most claims against the United States arising out of the detention of aliens like Jawad captured during the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The court rejected Jawad's reasons why the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) finding that he was an "enemy combatant" does not satisfy the section 7(a) requirements. The court also rejected Jawad's remaining claims. View "Jawad v. Gates" on Justia Law

Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Association and Military-Veterans Advocacy filed suit challenging the VA's policy requiring "blue-water" veterans to prove on a case-by-base basis that they were exposed to Agent Orange during their military service in order to be considered for certain benefits. Plaintiffs argued that the policy was arbitrary and capricious and otherwise unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2). Plaintiffs sought injunctive and mandamus relief to prevent the VA from denying the presumption of Agent Orange exposure to blue-water veterans. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing 38 U.S.C. 511(a), which bars review in district court of VA decisions “under a law that affects the provision of” veterans benefits. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Congress stripped the district court of jurisdiction over the claims at issue. View "Blue Water Navy Vietnam v. McDonald" on Justia Law

After Cooks terminated him, plaintiff filed suit against the company, alleging claims under the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301, 4302(b), and Alabama state law. The district court entered an order striking from the arbitration agreement two terms that violated USERRA, dismissing the suit without prejudice, and ordering plaintiff to submit his claims to arbitration. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the district court erred by failing to apply the plain language of USERRA’s non-waiver provision. The court concluded that the contract's arguable delegation clause - which would require that the arbitrator, rather than the court, determine whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable - does not control this appeal. The court also concluded that, in reaching whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable, section 4302(b) is not in conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1, 2, and the district court properly determined the arbitration agreement is enforceable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision to compel arbitration. View "Bodine v. Cook's Pest Control" on Justia Law

Trent M. Coburn pled not guilty to marijuana use in non-judicial proceedings related to a positive drug test, but was found guilty and received a negative non-commissioned officer evaluation report based on the offense. The Army subsequently denied Coburn continued Army Service. In Coburn I, the court remanded to the ABCMR so it could provide a reasoned explanation (if possible) for several questions the court could not resolve. Since then, the ABCMR has issued a new opinion in response to the court's remand, affirming the decision to terminate Coburn’s Medical Evaluation Board and proceed with his discharge. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the ABCMR’s conclusions. Therefore, the court affirmed the ABCMR’s decision to terminate Coburn’s disability processing and its conclusion that Coburn’s medical conditions did not warrant further medical review. View "Coburn v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act requires the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to set annual goals for contracting with service-disabled and other veteran-owned small businesses, 38 U.S.C. 8127(a). The “Rule of Two” provides that a contracting officer “shall award contracts” by restricting competition to veteran-owned small businesses if the officer reasonably expects that at least two such businesses will submit offers and that “the award can be made at a fair and reasonable price.” A contracting officer “may” use noncompetitive and sole-source contracts for contracts below specific dollar amounts. In 2012, the Department used the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), a streamlined method for acquisition of goods and services under prenegotiated terms, to procure medical center Emergency Notification Services from a non-veteran-owned business. The agreement ended in 2013. A service-disabled-veteran-owned small business filed a Government Accountability Office (GAO) bid protest, alleging that the Department procured multiple contracts through the FSS without employing the Rule of Two. The GAO determined that the Department’s actions were unlawful. The Department declined to follow the GAO’s nonbinding recommendation. The Federal Circuit held that the Department was only required to apply the Rule when necessary to satisfy its annual goals. The Supreme Court reversed, first holding that it had jurisdiction because the controversy is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Section 8127(d)’s contracting procedures are mandatory and apply to all of the Department’s contracting determinations. An FSS order is a “contract” within the ordinary meaning of that term and does not fall outside Section 8127(d). The Court rejected an argument that the Rule of Two will hamper mundane Government purchases as misapprehending current FSS practices, which have expanded beyond simple procurement to contracts concerning complex services over a multiyear period. View "Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Gourzong, a native of Jamaica, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1983. In 1993, having joined the U.S. military, he was convicted by a special court-martial at Camp Pendelton of willfully disobeying a lawful order, 10 U.S.C. 890(2), and “commit[ing] an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife who has not attained the age of sixteen years,” 10 U.S.C. 920. Gourzong was represented by counsel and pleaded guilty. He received a sentence of six months confinement, loss of pay, and bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority suspended part of the confinement and withheld executing the bad-conduct discharge until after appellate review procedures, 10 U.S.C. 871(c). An IJ found Gourzong removable, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), having been convicted of an aggravated felony. The BIA affirmed, rejecting his argument that convictions by special courts-martial categorically fall outside the definition in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A): “‘conviction’ means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court.” Although it is possible that a special court-martial can convene without a legally trained judge presiding, their convictions generally qualify as convictions under the Act. The Third Circuit agreed and, therefore, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Gourzong’s appeal. View "Gourzong v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner moved for one of the three judges of the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review, Judge William B. Pollard III, to disqualify himself. Judge Pollard is a civilian who serves as a part-time judge on the court. He also maintains a private law practice. Petitioner contends that this arrangement is unlawful and requires Judge Pollard’s disqualification. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Pollard's disqualification. Petitioner argued that Judge Pollard’s disqualification is compelled by the Rules of Practice of the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review; petitioner raises another related argument under the appearance of impartiality standard incorporated into the Rules of Practice; Judge Pollard must disqualify himself because the Judge’s part-time private practice of law violates 18 U.S.C. 203(a), a criminal statute; and Judge Pollard has violated 28 U.S.C. 454, which states that any justice or judge appointed under the authority of the United States who engages in the practice of law is guilty of a high misdemeanor. Although the court concluded that petitioner's arguments carry some force, he has not shown a "clear and indisputable" right to relief at this time. Therefore, the court denied the petition. The court noted that if the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review decides against petitioner in his pending appeal, he may renew his arguments about Judge Pollard on direct appeal to this court. View "In re: Omar Khadr" on Justia Law

