Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Lanquist and Temple served as midshipmen at the Academy for four years before they became commissioned naval officers. Both men later became employees of Ventura County. They are members of VCERA, which permits employees to purchase retirement service credit for time spent in military service. It excludes time spent as a midshipman at the United States Naval Academy. VCERA denied their requests to purchase retirement service credit for midshipmen service at the Academy. At a hearing before the VCERA retirement board, they presented evidence that as midshipmen at the Academy they were compensated as active duty servicemen and experienced hardships and dangers on surface cruises with active naval vessels similar to those experienced by commissioned officers. The trial court upheld the denial, holding that VCERA's policy of denying retirement service credit for service at the Academy is "appropriate" in view of state and federal authorities interpreting the terms "public service," and "active duty." The court of appeal reversed. "Military service" includes service as a midshipman, Gov. Code, 31450. View "Lanquist v. Ventura Cnty. Emps.' Ret. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a long-standing local ordinance, the City of Plymouth, Indiana pays its police officers “longevity pay” after each work anniversary, calculated by multiplying $225 by the number of years that the officer has been on the force. Faced with financial difficulties in 1989, Plymouth enacted a second longevity pay ordinance, which prorates longevity pay for officers who take a leave of absence during any given year, including for military service. During officer DeLee’s twelfth year on the job, he missed nearly eight months of work while serving in the Air Force Reserves. When he returned, Plymouth paid him one-third of his full longevity payment for that year. DeLee sued, arguing that longevity pay is a seniority-based benefit to which the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301–4335, entitles him in full. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plymouth. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Plymouth’s longevity benefit is more appropriately characterized as a reward for lengthy service, rather than as compensation for work performed the preceding year, USERRA guarantees DeLee a full longevity payment for his twelfth year of employment. View "DeLee v. City of Plymouth" on Justia Law

Erickson was a U.S. Postal Service employee from 1988 to 2000, and also a member of the Army National Guard Reserve. He was absent from the Postal Service for lengthy periods while on active duty with the National Guard. Between 1991 and 1995 he was absent for more than 22 months, and between 1996 and 2000, he worked at the Postal Service for only four days. The Postal Service inquired whether he intended to return. Erickson replied that he would not return until he completed his tour of duty in September 2001. The Postal Service removed him for excessive use of military leave. Erickson re-enlisted with the Guard and remained on active duty through 2005. In 2006, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board alleging violation of his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The Board rejected his claim under 38 U.S.C. 4312, holding that he had not made a timely request for reemployment and that military service was not a motivating factor in the termination. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to his reemployment claim, but reversed with respect to his discrimination claim. On remand, the Board found that Erickson had waived his USERRA rights by abandoning his civilian career, but on a second remand, ruled in favor of Erickson and granted him reinstatement with back wages and benefits. The Federal Circuit denied his application for recovery of attorney fees and expenses for the two appeals.View "Erickson v. U.S. Postal Serv." on Justia Law

In a 2011 memorandum, the Secretary of the Navy explained that the Navy would be “challenged to reduce enlisted manning to meet future planned end strength controls due to record high retention in the current economic environment.” To address these concerns and to “optimize the quality” of the Navy, the Secretary initiated an Enlisted Retention Board (ERB) to identify 3,000 sailors for separation. The Navy notified all personnel, outlined a timeline, and identified particular pay grades and occupational classifications or specialties that would be subject to review. Sailors were informed that if their job rating was over-manned and slated for review, they could apply for conversion to an undermanned rating that would not be subject to review. The Navy also published the quotas for each overmanned rating that would be subject to the ERB to give the sailors information about competition among the different ratings and to enable them to make informed decisions about their careers. The ERB selected 2,946 sailors for honorable discharge. A putative class of about 300 of those discharged challenged their dismissal and sought back pay. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the merit-based claims as nonjusticiable and denied remaining claims on the administrative record. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the Rhode Island National Guard, was hired by the Department of Corrections (DOC) in 1988. In 2000, Plaintiff left his full-time employment at the DOC to report for active duty with the National Guard. Plaintiff returned to the DOC after having been on military leave for six years. In 2003, Plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action against the DOC, contending that he was subjected to discrimination based on his military status when the DOC denied him promotion on three separate occasions during the six-year period when he was on military leave. The superior court entered judgment in favor of the DOC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in denying Plaintiff’s claim for a declaratory judgment where Plaintiff failed to show that his military status or resulting unavailability was a substantial or motivating factor in the DOC’s repeated decisions not to promote him; and (2) the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive relevant and material evidence in the case. View "Panarello v. State, Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

