Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Vandenberg Air Force Base is a designated a “closed base.” Civilians may not enter without express permission. The Air Force has granted an easement over areas of the Base, so that two public highways traverse the Base. One highway has an adjacent area designated for peaceful protests. The Base commander enacted rules to control the protest area and issued an advisory that anyone who fails to adhere to those policies may be barred from entering the Base. Apel was barred from the Base for trespass and vandalism, but continued to enter the protest area and was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 1382, prohibiting reentry of a “military... installation” after having been ordered not to do so “by any officer or person in command.” The district court rejected his defense that the section does not apply to the protest area. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. A “military ... installation” encompasses the commanding officer’s area of responsibility, including Vandenberg’s highways and protest area. Section1382 does not require exclusive possession and control. Although the highways and protest area are outside fenced areas on the Base, the entire Vandenberg property is under the administration of the Air Force. Although the Base commander has occasionally closed the highways to the public for security purposes or when conducting a military launch, section 1382 does not require base commanders to make continuous, uninterrupted use of a place within their jurisdiction, lest they lose authority to exclude certain individuals. View "United States v. Apel" on Justia Law

Kebodeaux was convicted by special court-martial of a federal sex offense. After serving his sentence and receiving a bad-conduct discharge from the Air Force, he moved to Texas where he registered with state authorities as a sex offender. Congress later enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which requires federal sex offenders to register in the states where they live, study, and work, 42 U.S.C. 16913(a). SORNA applies to offenders who, when SORNA became law, had completed their sentences. When Kebodeaux moved within Texas and failed to update his registration, the federal government prosecuted him and the district court convicted him under SORNA. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that SORNA’s registration requirements, as applied to Kebodeaux, fall within the scope of congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress did not apply SORNA to an individual who was, before its enactment, “unconditionally released,” but to an individual already subject to federal registration requirements. SORNA somewhat modified registration requirements to which Kebodeaux was already subject, to make more uniform "a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration requirements." At the time of his offense and conviction, Kebodeaux was subject to the Wetterling Act, which imposed similar registration requirements and was promulgated under the Military Regulation Clause (Art. I, s. 8, cl. 14), and the Necessary and Proper Clause. The same power that authorized Congress to promulgate the Uniform Code of Military Justice and punish Kebodeaux’s crime also authorized Congress to make the civil registration requirement at issue a consequence of conviction. Imposing a civil registration requirement that would apply upon the release of an offender like Kebodeaux is “eminently reasonable,” as is assignment of a special role to the federal government in ensuring compliance with federal sex offender registration requirements. View "United States v. Kebodeaux" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging that defendants fraudulently billed the United States for services provided to the military forces serving in Iraq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. Because the court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and the court found that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), 18 U.S.C. 3287, applied to this action, the court reversed. Because it could be appropriate for the district court to make factual findings to consider the public disclosure claim urged by defendants the court remanded so the district court could consider this issue. View "United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request for records held by the CIA pertaining to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) to carry out targeted killings. The district court affirmed the CIA's Glomar response, concluding that a response refusing to confirm or deny that the CIA had such records was justified under the circumstances of this case. The court concluded that it was not "logical or plausible" for the CIA to contend that it would reveal something not already officially acknowledged to say that the CIA "at least has an intelligence interest" in such strikes. The court held that the CIA's broad Glomar response was untenable and therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment dismissing plaintiffs' FOIA action and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union, et al v. CIA" on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity from tort suits, 28 U. S. C. 1346(b)(1), except for certain intentional torts, including battery; it originally afforded tort victims a remedy against the government, but did not preclude suit against the alleged tort-feasor. Agency-specific statutes postdating the FTCA immunized certain federal employees from personal liability for torts committed in the course of official duties. The Gonzalez Act makes the FTCA remedy against the U.S. preclusive of suit against armed forces medical personnel, 10 U. S. C. 1089(a), and provides that, “[f]or purposes of this section,” the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply to any cause of action arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of medical ... functions.” Congress subsequently enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, which makes the FTCA remedy against the government exclusive for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, 28 U. S. C. 2679(b)(1); federal employees are shielded without regard to agency or line of work. Levin, injured as a result of surgery performed at a U. S. Naval Hospital, sued the government and the surgeon, asserting battery, based on his alleged withdrawal of consent shortly before the surgery. Finding that the surgeon had acted within the scope of his employment, the district court released him and dismissed the battery claim. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Gonzalez Act served only to buttress the personal immunity granted military medical personnel and did not negate the FTCA intentional tort exception. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Gonzalez Act section 1089(e) abrogates the FTCA intentional tort exception, allowing Levin’s suit against the U.S. alleging medical battery by a Navy doctor acting within the scope of employment. The operative clause states, “in no uncertain terms,” that the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply,” and confines the abrogation to medical personnel employed by listed agencies. View "Levin v. United States" on Justia Law

