Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

After the September 11, 2011 attacks, the government detained plaintiff, an American citizen, as an enemy combatant. Plaintiff alleged that he was held incommunicado in military detention, subjected to coercive interrogation techniques and detained under harsh conditions of confinement, all in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiff and his mother sued John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from 2001 to 2003, alleging that they suffered from plaintiff's unlawful detention. The court held that, under recent Supreme Court law, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the court was compelled to conclude that, regardless of the legality of plaintiff's detention and the wisdom of Yoo's judgments, at the time he acted the law was not "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he [wa]s doing violated[d]" plaintiff's rights. Therefore, the court held that Yoo must be granted qualified immunity and accordingly reversed the decision of the district court. View "Padilla, et al. v. Yoo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Naval Criminal Investigative Service engineer since 1984, agreed to a transfer in 2002. The transfer was delayed because of her mother’s poor health. Shortly before the transfer was to occur, she voluntarily responded to a summons to act as a grand juror. The Navy paid her while she served as a grand juror (5 U.S.C. 6322(a)), but ordered her to report to Washington year later and directed her not to seek or accept extension of her grand jury duties. She nonetheless was sworn in for a second term. The Navy declared her to be AWOL, the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed an appeal, and she was terminated from her employment. The claims court granted summary judgment in favor of the government on pre-removal back pay claim and dismissed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, her post- removal claims for back pay, reinstatement, and other forms of compensation. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, holding that the claims court erred in interpreting 5 U.S.C. 6322(a), which entitles a grand juror to court leave when "summoned," regardless of whether the grand juror volunteered to be summoned. View "Hall v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner served in the Army for about 30 months, 1981-1983 and suffered injury to her knees and wrist. The VA regional office assigned a 10 percent rating to her left wrist with an effective date of 1986. In 1987, her right arm was injured as a result of medical care she received from the VA. In 1990, her injury to right knee and shoulder were each rated at 20 percent and her left knee at 30 percent. In 1996, she was unable to continue working as a bookkeeper and brought a claim for total disability based on individual unemployability. The regional office rated her service-connected disabilities at 70 percent, but denied a total rating based on unemployability under 38 C.F.R. 4.16(a). The regional office and Board of Veterans’ Appeals rejected her 2004 application for review. The Secretary conceded that the regional office committed error by incorrectly computing petitioner’s rating. The Veterans Court found no “clear and unmistakeable error” and that the error was harmless because the RO had made an unemployability determination that satisfied the requirements for a 4.16(a) analysis. The Federal Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because there was no issue of the interpretation of 4.16(a)View "Githens-Bellas v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Robert Newton alleged Major John R. Teter and Lieutenant Colonel Wayne E. Lee of the Utah Air National Guard violated his due process rights when they suspended and subsequently withdrew his Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) certificate, and when they suspended his employment as an Air Traffic Control Supervisor at Hill Air Force Base in Utah. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the suspension of his employment. It denied summary judgment on Plaintiff's due process claim regarding the withdrawal of his ATCS certificate, holding this claim was not barred by qualified immunity or by intramilitary immunity under the "Feres" doctrine. In this interlocutory appeal, Defendants challenged the denial of qualified immunity and intramilitary immunity on Plaintiff's ATCS certificate claim. Plaintiff cross-appealed the grant of summary judgment on his employment claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff's ATCS certificate was not barred by the "Feres" doctrine, and that the Court had no jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity to defendants. The Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's cross-appeal. View "Newton v. Lee, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of knowingly making a false statement to the Department of Defense security personnel when he entered Brooke Army Medical Center demanding to see a patient in the hospital accused in the Fort Hood shooting, Major Nidal Hasan, an army psychologist. The false statement at issue was defendant's statement to an army captain that he was Major Hasan's lawyer. Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that his false statement was material. The court concluded that a statement to a decision maker in a military hospital that the speaker was a lawyer for a restricted military prisoner was the type of statement capable of influencing the decision maker to allow the speaker to visit the patient and that the protocols in place did not affect the statement's materiality. The court also concluded that defendant's delivery of the statement in a manner not likely to persuade did not affect the materiality of the statement. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Abrahem" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Army awarded Parsons the prime contract for work in Iraq. The contract incorporated Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), for reimbursement of sub-contractor costs. Parsons entered into a subcontract with Odell for health care facilities and medical equipment. After the Army terminated task orders for convenience, Odell attempted to collect reimbursement above the amount determined by the Defense Contract Audit Agency as its provisional indirect cost. Settlement for termination of the prime contract did not address the issue. Following an audit, Parsons submitted Odell’s revised invoice to the termination contract officer, who stated that it would not settle directly with Odell under FAR 49.108-8 because it was not in the best interest of the government. Parsons submitted a sponsored Certified Claim under the Contract Disputes Act on behalf of Odell to the Procurement Contracting Officer, who denied the claim. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeal held that the request was routine and, under 48 C.F.R. (FAR) 2.101, needed to be in dispute to constitute a claim over which it had jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Parsons made no argument that its request was in dispute. The record did not indicate that the PCO ever received a proper request for payment.View "Parsons Global Servs., Inc. v. McHugh" on Justia Law