Respondents were five employees of the State covered by the Public Employees Retirement System who actively served in the United States military during several recognized periods of armed conflict and were honorably discharged from the military. Respondents sought military service credit available through W. Va. Code 5-10-15 based on their military service. The West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board denied Respondents’ requests for military service credit for service occurring periods of armed conflict other than limited exceptions. On appeal, the circuit court ruled in favor of Respondents and granted each of their military service credit requests in full. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in holding that Respondents were entitled to the military service credit they sought. View "W. Va. Consolidated Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Wood" on Justia Law

Biggers had been employed by the Navy for 29 years and in 2007 was Security Manager for the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center. The position required him to maintain a top secret security clearance. In 2008, a duty officer found that an outer vault door of the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network room was left open. Biggers notified the Commanding Officer of the potential violation. After an investigation, the Command Evaluator recommended that all security personnel (including Biggers) have their access to classified material suspended because “the investigation revealed numerous systemic problems, violations and deficiencies.” Biggers’ security clearance was suspended pending a final determination by the Department of Navy Central Adjudication Facility (DONCAF) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7513. Ultimately, DONCAF concluded that the information provided by Biggers and the Center “sufficiently explained, mitigated, or provided extenuating circumstances,” and Biggers was found eligible for a Top Secret clearance and assignment to a sensitive position and returned to duty status.. His suspension had lasted nine months. The Navy did not provide back pay or treat him as employed for calculation of retirement benefits. Biggers alleged that the suspension was motivated by retaliatory animus arising from his participation in an EEOC proceeding. An AJ determined that the Merit Systems Protection Board may not review the merits of a security clearance revocation or suspension. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Biggers was not entitled to back pay. View "Biggers v. Dep't of the Navy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the National Guard, filed suit against TXD, alleging that TXD violated the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301 et seq., when it terminated him while he was deployed on active duty in Iraq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TXD. At issue was whether TXD violated its USERRA obligations to plaintiff while he was on leave by not including him on an asset list of TXD employees provided to Foxxe, which took over TXD's operations without interruption. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the modified claim turned on one or more essential facts that the summary judgment record did not address. View "Dorris v. TXD Services, LP" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an employment discrimination suit filed by appellant against the Navy. The Navy subsequently offered a stipulation of Settlement (the "Agreement"). After concluding that specific performance of the Agreement was no longer practicable, appellant sought nearly a million dollars in damages and attorney's fees. The court held that a settlement agreement embodied in a consent decree was a contract under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), and transferred the case to the Court of Federal Claims. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order dismissing the motion to enforce and remanded with instructions to transfer to the Court of Federal Claims. View "Franklin-Mason v. Mabus, Jr." on Justia Law

Crawford began working for the Department of the Army in 1986, with credit for military service. In 2006, when called to uniformed service, Crawford was an IT Specialist, GS-2210-11, in the Corps of Engineers. The Army subsequently outsourced many IT functions and abolished Crawford’s position, but formed a new organization, the Corps of Engineers Information Technology (ACE-IT). When Crawford completed uniformed service, the Army briefly returned him to an IT Specialist position, but reassigned him as Program Support Specialist, GS-0301-11. Crawford claimed violation of reemployment protections for those in uniformed service under 38 U.S.C. 4313(a)(2). The administrative judge ordered the Army to place Crawford in a position of “like status” to an IT Specialist. The Army later submitted notice that it was not able to find a position of “like status” and had requested the Office of Personnel Management’s placement assistance. Crawford sought enforcement with the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming that the search for positions was limited to vacant positions. The AJ agreed. The Army then reassigned Crawford to a position as an IT Specialist within ACE-IT, with the same duty station, title, and grade as his old position. The Board concluded that the Agency was in compliance and dismissed Crawford’s appeal. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Crawford v. Dep't of the Army" on Justia Law