Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Chaplains in the Navy who identified themselves as non-liturgical Christians and two chaplain-endorsing agencies filed suit claiming, inter alia, that several of the Navy's policies for promoting chaplains prefer Catholics and liturgical Protestants at the expense of various non-liturgical denominations. At issue on review was the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against the Navy's use of the challenged practices. Given facially neutral policies and no showing of intent to discriminate, the chaplains' equal protection attack on the Navy's specific policies could succeed only with an argument that there was an intent to discriminate or that the policies lacked a rational basis. Because the chaplains attempted no such arguments, the court agreed with the district court that they have not shown the requisite likelihood for success. As to the Establishment Clause, the chaplains have not shown a likelihood of success under any test that they have asked the court to apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "In re: Navy Chaplaincy, et al. v. United States Navy, et al." on Justia Law

In these three appeals, enemy combatants held by the United States at Bagram Airfield Military Base in northwest Afghanistan sought access to the writ of habeas corpus. Over three years ago, the court concluded that enemy combatants held at Bagram could not invoke the Suspension Clause to challenge their detentions. In these appeals, the court dismissed the petitions for want of jurisdiction where, because the Suspension Clause did not run to Bagram, section 7 of the 2006 Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, did not effect any unconstitutional suspension of the writ. The court remanded Hamidullah's petition to the district court for the limited purpose of determining whether he is in the sole custody of the government of Pakistan. View "Maqaleh, et al. v. Panetta, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a noncitizen "enemy combatant" undergoing proceedings before a military commission at Guatanamo Bay, sought a declaratory judgment that the commission lacked jurisdiction to hear the charges against him because the alleged acts occurred in Yemen, where he argued no war or hostilities existed in 2000 or 2002. The court held, pursuant to Hamad v. Gates, that Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. 2241(e), deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit. The court rejected plaintiff’s claims challenging the constitutionality of the Act. View "Al-Nashiri v. MacDonald" on Justia Law

Relators filed suit in district court asserting claims arising from a Direct Procurement Method (DPM) scheme. The DOD instituted the International Through Government Bill of Lading program to govern transoceanic moves, while relying on the DPM to contract for transport strictly on the European continent. These appeals and cross-appeals were taken from final judgments, entered in accordance with Rule 54(b), in two qui tam actions consolidated for litigation in district court. The court concluded that relator possessed standing to sue for civil penalties while bypassing the prospect of a damages award and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in his favor; the court reversed and remanded to the extent that the district court denied relator discovery of any penalties; and the court vacated the district court's ruling in favor of the United States so that it could conduct further proceedings on what remained of the government's FCA claim and reentered judgment as appropriate. View "United States ex rel. Kurt Bunk v. Gosselin World Wide Moving" on Justia Law

Crawford began working for the Department of the Army in 1986, with credit for military service. In 2006, when called to uniformed service, Crawford was an IT Specialist, GS-2210-11, in the Corps of Engineers. The Army subsequently outsourced many IT functions and abolished Crawford’s position, but formed a new organization, the Corps of Engineers Information Technology (ACE-IT). When Crawford completed uniformed service, the Army briefly returned him to an IT Specialist position, but reassigned him as Program Support Specialist, GS-0301-11. Crawford claimed violation of reemployment protections for those in uniformed service under 38 U.S.C. 4313(a)(2). The administrative judge ordered the Army to place Crawford in a position of “like status” to an IT Specialist. The Army later submitted notice that it was not able to find a position of “like status” and had requested the Office of Personnel Management’s placement assistance. Crawford sought enforcement with the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming that the search for positions was limited to vacant positions. The AJ agreed. The Army then reassigned Crawford to a position as an IT Specialist within ACE-IT, with the same duty station, title, and grade as his old position. The Board concluded that the Agency was in compliance and dismissed Crawford’s appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Crawford v. Dep't of the Army" on Justia Law