Donnellan served in the National Guard from 1969 until 2000. In 1996, a portion of his sigmoid colon was removed as treatment for colon cancer. In March 1998, after diagnosis of acquired polyposis, he had a total colectomy. While on active duty for training in May-June 1998, he became ill and underwent emergency surgery to remove a portion of his small intestine because of a small bowel perforation. After surgery, his doctors treated a small bowel fistula. The DVA denied a service connection to ensuing complications. In 2007, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied benefits, finding by clear and unmistakable evidence that Donnellan’s disease and ensuing complications did not increase in severity beyond natural progression during his period of active duty for training. The Veterans Court remanded, holding that the statutory presumption of aggravation does not apply to an increase in the degree of a disability suffered by a member of the National Guard while on active duty for training who is not a veteran under 38 U.S.C. 101(2) and that his doctor’s medical opinion did not satisfy the Board’s instructions on remand. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal. The Veterans Court’s remand order is not a final decision. View "Donnellan v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Two U.S. Army Reserve officers, deployed to Iraq in 2003 to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority, were convicted of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C.371, for participating in a bid-rigging scheme that involved directing millions of dollars in contracts to companies owned by an American businessman. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish participation in the conspiracy; to denial of a motion to suppress; and to denial of immunity for a co-conspirator. View "United States v. Whiteford" on Justia Law

In 1992, at age 57, Navy veteran who served on active duty during the Korean Conflict began receiving pension benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1521(a) for non-service connected disabilities. He had a combined disability rating of 80% based on prostate cancer, osteoarthritis of both knees, glaucoma/cataracts, hypertension, hyperthyroidism, and major depressive disorder. The disabilities rendered him "permanently and totally disabled." In 2006, he applied for an enhanced pension under the special monthly rate (38 U.S.C. 1521(e)), seeking consideration for housebound status because he was older than 65 years of age and had a disability rating of more than 60%. The regional office denied the claim because he had received a pension under section 1521 before turning 65. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied an appeal. The Veterans Court reversed and remanded. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, overruling Veterans Court’s interpretation of 38 U.S.C. 1513(a) in Hartness v. Nicholson (2006). Veterans applying for special monthly pension benefits under section 1521(e) should be on equal footing regardless of when they apply for a pension, i.e., whether the veteran applies before or after turning 65 years old.View "Chandler v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

Petitioner served 26 years in the U.S. Army. Following his discharge, he began working in a civil service position as a maintenance management specialist for the Department of the Navy. His appointment was subject to completion of a one-year probationary period. Petitioner had no previous federal civilian service. Before expiration of the probationary period, the agency notified petitioner that he would be terminated from his position for unacceptable performance. He sought to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The administrative judge found that petitioner had no statutory right of appeal to the Board and that, as a probationary employee, petitioner's rights before the Board were limited to those defined by OPM regulations allowing appeal only if the termination was based on partisan political reasons or was the result of discrimination based on marital status, 5 C.F.R. 315.806(b). The Board rejected petitioner's claim that his military service should count toward completion of the one-year period of continuous service needed to qualify for Board review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that petitioner did not qualify as an employee within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(A). View "Wilder v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law