Hudgens injured his right knee while serving on active duty in the U.S. Army. In 2003, Hudgens had partial knee replacement surgery; in 2006, he sought VA benefits. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied him a disability rating of greater than 10 percent for degenerative joint disease in the right knee and denied him entitlement to a compensable disability rating for instability in the right knee for a prior time period. The Veterans Court vacated those decisions; held that Hudgens was not entitled to compensation for his prosthetic knee replacement under 38 C.F.R. 4.71a, Diagnostic Code 5055; and remanded for determination of whether his knee replacement could be rated by analogy to that code. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Hudgens may be compensated under DC 5055 based on his partial knee replacement. Hudgens’s interpretation of DC 5055 is consistent with the beneficence inherent in the veterans’ benefits scheme and with the majority of Board decisions that have interpreted the regulation. View "Hudgens v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The Navy's Diego Garcia facility, a 10.5-square-acre Indian Ocean atoll, 1,800 miles east of Africa and 1,200 miles south of India, had no commercial or civilian infrastructure. In 2005, the Navy sought bids on a firm fixed-price contract for Diego Garcia support services, ranging from information technology to refuse collection. For contractor vehicles and equipment, “contractor-furnished fuel,” was to be provided by the Navy at the prevailing Department of Defense rate. DG21 submitted a bid and, for contractor-furnished fuel, arrived at “a significantly lower number of gallons than” reflected in the solicitation. DG21 indicated that if fuel rates varied from historical rates by 10% or more, it would request an equitable adjustment. The Navy clarified that the solicitation was fixed-price, “DG21 assumes the full risk of consumption and/or rate changes. Please price ... accordingly.” The Navy questioned the lack of an escalation clause. DG21 did not change its estimate or pricing, but removed the equitable adjustment reference. DG21’s $455,292,490 proposal was accepted. During the contract term, fuel prices rose dramatically, reaching a maximum of more than double the historical rate indicated in the solicitation. In 2011, DG21 requested an equitable adjustment, characterizing the fuel cost as a $1,171,475.90 contract “change” under FAR 52.243-4. The contracting officer and the Board of Contract Appeals rejected the request. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The cost increase was not a change to the contract triggering FAR 52.243-4; the contract allocated that risk to DG21. View "DG21, LLC v. Mabus" on Justia Law

Davis and his wife purchased a Philadelphia rental property in 1997 1997. A longtime member of the U.S. Army Reserve, Davis was called to active duty in 2004. A few months later, the Davises transferred the property to Global LLC, owned and managed by Davis, to “insulate themselves from liability” because “his wife was unable to manage the property.” In 2009, Davis and Global asked the Philadelphia Department of Revenue to reduce Global’s property tax debt, citing the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 U.S.C. 3901, which limits interest imposed on a servicemember’s delinquent property taxes during active duty to a rate of six percent and forbids additional penalties. The Department denied this request, stating that the SCRA does not apply to a business owned by a servicemember and that Davis should file an abatement petition with the Philadelphia Tax Review Board. The Review Board denied that petition. Two years later the city initiated foreclosure proceedings; the state court entered judgment in the city’s favor. Davis and Global filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. SCRA extends only to servicemembers; a corporation is not a “servicemember” under the statute. View "Davis v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law