Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his negligence action against defendant where plaintiff alleged that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of defendant, a private contractor of the Army. The district court dismissed plaintiff's negligence claim because it was barred by the political question doctrine, or in the alternative, preempted by the combat activities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq. The court affirmed the judgment on the basis that an adjudication of plaintiff's claim against defendant would necessarily implicate a political question, where the court would be obliged to evaluate military decisions in a combat theatre, which the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to decide. Accordingly, the court did not reach the FTCA preemption issue and vacated that aspect of the district court's opinion. View "Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Serv." on Justia Law

This was an appeal from three orders: (1) denying summary judgment to Wachovia on the ground that appellee had adequately requested reinstatement to his prior employment position following a period of active military duty; (2) awarding liquidated damages, in an amount equal to the award of backpay and granting equitable relief to appellee following a bench trial on damages after a jury found Wachovia liable for violating the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4313, in failing to reemploy appellee promptly to a position of like seniority, status, and pay following his military services; and (3) denying Wachovia's motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The court held that because it found no error in the district court's thoughtful and well-reasoned opinions, the court affirmed.View "Serricchio v. Prudential Securities Inc." on Justia Law

A veteran was employed by the Navy. Terminated in 1994, he filed an EEOC complaint. In a 1995 settlement agreement, the Navy agreed to remove from the Official Personnel Folder adverse performance evaluations; to remove records of disciplinary action; and to document that he had resigned for personal reasons. In 1996, plaintiff discovered that the Navy had not complied and filed another complaint. In a 1996 agreement, the Navy agreed to employ plaintiff and to document that he had resigned in 1994. In 1998 plaintiff was accused of stealing and suspended. He filed a third EEOC complaint, then was accused of threatening a crew member. After being notified of his proposed removal, plaintiff resigned. Under a 2001 settlement, the Navy agreed to pay plaintiff $1,000, to expunge the suspension, and to provide a neutral reference. Records obtained in 2006 indicated that the Navy had not documented that he resigned for personal reasons. In 2008, he filed suit. The district court dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, breach of contract claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). The Federal Circuit reversed. The agreements can fairly be interpreted as mandating payment of money damages for breach by the government, subject to Tucker Act jurisdiction. The claims were not time-barred because plaintiff was entitled to benefit of the accrual suspension rule. View "Holmes v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a sales representative for the company and member of the National Guard was deployed to Iraq. When he returned, the company told him there were no positions available. The company eventually offered, and plaintiff accepted, a much lower position, but later terminated plaintiff for absenteeism. The district court awarded damages against the company for violating the Uniform Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4311; Massachusetts anti-discrimination law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4(1)(D); and the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148 and awarded attorney's fees. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the company. had waived a preemption claim. There wass ample evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the company acted willfully in refusing to reinstate plaintiff in his pre-service position and that its claim of absenteeism was pretextual.View "Fryer v. A.S.A.P. Fire & Safety Corp., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a detainee at the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that intelligence reports offered by the government to prove his membership in the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) cell were reliable. The court held that there was no error in the district court's careful consideration of the evidence and affirmed the denial of appellant's petition. View "Khan v. Obama, et al." on Justia Law

The class action alleged that National Guard members were required to take correspondence courses to keep positions or advance in rank and sought compensation for time spent on the courses. At the time, 37 U.S.C. 206 provided for compensation for: "equivalent training, instruction, duty, or appropriate duties, as the Secretary may prescribe . . . . This section does not authorize compensation for work or study performed by a member of a reserve component in connection with correspondence courses of an armed force." The Federal Circuit reversed dismissal. Meanwhile, Congress amended 37 U.S.C. 206(d), retroactively clarifying that National Guard members would not be compensated for correspondence courses. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim that retroactive application of these amendments amounted to taking of vested rights. The district court granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The earlier remand was not a holding that plaintiffs were entitled to compensation. The trial court had authority to consider and acted within its discretion in finding that none of the plaintiffs received written orders or authorizations from state commanders in connection with correspondence courses, so none were placed in a duty status necessary for federal payment. View "Clark v. United States" on Justia Law

Decedent, on active duty, committed suicide in his barracks. Navy and Department of Defense personnel had been called and arrived at his residence, but did not find the gun they were told he had. They permitted decedent to go to the bathroom accompanied by his friend. Upon entering, he pulled a gun from his waistband and committed suicide by shooting himself. After attempting unsuccessfully to recover from the Navy through administrative procedures, decedent's family brought a wrongful death claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court found the case barred by the Feres doctrine, which provides that "the Government is not liable ... for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Decedent stood "in the type of relationship to the military at the time of his . . . injury that the occurrences causing the injury arose out of activity incident to military service." View "Purcell v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the Veterans Health Administration, submitted eight requests under the Freedom of Information Act, (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, primarily asking for emails to and from specified individuals. At issue was whether an agency fulfilled its disclosure obligation by offering to supply the documents to the requester, but only in his capacity as an employee of that agency. Also at issue was the application to internal emails of FOIA Exemption 6, which provided that an agency could withhold "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." The court held that plaintiff's claim as to the 157 emails was not mooted by the VA's offer to provide him the records in his capacity as its employee. The court remanded for the district court to consider the VA's claimed exceptions as to those emails in the first instance. The court also held that, as to the VA's application of Exemption 6 to the nine in camera emails, the district court's decision was vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Yonemoto v. Dept. of Veterans Affair" on Justia Law

Defendant was discharged from the U.S. Army due to a personality disorder. He was later charged under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. 3261(a), and sentenced, by a federal district court, to life in prison for participating in a sexual assault and multiple murders while stationed in Iraq. Co-conspirators, still on active duty and subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 802(a)(1), were tried by courts-martial and each sentenced to between 90 and 110 years imprisonment; they are eligible for parole in ten years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first noting that Iraq could not prosecute the defendant and that prosecution in the U.S. did not violate international law. The Army completed a valid discharge of defendant, so that he was no longer subject to courts-martial. His trial under MEJA did not violate the separation-of-powers principle or his due process or equal protection rights. Defendant was no longer similarly situated with his co-conspirators when charges were filed. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

American citizen-civilians alleged that they were detained and illegally tortured by U.S. military personnel while in Iraq in 2006 and released from military custody without being charged with a crime. At the time they worked for a privately-owned Iraqi security services company. Plaintiffs sought damages and brought a claim to recover personal property that was seized. The district court denied motions to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts supporting Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility for the alleged torture and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity on the pleadings. The law was clearly established in 2006 that the alleged treatment was unconstitutional. No reasonable public official could have believed otherwise. A "Bivens" remedy is available for alleged torture of civilian U.S. citizens by U.S. military personnel in a war zone. The court noted that U.S. law provides a civil remedy for aliens who are tortured by their own governments. Claims by aliens, alleging torture by U.S. officials, are distinguishable. The Administrative Procedure Act's "military authority" exception precludes judicial review of military actions affecting personal property in a war zone. View "Vance v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law