Sharp, a federal supply contractor, submitted a termination compensation claim to the Department of the Army contracting officer, and later brought a Contracts Dispute Act claim before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, claiming that, because the Army failed to exercise the entirety of the last option year under a delivery order, Sharp was entitled to premature discontinuance fees under its General Services Administration schedule contract. The ASBCA dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Federal Acquisition Regulation, does not permit ordering agency contracting officers to decide disputes pertaining to schedule contracts. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Under FAR 8.406-6, only the GSA contracting office may resolve disputes that, in whole or in part, involve interpretation of disputed schedule contract provisions. View "Sharp Elec. Corp. v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Walker served in the U.S. Army Air Force, 1943 to 1945, as a four-engine airplane pilot and flight instructor. The VA Regional Office denied his 2007 disability claim for bilateral hearing loss. Walker appealed to the Board of Veterans Appeals, including sworn statements from his son and wife that his hearing loss began in service and continued throughout his life. Walker was examined by a VA audiologist. Walker’s service medical records were not available due to a fire. The audiologist concluded that the hearing loss was “less likely as not caused primarily by military service as a pilot,” that age could not be excluded as the primary etiology, and that Walker was exposed to recreational noise by hunting game without use of hearing protection. The Board concluded that Walker failed under the three-element test to establish service connection for his hearing loss. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Walker v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Filipino World War II veterans and their widows, contended that their Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection were violated by a statute establishing the Filipino Veterans Equity Compensation Fund (FVEC) and by the VA's administration of it, resulting in their lack of payment. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice on the pleadings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The court held that the Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, div. A, 102 Stat. 4105, barred review of plaintiffs' due-process claim and the district court's dismissal of the claim was appropriate. Because plaintiffs' complaint did not challenge a new classification established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 1002(i), 123 Stat. at 202, and did not allege any plausible facts suggesting that the classification in 38 U.S.C. 107 was created for a discriminatory purpose, the court held that the district court did not err when it dismissed the equal-protection claim under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Recinto, et al v. The U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, et al" on Justia Law

Viegas served in the U.S. Army, 1965-1967. After leaving the service, he was injured in a diving accident, resulting in “incomplete” quadriplegia. In 2004, Viegas participated in a prescribed aquatic therapy session at a VA medical center. He used a restroom in the VA facility. The grab bar he used to lift himself into his wheelchair came loose from the wall and he fell to the ground. As a result of the fall, Viegas sustained injuries to his upper and lower extremities. Viegas’ medical condition deteriorated after his fall. Prior to his fall, Viegas could sometimes walk with a walker, but since the accident he can only stand with assistance. Viegas sought disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151. A VA regional office denied the claim. The board affirmed, stating that such benefits are available only if additional disability results from injury that was part of the natural sequence of cause and effect flowing directly from the actual provision of hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination furnished by the VA and such additional disability was directly caused by that VA activity. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Veterans Court misinterpreted the causation requirement. View "Viegas v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

The court consolidated appeals by veterans claiming that their current disabilities are connected to injuries sustained during military service. In both cases, the veterans’ medical records contained at least one physician’s report opining that the claimed disabilities were service-connected and at least one ambiguous or inconclusive report declining to confirm such a nexus. The Department of Veterans Affairs relied on inconclusive opinions in denying the veterans entitlement to service-connected disability benefits, and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed. Finding that the medical examination did not comply with the Board’s instructions and that the Board failed to explain its reasons and bases for denying service connection, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims remanded. The Federal Circuit affirmed that remand, rather than reversal, was appropriate. View "Deloach v. Shinseki" on Justia Law