Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a member of the National Guard, filed suit against TXD, alleging that TXD violated the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301 et seq., when it terminated him while he was deployed on active duty in Iraq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TXD. At issue was whether TXD violated its USERRA obligations to plaintiff while he was on leave by not including him on an asset list of TXD employees provided to Foxxe, which took over TXD's operations without interruption. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the modified claim turned on one or more essential facts that the summary judgment record did not address. View "Dorris v. TXD Services, LP" on Justia Law

When an attorney successfully represents a veteran, the Veterans Administration may directly pay reasonable legal fees to the attorney from any past-due benefits awarded to the veteran, 38 U.S.C. 5904(d). For most types of claims, an attorney has one year to challenge denial of direct pay, 38 U.S.C. 7105, but for “simultaneously contested claims,” the period is 60 days, 38 U.S.C. 7105A. A regional office applied the 60-day period to reject a challenge filed by an attorney 90 days after written denial of his direct-fee request, based on its award to the veteran on a claim other than the claim for which the attorney represented the veteran. Because the statute does not define the term, the VA relied on 38 C.F.R. 20.3(p), which explains that simultaneously contested claim refers to the "situation in which the allowance of one claim results in the disallowance of another claim involving the same benefit or the allowance of one claim results in the payment of a lesser benefit to another claimant” and its Claim Adjudication Manual’s guidance that a denial of an attorney fee request should be treated as a simultaneously contested claim. The Board of Veterans Appeals, the Veterans Court, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Mason v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an employment discrimination suit filed by appellant against the Navy. The Navy subsequently offered a stipulation of Settlement (the "Agreement"). After concluding that specific performance of the Agreement was no longer practicable, appellant sought nearly a million dollars in damages and attorney's fees. The court held that a settlement agreement embodied in a consent decree was a contract under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), and transferred the case to the Court of Federal Claims. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order dismissing the motion to enforce and remanded with instructions to transfer to the Court of Federal Claims. View "Franklin-Mason v. Mabus, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioners, detainees who have been cleared for release but remain held at Guantanamo Bay, engaged in a hunger strike unless and until they were released. The government subsequently instituted a force-feeding protocol. Petitioners invoked the district court's habeas jurisdiction and moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the authorities from force-feeding them. Two district courts denied petitioners' request, concluding that the Military Commissions Act (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to consider such challenges brought by Guantanamo detainees. The court concluded that, under the law of this circuit, petitioners' challenges to the conditions of their confinement properly sounded in habeas corpus and were not barred by the MCA. The court concluded, however, that petitioners failed to establish their entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district courts' denials of petitioners' applications for a preliminary injunction. View "Aamer, et al. v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an action filed against Defendant-Respondent Mallory Martinez, a National Guard member, by Plaintiff-Appellant William Teurlings. Plaintiff alleged he suffered personal injury and economic damage resulting from a vehicle collision caused by defendant's negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment asserting immunity under I.C. 6-904(4), which provides immunity to National Guard members for claims arising out of certain federal training or duty. The district court granted the motion after concluding defendant fell within the scope of the statutory immunity. Teurlings appealed, arguing that defendant was not immune because she was not "engaged in training or duty" and she was not acting within the course of her employment at the time of the collision. Finding that the district court erred in granting defendant immunity, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in her favor and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Teurlings v. Larson" on Justia Law

Roberts asserts that he is owed living quarters allowance (LQA) for his current civilian position as Deputy Camp Commander for a Marine Corps base in Okinawa, Japan. LQA is authorized for particular classes of employees by the Overseas Differentials and Allowance Act, 5 U.S.C. 5921, and regulations issued by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and Marine Corps Bases Japan Order P12000.2A. In deciding whether to offer LQA for Roberts’s position, the deputy commanding general considered prior experience that there were qualified, locally-available candidates for DCC positions for whom LQA was not needed as a recruitment incentive. Many active-duty Marines like Roberts wished to remain in Okinawa in civilian positions after retirement. The deputy commanding general also determined that there were insufficient funds to support LQA for DCC positions in Okinawa without reallocating funds from other programs. Response to the 2008 job announcement, which noted that LQA was not offered, confirmed the lack of recruitment need; 14 qualified, locally-available candidates applied. When he was offered the position, Roberts was informed that his salary would be include no LQA.” The Claims Court rejected Roberts’s subsequent appeal of denial of his request for LQA. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Roberts v. United States" on Justia Law

