Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Records indicate that the veteran's knee was injured in 1949 while he was playing football with a military team. Treatment at a field hospital in Germany included x-rays that revealed no bone or joint injury. The knee was not treated again until 1999, when the veteran claimed service-related disability. X-rays at a VA clinic showed minimal degeneration consistent with osteoarthritis. On remand, for the VA's failure to assist the veteran, instructions to the VA hospital stated "NO EXAM" and indicated a file review, but did state that an exam was allowable if necessary. The Veterans' Court upheld a second denial of benefits. The Federal Circuit affirmed; the Veterans Court acted correctly in not requiring the Board to state reasons why the medical examinersâ reports were competent and sufficiently informed. The court noted that the veteran did not raise his concerns about the instructions with the Board and that it cannot review a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case under 38 U.S.C. 7292.

The petitioner joined the Air Force in 1979 and, after being denied promotion twice, was discharged from active duty in 1989. The Deputy for Air Force Review Boards eventually agreed to void a substandard officer effectiveness report in her record. After the petitioner's separation from active service, the Special Selection Board reconsidered the record and did not recommend promotion. After several requests, the Air Force reinstated the petitioner to active duty in 1995 and promoted her to major, with a date of rank of 1988. After again being denied promotion twice, she applied for direct promotion in 2002, arguing that one of her evaluations was prepared by an officer she had reported for misconduct and that the break in service deprived her of an opportunity to develop a record to support promotion. Relief was denied. The petitioner was involuntarily retired in 2003. The Court of Claims rejected her suit. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that the Corrections Board thoroughly reviewed the claims and that the decision was not arbitrary.

The Department of Veterans Affairs disability rating schedule governs entitlement to compensation based on loss of earning capacity. The Veterans Court held that the petitioner, whose 100% disability rating is based on multiple disabilities, no one of which is rated at 100%, did not qualify under 38 U.S.C. 1114(s), which provides $320 in additional monthly compensation to a veteran with âa service-connected disability rated as totalâ if the veteran either has another independently rated disability or combination of disabilities rated at 60%, or is permanently housebound by reason of service-connected disability. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The use of the singular and plural terms was purposeful and intended to limit payment of the special monthly compensation to a veteran who has at least one condition that has been rated as totally disabling. The court rejected an argument based on a rule that allows the Secretary to rate the veteran as âtotally disabled based on individual unemployabilityâ even if a veteran does not qualify for a rating of 100%.

After the Board of Veteransâ Appeals denied the veteran's claim for service-connected benefits for a thyroid disorder, the Veterans Court vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration. The veteran sought fees of $11,710.57 for attorney work under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412. The district court awarded $8,601.80 and denied a request for supplemental fees for time spent defending the original fee request. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. A veteran is entitled to attorney fees incurred throughout the litigation, including those incurred in preparation and defense of the fee application to the extent those fees are defensible; the veteran was partially successful in defending his original fee application.

Criminal proceedings were conducted with five defendants, members of the Raven 23 team from Blackwater Worldwide ("Blackwater"), where Blackwater was hired by American security officials to evacuate a diplomat from a car bomb explosion and where there existed a dispute over who fired shots that killed and wounded Iraqi civilians. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed an indictment against the five defendants on the ground that the evidence presented to the grand jury, and the decision to prosecute two of the defendants, was tainted by statements of defendants. The court held that the district court erred by treating evidence as single lumps and excluding them in their entirety when at the most, only some portion of the content was tainted; by failing to conduct a proper independent-source analysis as required by Kastigar v. United States and United States v. Rinaldi; by applying the wrong legal standard when it excluded a defendant's journal and his testimony simply because the news reports based on some of the immunized statements were "a cause" for his writing it; and to the extent that evidence tainted by the impact of one defendant's immunized statements may be found to have accounted for the indictment of that defendant, it did not follow that the indictment of any other defendant was tainted.

The VA denied the plaintiff's claim for benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from a sexual assault that she claimed occurred in 1984, while she was stationed in Japan. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. The Veterans Court committed harmless error in stating that a medical opinion based on a post-service exam cannot be used to establish the occurrence; the Veterans Board of Appeals detailed its consideration of all of the plaintiff's evidence and determined that the preponderance of the evidence was against a finding of verification of the occurrence.

In 1978 the VA published an Agent Orange Program Guide that was the basis for denial of many claims of service-related injury. While a suit, challenging the Guide as issued in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), was pending, Congress enacted the 1984 Veteransâ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, which rendered the Guide irrelevant to new claims. Plaintiffs continued to pursue their suit and, in 2005, new named plaintiffs were added. In 2008, the district court granted the government's 1979 motion for judgment. The D.C. Circuit first remanded the case for transfer under the 1988 Veterans Judicial Review Act, 38 U.S.C. 502, but, on rehearing, ordered dismissal. The veterans refiled in the Federal Circuit, which dismissed for failure to file within the Act's six-year limitations period. When the claim was filed, no court had jurisdiction to hear APA challenges to VA regulations and the 1988 Act did not retroactively create a cause of action.

The district court rejected a challenge to 5 U.S.C. 3328, which bars males who have knowingly and willfully failed to register for the draft by age 26 from employment by the executive branch. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for entry of a judgment denying relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs, who were dismissed or resigned from federal employment after discovery of their failure to register, is under the Civil Service Reform Act. Although the claims implicate constitutional violations, Congress intended to consolidate employee removal actions in a single forum. The Merit System Protection Board cannot grant relief by invalidating the statute, but a court could do so on review of board action. The court characterized the constitutional challenges as "unpromising."

Defendant appealed his guilty plea conviction of being a dishonorable discharge in possession of firearms where defendant's U.S. Air Force DD-214 certificate of release form ("DD-214") was not sent to him when the Air Force incorrectly believed that it did not have defendant's valid mailing address. At issue was whether defendant knew that he was actually discharged and whether the government had to prove that defendant had knowledge of his status as a felon to establish a violation under 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court affirmed the conviction and held that the government was not required to prove defendant knew he had been dishonorably discharged from the Air Force at the time of his offense and that defendant's discharge was effective when his DD-214 was ready for delivery.

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit for damages against defendant, a former United States Marshal, claiming that they were unconstitutionally strip searched by Deputy U.S. Marshals under defendant's direction after plaintiffs were arrested during a demonstration in September 2002. At issue was whether it was clearly established in September 2002 that strip searching an arrestee before placing him in a detention facility without individualized reasonable suspicion was unconstitutional. The court held that it need not consider whether defendant had individual suspicion as to each of the plaintiffs where there was no clearly established constitutional prohibition in 2002 of strip searching arrestees without individualized, reasonable suspicion and therefore, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment. View "Paul Bame, et al v. Todd Dillard, et al" on Justia Law