Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Military chaplains, all non-liturgical Protestants, alleged that the Navy systematically discriminated against members of their religious denominations in the awarding of promotions. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that they lacked Article III standing and, alternatively, were unlikely to succeed on the merits. The court concluded that at least those plaintiffs whose promotions would likely be considered by future selection boards operating under the challenged policies have standing to pursue claims for injunctive relief. The court also concluded that the district court's resolution of plaintiffs' denominational preference theory was not based on factual findings that the court could review for clear error. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's determination that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. The court also vacated the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Church, et al v. United States Navy, et al" on Justia Law

The Army solicited proposals for aerial target flight operations and maintenance services. Kratos provided these services under a predecessor contract. The solicitation listed three evaluation factors: Technical/Management; Past Performance; and Price/Cost to be rated as “outstanding,” “satisfactory,” “marginal,” or “unsatisfactory.” The contract was subject to the Service Contract Act of 1965, under which the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires that “successor contractors … in the same locality must pay wages and fringe benefits … at least equal to those contained in any bona fide collective bargaining agreement … under the predecessor contract.” The Army received three proposals, including the offers from SA-TECH and Kratos. After review, the Technical Evaluation Committee announced a Final Evaluation Report, noting potential difficulties for SA-TECH under the Labor sub-factor, but rating SA-TECH as “outstanding” for all factors. Kratos also received “outstanding” ratings. The Source Selection Authority concluded that SA-TECH offered the best value for the government. Kratos filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office. SA-TECH subsequently protested the Army’s decision to engage in corrective action instead of allowing SA-TECH’s award to stand. The Claims Court denied the Army’s motion to dismiss and found the Army’s actions unreasonable and contrary to law. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Sys. Application & Tech., Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Hillyard suffered a head injury and was hospitalized for two weeks while serving in the U.S. Army. Hillyard filed a single claim for service connection for a mental condition, which he attributed to his in-service head injury. The Veterans Administration denied his claim and the Board affirmed and subsequently denied Hillyard’s request for revision. The Veterans Court affirmed. Hillyard later filed a second request for revision alleging clear and unmistakable error (CUE) by the Board in failing to consider and apply 38 U.S.C. 105(a) and 1111, a different CUE allegation from the one he made in his first request. The Board dismissed the second request for revision with prejudice, concluding 38 C.F.R. 20.1409(c) permitted only one request for revision to be filed. The Veterans Court affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The interpretation of Rule 1409(c) proffered by the VA is consistent with the language of the regulation and is in harmony with the VA’s description of the regulation in its notice of rule-making. View "Hillyard v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Conyers and Northover were indefinitely suspended and demoted, respectively, from their positions with the Department of Defense after they were found ineligible to occupy “noncritical sensitive” positions. The Department argued that, because the positions were designated “noncritical sensitive,” the Merit Systems Protection Board could not review the merits of the Department’s determinations under the precedent set forth in Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). The Board held that Egan limits review of an otherwise appealable adverse action only if that action is based upon eligibility for or a denial, revocation, or suspension of access to classified information. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. Egan prohibits Board review of agency determinations concerning eligibility of an employee to occupy a “sensitive” position, regardless of whether the position requires access to classified information. View "Berry v. Conyers" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras and a lawful permanent resident alien of the United States, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's order finding him removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. At issue before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether Petitioner's conviction under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice qualified as an "aggravated felony" under the modified categorical approach as explained in the Court's recent en banc decision in United Sates v. Aguila-Montes de Oca. The Court granted the petition, concluding that Petitioner's Article 92 conviction was not an aggravated felony and Petitioner was therefore not removable. Remanded with instructions to vacate the removal order against Petitioner. View "Aguilar-Turcios v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Sean Theodore Brehm, a citizen of South Africa, pled guilty to a federal charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, on condition that he be allowed to challenge through appeal the jurisdictional basis of the indictment underlying his conviction. The grand jury accused Defendant of stabbing a British subject, "J.O.," during an altercation at Kandahar Airfield, while both men were employed with private contractors supporting the NATO war effort in Afghanistan. On appeal, Defendant argued that the indictment's reliance on the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act was misplaced, in that the statute (which Defendant admitted was valid on its face) could not be applied to him in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Defendant also asserted that the government failed to establish a sufficient nexus between him and the United States to support the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, pointing out that, prior to his arrival in Virginia as an accused, neither he nor his victim had ever set foot in this country. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenges to his conviction and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Brehm" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a dual-status air reserve technician (ART) in the 301st maintenance group (301st MG). ARTs are full-time civilian employees who are also required to serve in the Air Force Reserve in the units for which they work as civilians. Plaintiff was the chief of training management of the 301st MG in his civilian capacity and a technical sergeant and chief of training of the 301st MG in his military capacity. Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment at the 301st MG, which caused him to leave his civilian job with the unit and lose his reserve position. The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary of the Air Force. The Fifth Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over all allegations with the exception of one incident for Defendant's failure to exhaust his Title VII administrative remedies and over the remaining claim by virtue of the Feres doctrine. Remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Filer v. Donley" on Justia Law

