Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, current and former members of the Navy and Marine Corps, filed suit against senior officials in the military and the Department of Defense, alleging that they were raped, sexually assaulted, or sexually harassed by their fellow Sailors and Marines, only to suffer retaliation from their superiors for reporting their plight. The Supreme Court has held that military officials are not subject to personal liability under the Constitution for their management decisions, including the choices they make about the discipline, supervision, and control of servicemembers. The court joined the Fourth Circuit in concluding that no Bivens remedy is available in this instance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit. View "Klay, et al. v. Panetta, et al." on Justia Law

Erickson was a U.S. Postal Service employee from 1988 to 2000, and also a member of the Army National Guard Reserve. He was absent from the Postal Service for lengthy periods while on active duty with the National Guard. Between 1991 and 1995 he was absent for more than 22 months, and between 1996 and 2000, he worked at the Postal Service for only four days. The Postal Service inquired whether he intended to return. Erickson replied that he would not return until he completed his tour of duty in September 2001. The Postal Service removed him for excessive use of military leave. Erickson re-enlisted with the Guard and remained on active duty through 2005. In 2006, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board alleging violation of his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The Board rejected his claim under 38 U.S.C. 4312, holding that he had not made a timely request for reemployment and that military service was not a motivating factor in the termination. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to his reemployment claim, but reversed with respect to his discrimination claim. On remand, the Board found that Erickson had waived his USERRA rights by abandoning his civilian career, but on a second remand, ruled in favor of Erickson and granted him reinstatement with back wages and benefits. The Federal Circuit denied his application for recovery of attorney fees and expenses for the two appeals.View "Erickson v. U.S. Postal Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350, against former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other federal officials allegedly involved in his detention as a suspected terrorist. Plaintiff was determined to be an "enemy combatant" but was eventually released to his native country of Algeria. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2). View " Ameur v. Gates" on Justia Law

In a 2011 memorandum, the Secretary of the Navy explained that the Navy would be “challenged to reduce enlisted manning to meet future planned end strength controls due to record high retention in the current economic environment.” To address these concerns and to “optimize the quality” of the Navy, the Secretary initiated an Enlisted Retention Board (ERB) to identify 3,000 sailors for separation. The Navy notified all personnel, outlined a timeline, and identified particular pay grades and occupational classifications or specialties that would be subject to review. Sailors were informed that if their job rating was over-manned and slated for review, they could apply for conversion to an undermanned rating that would not be subject to review. The Navy also published the quotas for each overmanned rating that would be subject to the ERB to give the sailors information about competition among the different ratings and to enable them to make informed decisions about their careers. The ERB selected 2,946 sailors for honorable discharge. A putative class of about 300 of those discharged challenged their dismissal and sought back pay. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the merit-based claims as nonjusticiable and denied remaining claims on the administrative record. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, foreign nationals, alleged that they were tortured and otherwise mistreated by American civilian and military personnel while detained at Abu Ghraib. CACI, a corporation domiciled in the United States, contracted with the United States to provide private interrogators to interrogate detainees at Abu Ghraib. Plaintiffs alleged that CACI employees instigated, directed, participated in, encouraged, and aided and abetted conduct towards detainees that clearly violated federal and international law. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. does not foreclose plaintiffs' claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, and that the district court erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. In light of Kiobel, the court held that plaintiffs' claims "touch and concern" the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute. Because the court was unable to determine whether the claims presented nonjusticiable political questions, the court did not reach the additional issue of the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' common law claims. The court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to all plaintiffs' claims and remanded. View "Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from events surrounding six individuals formerly detained at Guantanamo Bay. At issue was whether the detainees cleared by a military tribunal but nevertheless subjected to continued detention and allegedly abusive treatment have sufficiently alleged that those authorizing and supervising their detention acted outside the scope of their employment. The actions at issue can be divided into two categories: (1) the continued detention of plaintiffs post- Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) clearance, and (2) all acts attendant to that continued detention that occurred during the post-clearance period. The court concluded that claims in both categories, as pled, failed to support the conclusion that defendants acted outside the scope of their employment. Accordingly, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. View "Allaithi v.Rumsfeld, et al." on Justia Law

