Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Federal employees are entitled up to 15 days each year of military leave to attend training as a member of a reserve of the armed forces or National Guard. 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). The Federal Circuit held that federal agencies cannot charge military leave on non-workdays. Duncan worked as a civilian for the Air Force until his retirement in 2005. From 1980 to 1998, he was also in the Air Force Reserve and performed 12 days each year of active duty plus additional duty for training. In 2009, he filed a claim with the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging that the Air Force had charged his leave on non-workdays in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, seeking compensation for six days. An Administrative Law Judge granted the request, finding Duncan's recollection credible. The Board reversed, holding that it requires more than personal recollection and reliance on military documents. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The record did not show that all corroborating evidence was unavailable. View "Duncan v. Dep't of the Air Force" on Justia Law

The veteran served in Vietnam in the 1960s. He was honorably discharged and received service connection compensation for arthritis and hearing loss. In 1993, he had a malignant melanoma surgically removed; it continued to spread and he died in 1994. The surviving widow filed an Application for Dependency and Indemnity Compensation alleging that her husband’s death was service connected due to exposure to Agent Orange and extensive sunlight while serving in Vietnam. The Regional Office denied the claim. In 2004, she filed the current claim and submitted an internet article discussing an Air Force study that found an elevated risk of melanoma in veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange. The Board reopened and remanded the claim. On remand, a VA medical examiner determined that it was "at least as likely as not" that the melanoma was causally related to active duty service. The RO again denied the claim.. The Board affirmed. The Veterans Court vacated and remanded. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that there was no final decision.View "Ebel v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

The United States brought an action against ADMH, claiming that ADMH violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301 et seq., when it failed to rehire longtime employee Roy Hamilton after his service in Iraq with the Alabama National Guard. The district court denied ADMH's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity and found that ADMH had violated USERRA by not immediately rehiring Hamilton after his return from Iraq. The court held that ADMH was not entitled to sovereign immunity, and that the district court did not err in finding that ADMH violated USERRA and was required to pay money damages. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Ala. Dept. of Mental Health" on Justia Law

Appellants, as representatives of the estates of their deceased sons, brought this action against federal officials and employees in district court seeking money damages relating to the alleged mistreatment and eventual death of those sons while they were detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. The district court granted the motion of the United States to be substituted as defendant and the motion of the United States for dismissal of the claims. Because the court was satisfied that neither the district court nor this court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action due to the jurisdictional bar created by section 7(a) of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), 28 U.S.C. 2241(e), the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal, although on different grounds than those relied upon by the district court. The court held that the Supreme Court did not declare section 2241(e)(2) unconstitutional under Boumediene v. Bush and that provision retained vitality to bar those claims. Therefore, the decision of the district court dismissing the claims should be affirmed, although for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Al-Zahrani v. Rodriquez" on Justia Law

A widow alleged that her husband developed cancer due to exposure to radiation while he was serving on active duty. Based on regulations that presume causation for certain diseases, the Board of Veterans' Appeals awarded service connection with an effective date of 1988. The Board did not determine whether she established a direct service connection that was not based on the presumptions. The Veterans Court remanded for such findings. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting the widow's argument that the evidence in the record supported reversal and an earlier effective date. View "Byron v. Shinseki" on Justia Law

More than 7,000 named plaintiffs brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680, asserting injuries because of the U.S. Navy's alleged negligence in emitting pollutants during military exercises (which ended in 2003) at the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed. The limited abrogation of sovereign immunity in the FTCA does not extend to these claims because of the discretionary function exception, which precludes FTCA actions against government conduct which is both within the discretion of the relevant government party and susceptible to policy-related judgments. The court rejected arguments that the Navy acted beyond its discretion because it allegedly violated mandatory directives concerning water pollution issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1389; violated a pair of permits that purportedly forbid firing depleted uranium bullets on Vieques; violated unidentified internal regulations, policies, directives, and orders; and failed to comply with a purported duty to warn. View "Sanchez v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiff applied for an IT specialist position with the Miami VA Healthcare System. He did not get the job and, after exhausting rights before the Department of Labor, filed an appeal, asserting that the VA violated his rights relating to veteran's preference. The AJ concluded that the Merit Systems Protection Board had no authority to review the merits of the VA’s non-selection of plaintiff. The Board agreed. The Federal Circuit vacated. There is no way to determine whether the Veterans' Preference Act (58 Stat. 390) has been violated without examining the grounds for non-selection. The Board has jurisdiction to determine whether the VA properly afforded plaintiff the right to compete for the job and properly determined, in accordance with 5 C.F.R. § 302.302(d), that he was not qualified for the position View "Lazaro v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Appellant Rick Strandlof was charged under the Stolen Valor Act (18 U.S.C. 704(b)) which makes it illegal to falsely claim to have received a military award or honor. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the Act is constitutional. Despite never having served in the armed forces, Appellant founded the Colorado Veterans Alliance, and frequently told veterans he graduated from the United States Naval Academy, was a former U.S. Marine Corps Captain, and had been wounded in combat in Iraq. He bragged of receiving a Purple Heart, and he boasted that he had been awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in battle. A number of local veterans found Appellant to be an unconvincing imposter. Angered by Appellant's lies, they contacted the FBI and reported their suspicion that Appellant was a phony. After military officials confirmed Appellant never attended the Naval Academy or served in the military, the government filed a criminal complaint in the District of Colorado charging him with making false claims about receipt of military decorations or medals, in violation of the Act. Reasoning that false statements are generally protected by the First Amendment, the district court declared the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional and dismissed the charges against Appellant. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with that reading of Supreme Court precedent and reversed: "[a]s the Supreme Court has observed time and again, false statements of fact do not enjoy constitutional protection, except to the extent necessary to protect more valuable speech. Under this principle, the Stolen Valor Act does not impinge on or chill protected speech, and therefore does not offend the First Amendment." View "United States v. Strandlof" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, presently incarcerated due to his conviction after trial for federal crimes of terrorism, and his mother, sued for legal and equitable relief based on plaintiff's prior military detention as an "enemy combatant." Plaintiff sought a declaration that defendants' policies were unconstitutional, an order enjoining his future designation as an enemy combatant, and nominal damages of one dollar from each defendant. The court affirmed the district court's refusal to imply a new cause of action for money damages against top Defense Department officials for a range of policy judgments pertaining to the designation and treatment of enemy combatants. The court also held that defendants have asserted a valid qualified immunity defense to defendant's Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., claim. The court further held that the district court did not err in concluding that defendant lacked standing to seek an order enjoining the government from designating him as an enemy combatant. Therefore, finding plaintiff's claims to be without merit, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lebron, et al. v. Rumsfeld, et al." on Justia Law

Organizations challenged a rule issued by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (amending 38 C.F.R 3.304(f)) with respect to claims for service-connected disability benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder. The new rule: allows a veteran to establish PTSD without supporting evidence; applies the lower evidentiary standard only if a VA psychologist or psychiatrist, or one contracted with the VA, confirms the claimed-stressor supports the diagnosis; and defines the veteran’s "fear of hostile military or terrorist activity" as involving a response characterized by "a psychological or psycho-physiological state of fear, helplessness, or horror." The Federal Circuit upheld the rule as not violating the statutory requirement that the Secretary consider all medical evidence and give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant when there is an approximate balance of evidence. There is a rational basis for the distinction between private practitioners and VA associated practitioners. View "Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y Veterans Affairs." on Justia Law