The FBI investigated Alwan, an Iraqi living in Bowling Green, after his fingerprints appeared on an improvised explosive device in Iraq, and introduced Alwan to a confidential source (CHS), who recorded their conversations. CHS convinced Alwan that he was part of a group supporting Jihad. Alwan assisted in sending what he believed to be money and weapons to the Mujahidin several times and eventually asked to lead the fictional terrorist cell. CHS instructed Alwan to recruit others. Hammadi agreed to join, stating that he had participated in IED attacks on American troops and had been arrested, but bribed his way free and fled to Syria. In Syria, he applied for refugee status to immigrate to the U.S. and answered “no” when asked if he had engaged in terrorist activity. Hammadi had moved to Bowling Green on the recommendation of Alwan, whose family he knew from Iraq and whom he had met in Syria. The two transported $100,000 from CHS to a truck, believing that it would find its way to Iraq, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A. They hid rocket-propelled grenade launchers, machine guns, plastic explosives, and sniper rifles in another truck, for transport to terrorists, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B. They loaded Stinger missiles into another truck and plotted to murder a U.S. Army Captain. Hammadi pleaded guilty to 10 terrorism and two immigration offenses. Rejecting claims of entrapment and sentencing manipulation, the district court imposed a life sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Hammadi would not qualify for a departure under either theory.View "United States v. Hammadi" on Justia Law

Hall entered active duty in the Army in 1990, but refused to go to basic training and asked to go home. He made threats and admitted to an arrest for carrying a gun. A psychiatric evaluation showed that Hall was believed to suffer from an “avoidant personality disorder” and he was discharged after 15 days in service. In 2006, Hall sought VA disability benefits, claiming that he suffered post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of an in-service sexual assault perpetrated by a superior officer. The claim was denied because Hall was not regarded as credible and could not prove the assault. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Hall v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Sneed is the surviving spouse of Reginald, who served on active duty 1964-1968 and suffered service-connected disabilities, including post-traumatic stress syndrome, post-concussion syndrome, degeneration of the vertebrae, narrowing of the spinal column, tinnitus, a perforated tympanic membrane, and scarring of the upper extremities. In 2001, Reginald fell and suffered a spinal cord contusion, rendering him a quadriplegic. In 2003, he was living in a nursing home for paralyzed veterans. There was a fire and all of the residents died of smoke inhalation. Sneed sought dependency and indemnity compensation, 38 U.S.C. 1310, alleging that her husband’s service-connected disabilities were a cause of his death. The VA denied the claim. The Board affirmed. Sneed’s notice of appeal was due by August 3, 2011. Sneed retained attorney Eagle, communicated with Eagle’s office “for a year or longer” and stated that “Eagle knew that there was a deadline.” On August 2, 2011 Sneed received a letter stating that Eagle would not represent Sneed in her appeal. Failing to find new counsel, Sneed filed notice of appeal on September 1, 2011, with a letter explaining her late filing. The Veterans Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that attorney abandonment can justify equitably tolling the deadline for filing an appeal. View "Sneed v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Abdul Razak Ali was captured in 2002 by U.S. and Pakistani forces and detained as an enemy combatant. When captured at a guesthouse in Pakistan, Ali was with an al Qaeda-associated terrorist leader named Abu Zubaydah. Ali subsequently challenged the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Based on Ali's presence at the guesthouse with Abu Zubaydah, his participation in Abu Zubaydah's training program, his admission to traveling to Afghanistan to fight in the war against U.S. and Coalition forces, and other evidence connecting Ali to Abu Zubaydah fighters, the district court concluded that it was more probable than not that Ali was in fact a member of Abu Zubaydah's force. The court concluded that the facts justify the President's decision to detain Ali as an enemy combatant under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. Pub. L. No. 107-40, section 2(a), 115 Stat. 224. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Ali's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. View "Ali v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants - AFGE, several AFGE locals that represent Air Reserve Technicians (ARTs), and ART Mark Winstead - challenged three Air Force instructions requiring ARTs to wear military uniforms while performing civilian duties. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal because the exclusive remedial scheme of the CSRA precluded AFGE's claims.View "American Federation of Government Employees, et al v. Secretary of the Air Force" on Justia Law