Stallworth served in the U.S. Army, 1974-1975, during which time he experienced a psychotic episode that was attributed to his illicit use of the drug LSD. He recovered with hospitalization, but relapsed following return to active duty and was diagnosed with acute paranoid schizophrenia. A treating physician noted that it was not clear whether Stallworth’s illness was caused by his drug use or by independent psychosis. An Army medical board found him unfit for further military duty. Weeks later, a VA Regional Office awarded Stallworth service connection for schizophrenia at a 50% disability rating. Thereafter, Stallworth was often admitted to inpatient psychiatric facilities where medical professionals repeatedly opined that he had “no mental disorder” and that Stallworth’s service connection diagnosis was in error. The VA severed Stallworth’s service connection on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) and declined to reopen his claim because of a lack of new evidence. In 1981, the Appeals Board affirmed. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Stallworth v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his claim under Rule 12(b)(6), alleging that Nationstar violated section 533 of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 U.S.C. app. 533, when it maintained certain fees related to a rescinded Notice of Default on his account while he was on active duty. Because the state-law statutory definition of foreclosure contemplates the inclusion of specified fees as part of the foreclosure proceeding, and because the Supreme Court has unambiguously required courts to give a broad construction to the statutory language of the SCRA to effectuate the Congressional purpose of granting active-duty members of the armed forces repose from some of the trials and tribulations of civilian life, the court held that the attempted collection of fees related to a Notice of Default on a California property constituted a violation of section 533. In this case, plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to allege that Nationstar's continuing failure to remove the fees incidental to the Notice of Default was a continuation of that foreclosure proceeding while plaintiff was on active duty service in violation of section 533. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Brewster v. Sun Trust Mortgage" on Justia Law

Dixon served in the Army, 1979-1992, including as a chemical operations specialist in the Persian Gulf, where he was exposed to pyridostigmine and “encountered smoke from oil fires, diesel, and burning trash,” and had “cutaneous exposure [to] diesel and petrochemical fuel.” In 2003, Dixon was diagnosed with sarcoid lungs and transverse myelitis, which left him temporarily paralyzed from the waist down. He sought service-connected disability benefits. In 2004 a VA regional office denied Dixon’s claim. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed, Dixon filed a pro se notice of appeal, 60 days after the 120-day filing deadline, 38 U.S.C. 7266(a). The Veterans Court dismissed, concluding that it was “without jurisdiction.” In 2011 the Supreme Court held that the filing deadline is not jurisdictional. The Veterans Court issued an order allowing Dixon and others to move to recall the dismissals. Still acting pro se, Dixon sought equitable tolling, explaining that he suffered from physical and psychiatric disabilities that prevented him from filing in a timely manner, accompanied by a statement from his psychiatrist. The Veterans Court denied Dixon’s motion. Attorneys subsequently agreed to represent Dixon. The Veterans Court allowed until October 4, 2012 to move for reconsideration. The VA refused to provide a copy of the file and the earliest available appointment for reviewing the file was October 1. On that dated, VA staff monitored the review and declined requests for copies of documents. The Federal Circuit reversed the denial of an extension, stating that the disability compensation system is not meant as a trap for the unwary, or a stratagem to deny compensation to a veteran who has a valid claim.View "Dixon v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

In 2001 KBR agreed to provide the Army with logistics support services during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Individual task orders required KBR to install, operate and maintain dining services near Mosul, Iraq on a cost-plus-award-fee basis. KBR selected ABC, a subcontractor, to build a prefabricated metal dining facility and to provide dining services for a camp population of 2,573. In June 2004, the Army ordered KBR to stop construction of the metal facility and begin construction of a reinforced concrete facility for an estimated 2,573 to 6,200+ persons. Instead of requesting bids for the new work, KBR kept ABC as the subcontractor due to the urgency of the request. ABC submitted a new proposal with a total monthly cost about triple the monthly cost initially quoted. ABC attributed the increased costs to additional labor and equipment to serve a larger population and to a drastic increase in the cost of labor and a severe shortage of staff willing to work in Iraq. Due to a calculation error, it was determined that ABC’s proposal was reasonable. KBR’s management reviewed and approved a change order, embodying ABC’s proposal. In 2005 the subcontract ended and title to the dining facility passed to the Army. In 2007, the Defense Contract Auditing Agency suspended payment of certain costs paid by KBR to ABC pursuant to the change order. KBR prepared a new price justification for the concrete dining facility and ultimately filed suit, seeking recovery of the $12,529,504 in costs disapproved for reimbursement. The Claims Court awarded $6,779,762. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. v. United States" on Justia Law