Wilson served in the Navy 1986-1990 and again 1992-1994. He was given a 70% disability rating for several service-connected physical conditions. In 2001, Wilson was found guilty of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm and was sentenced to concurrent life terms. His convictions and sentences were affirmed. Wilson then pursued unsuccessful state and federal collateral attacks. For veterans who have service-connected disabilities rated at 20% or more and who are incarcerated for than 60 days for a felony,” 38 U.S.C. 5313(a)(1) requires reduction in compensation to the level of 10% disability, effective the 61st day of incarceration. The VA informed Wilson by letter that his rate of compensation would be reduced to 10%, effective back to December 20, 2001 and requested refund of overpayment of $15,464.50. The Regional Office Committee on Waivers and Compromises denied a waiver. Wilson was also denied a “total disability evaluation based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disabilities” (TDIU) rating on the basis that his unemployability was due to his incarceration The Board of Veterans’ Appeals applied the multi-factor test from 38 C.F.R. 1.965 to determine that recovery of the overpayment would not be against “equity and good conscience” and agreed that Wilson was not entitled to a TDIU rating. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit upheld the decision. View "Wilson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Spicer served on active duty in the Navy from 1984 until 1987. In 1986, Spicer fractured his left little finger when a door closed on his hand while aboard ship. The fracture required surgery, which resulted in the finger joint fusing. In 2007, a VA examiner diagnosed Spicer as having degenerative arthritis of the distal interphalangeal joint in that finger. A VA regional office denied Spicer a compensable rating. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals found that although Spicer’s left finger disability was manifested by pain and limitation of motion, he failed to meet the criteria for a compensable evaluation for a left finger disability under either Diagnostic Code (DC) 5227 or 5230. The Veterans Court rejected Spicer’s argument that DC 5003 assigns a 10% rating for either a single affected major joint or a group of affected minor joints and that 38 C.F.R. 4.45(f) does not mandate that multiple minor joints be involved. The Veterans Court stated that “the DIP joint is not a major joint or minor joint group for the purpose of rating disabilities from arthritis.” The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Spicer v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

In 1996, the Air Force entered into a contract under which SUFI would install and operate telephone systems in guest lodgings on bases in Europe at no cost to the government; the Air Force agreed that SUFI network was to be the exclusive method available to a guest placing telephone calls at the lodging. The contract permitted SUFI to block other networks and required the Air Force to remove or disable preexisting Defense Switched Network (DSN) telephone lines in hallways and lobbies, but DSN phones remained in place. Call records showed that, with Air Force assistance, guests often placed multiple or lengthy individual calls. After the Air Force declined to implement controls to curb DSN and patched-call abuse, SUFI blocked guest-room access to the DSN operator numbers but permitted morale calls from lobby phones, monitored by sign-in logs. Air Force personnel failed to require guests to sign the logs and gave guests new DSN access numbers, to circumvent SUFI’s charges. After failed attempts to resolve the situation, including through the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, SUFI sold the telephone system to the Air Force for $2.275 million and submitted claims, totaling $130.3 million, to the contracting officer. The officer denied the claims, except for $132,922 on a claim involving use of calling-cards. The Board later awarded $7.4 million in damages, plus interest. In an action under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491, the Court of Federal Claims awarded $118.76 million in damages, plus interest. The Federal Circuit vacated in part and remanded for additional findings. View "SUFI Network Servs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Matthews enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1990. In 2006, while on active duty, he pled guilty to computer pornography and solicitation of a child. He was sentenced to 21 years plus 10 months in prison. In 2007, an administrative separation board imposed an “other than honorable” discharge on Matthews. In 2010, Matthews sought back pay from the date of his arrest and “retainer” pay, based on a total of 20 years of active duty, reached while incarcerated. He claimed he was not properly discharged, citing the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552b; the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552; the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. 1034; and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706. The Claims Court of held that it lacked jurisdiction over claims founded on the four statutes because they are not money-mandating and held that Matthews failed to state claims for back pay under 37 U.S.C. 204(a) and retainer pay under 10 U.S.C. 6330(b). The statute prohibits service members from receiving pay for absences without leave that are not unavoidable; an absence due to civilian incarceration is not unavoidable. When he was arrested Matthews had not reached the 20 years of active duty service required to receive retainer pay. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Matthews v. United States" on Justia Law