Palmquist, a veteran, injured in a helicopter crash that caused residual brain injury, was entitled to preference in federal employment, 5 U.S.C. 2108(3)(C), 3309(1), 3313(2)(A). The VA hired him as a medical support assistant. Aichner was his supervisor. Palmquist applied for promotion but did not receive an interview. He believed that the VA had not honored his preference, and told Aichner that he was going to complain to the equal employment opportunity specialist and his congressman. He did so. Aichner and Palmquist maintained a generally positive relationship for the next two years, but Palmquist was sometimes preoccupied, left the unit during working hours to do personal business, distracted other employees, and used his computer for personal purposes. Palmquist sought a new position. An interview went well. Interviewers warned Palmquist against unsolicited post-interview contact, but he e-mailed both to reiterate his qualifications. Aichner gave a generally favorable recommendation, but the recommendation was one factor in Palmquist not getting the job. The court rejected his claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701-796. The First Circuit affirmed. The Act does not entitle a plaintiff to relief when retaliation for complaints about disability discrimination is a motivating factor in, but not the “but-for” cause of, adverse employment action. View "Palmquist v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act guarantees returning veterans reemployment with their former employers and prohibits employers from discriminating against veterans based on their military service, 38 U.S.C. 4301–4335. Petty claimed that Metropolitan Government of Nashville-Davidson County violated USERRA in its treatment of him after he returned to Metro’s police department from active duty in the U.S. Army: Metro failed to restore him to his former position of patrol sergeant and discriminated against him on the basis of his military service. Metro had declined to reinstate him because of his alleged dishonesty concerning his military discipline history. Following remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Petty on his reemployment claims and ordered Metro to reinstate him to his former position as a patrol sergeant; the court awarded Petty back pay and partial liquidated damages on his reemployment claims and ruled in his favor on his discrimination claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Metro was on notice of its obligation to reinstate Petty, but never did so. View "Petty v. Metro. Gov't of Nashvlle & Davidson Cty." on Justia Law

In 1995, Sheikh Abdel Rahman was convicted of soliciting the murder of Egyptian President Mubarak while he was visiting New York; attacking American military installations; conspiring to murder President Mubarak; conspiring in the successful 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center; conspiring to bomb other New York structures; and conspiring to commit sedition. His conviction was affirmed in 1999. Stewart was a member of his legal team and agreed to "Special Administrative Measures." Despite those obligations, Stewart smuggled messages to and from the incarcerated Sheikh, mostly relating to continuance of a ceasefire that an Egyptian militant group had declared on violent efforts to overthrow the Egyptian government. Stewart was convicted of conspiring to defraud the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 371; providing and concealing material support to a conspiracy to kill and kidnap persons in a foreign country, 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 18 U.S.C. 2; conspiracy to provide and conceal such support, 18 U.S.C. 371; and making false statements, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The Second Circuit affirmed but remanded for resentencing. On remand, he court determined that the Guidelines sentence was 360 months, which was also the statutory maximum, and imposed a sentence of 120 months. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law