Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

The Stolen Valor Act makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals and provides an enhanced penalty if the Congressional Medal of Honor is involved, 18 U. S. C. 704 (b),(c). After pleading guilty to falsely claiming that he had received the Medal of Honor, Alvarez challenged the Act as unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit held that the Act is invalid under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Characterizing the law as a content-based restriction on protected speech, the Court applied the “most exacting scrutiny.” Falsity alone does not take speech outside the First Amendment. While the government’s interest in protecting the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question, the First Amendment requires a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented; that link was not established. The government had no evidence that the public’s general perception of military awards is diluted by false claims or that counter-speech, such as the ridicule Alvarez received online and in the press, would not suffice to achieve its interest. The law does not represent the “least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.” The government could likely protect the integrity of the military awards system by creating a database of Medal winners accessible and searchable. Dissenting Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas viewed the Act as significantly limited and necessary to the important governmental objective. View "United States v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

Thompson served in the Navy from October 1973 to January 1975. During active service, he was treated for psychiatric symptoms, attributed to immature personality disorder. Over the following years, he was hospitalized sporadically based upon complaints of a nervous disorder and an inability to get along with others. In 1984 he was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. He was hospitalized for schizophrenia several times between 1984 and 1991. In 2006, a VA Regional Office issued a rating decision finding no service connection with respect to any acquired psychiatric disorder. Before the Veterans Court reached the merits of an appeal, the parties filed a joint motion for partial remand citing a 2009 intervening decision. The motion was granted. Thompson then moved for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Veterans Court denied the motion, holding that he was not a prevailing party under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Thompson v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Appellee, a government contractor, underwent military detention in Iraq. After his release, he filed this action in the district court alleging claims under the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), 42 U.S.C. 2000dd et seq., and a Bivens action for violation of his due process rights. Secretary Rumsfeld moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion as to the claims under the DTA and some other claims, but did imply an action under the Bivens due process theory and denied Rumsfeld's motion to dismiss as to those claims. Secretary Rumsfeld appealed from the denial of his motion, arguing both that the claims were barred by qualified immunity and that the district court erred in implying such a cause of action in the first instance. The court agreed that the district court erred in implying such a cause of action and reversed the order. View "Doe v. Rumsfeld, et al." on Justia Law

Reeves served as a heavy mortar crewman during combat offensives, 1942-1945, and was awarded three Bronze Stars. In 1981, Reeves filed a claim seeking service-connected disability benefits, with a medical opinion, stating that Reeves had bilateral, nerve-type hearing loss in 1962, attributable to noise exposure or to treatment with quinine for malaria. He also submitted records of an audiogram and statements from officers with whom he had served. The board denied the claim, stating that hearing loss documented in 1962 was too remote from active service. Reeves did not appeal. In 2004, the board granted an application to re-open, citing new evidence of treatment from 1946 to 1954, and awarded him service-connected disability benefits, effective 2002. In 2006, Reeves sought revision to an earlier effective date. The board denied the motion. The Veterans Court affirmed, rejecting an assertion that the evidence of record in 1983 was such that the board had no choice but to resolve in his favor that his hearing disability was incurred in service. Reeves died in 2011; the Federal Circuit substituted his widow and reversed. The Veterans Court misinterpreted 38 U.S.C. 1154(b) in rejecting the clear and unmistakeable error claim. View "Reeves v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

After the Air Force announced it would conduct a reduction-in-force (RIF) at Luke Air Force Base, the Union made several proposals about how the RIF should be conducted and asked the Air Force to enter into negotiations. The Air Force claimed it had no duty to negotiate over three of the Union's proposals, prompting the Union to appeal the FLRA. The FLRA determined that the Air Force had an obligation to negotiate over two of the three disputed proposals and the Air Force subsequently petitioned for review of the unfavorable rulings. Because the Air Force's objections to the FLRA's rulings were either waived or unavailing, the petition for review was denied. View "U.S. Dept. of the Air Force v. FLRA" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the district court's dismissal of his claim challenging his separation under the Army Qualitative Management Program (QMP) for failure to "meet Army standards." Appellant argued that because an Administrative Separation Board (ASB) found that a preponderance of the evidence did not support the allegation that he had wrongfully used marijuana, his separation under the QMP was unlawful. The district court found, and the court agreed, that because appellant did not specifically challenge the QMP action in his 2002 and 2006 applications to the Army Board of Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), the matter was not properly subject to judicial review. In regards to appellant's second contention pertaining to the termination of his Medical Evaluation Board (MEB) process, the court reversed the decision of the district court and instructed the trial court to remand the case for further proceedings. View "Coburn v. McHugh" on Justia Law

The Government appealed from the district court's judgment requiring the Government to disclose, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, information redacted from two memoranda prepared by the OLC. The Government contended that the redactions were justified under FOIA because the information pertained to a highly classified, active intelligence method. The court concluded that the Government could withhold this information under FOIA Exemption 1. Plaintiffs challenged the judgment insofar as it sustained the Government's withholding of certain records relating to the use of waterboarding and a photograph of a high-value detainee in custody. The court agreed with the district court that the materials at issue were exempt from disclosure. The district court erred, however, in requiring the Government to disclose the classified information redacted from the two memoranda. View "American Civil Liberties Union v. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

Duchesneau served on active duty in the Army, July 1996 to January 1999. In 2000, a VA Regional Office granted service connection for her right shoulder bursitis with a 10 percent disability rating. In 2003 she sought an increased disability rating, but the RO denied her claim. The Board affirmed. The veterans' court rejected her claim for two separate disability ratings under a single diagnostic code, set aside the Board's decision as to a single appropriate disability rating under DC 5201 and remanded to the Board to clarify the precise extent of her right shoulder limitation. The Federal Circuit rejected an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the veterans' court decision was not a final judgment. View "Duchesneau v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Wife serves in the U.S. Air Force and executed a military power of attorney designating husband as her attorney-in-fact during her deployment overseas. Husband presented a photocopy of this instrument to the Fayette County Clerk to recording an original deed and mortgage in the real property index records. The clerk’s office rejected the copy as inauthentic and refused to record the documents. The district court dismissed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which claimed that rejection of the power of attorney violated 10 U.S.C. 1044b. That statute sets the minimal requirements for executing a military power of attorney and prohibits states from imposing additional requirements. During the pendency of appeal, the couple submitted an original military power of attorney and the documents were recorded. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The unnotarized copy of the power of attorney lacked an essential element of a military power of attorney and did not qualify for 1044b(a) protections. View "Bartholomew v. Blevins" on Justia Law

Morris served on active duty for two months in 1964. His entrance examination and examination upon separation revealed no psychiatric abnormality. In 1966 Morris sought disability compensation for a psychiatric disorder, claiming that in basic training, he had suffered abuse from his sergeant, which caused him to experience nervous breakdown. The VA Regional Office denied the claim. In 1986, the RO concluded that additional evidence did not constitute new and material evidence. Following another denial, Morris presented evidence that he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and a VA physician's opinion that it had its onset during service. The Board denied the claim. On remand in 1992, the Board concluded that evidence supported the claim but that its 1988 decision was final. In 1993, the RO awarded service connection for schizophrenia effective from 1987. In 1996, the Board denied a claim that the award should be retroactive to 1966. The Veterans Court rejected an argument that the 1988 Board failed to apply correctly 38 U.S.C. 105(a), 1110, and 1111, noting no evidence that the Board incorrectly considered his condition a personality disorder. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Under 38 C.F.R. 3.303(c), personality disorders are not diseases or injuries within the meaning of 1110 and are not compensable. View "Morris v. Shinseki" on Justia Law