Justia Military Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Military Law
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In 1964, appellant Robert Cassinelli and respondent Janice Cassinelli were married; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received zero. As a result, the trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest. However, it could properly order Robert to reimburse Janice for her lost community property interest; doing so would not have violated either federal law or finality principles. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order awarding Janice the same amount on a different theory. View "Marr. of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging violations of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-4334. Plaintiff claimed that he was fired from his job after providing notice of his deployment to Afghanistan in the United States Navy Reserve. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the plain text of USERRA does not preclude the compelled arbitration of disputes arising under its provisions. Furthermore, plaintiff has failed to establish that the legislative history evinces Congress’s intent to prevent the enforcement of the arbitration agreement he signed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration and dismissing the complaint. View "Ziober v. BLB Resources" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals' review was whether one spouse’s unilateral election (after a settlement agreement and judgment of dissolution) to change from one type of military benefit (retirement that was taxable and community property) to another type of military benefit (combat-related special compensation that was not taxable and separate property) could defeat the community property interest of the other spouse set forth in the marital settlement agreement. The Court determined that one spouse could not, by invoking a condition wholly within his control, defeat the community interest of the other spouse. The trial court here correctly determined that "the post-judgment election" by appellant Philip Chapman did not relieve him of his agreement to pay respondent Judy Chapman $475 per month for her community property share of his military retirement. The Court reversed the trial court’s order, however, because the remedy the court selected was improper. The trial court imposed a constructive trust on the funds received by Philip as combat-related special compensation benefits. But the remedy of a constructive trust was available only for wrongful conduct. View "Marriage of Chapman" on Justia Law

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Aldridge served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps, 1984-1992, and was denied a disability rating higher than 10% for patellofemoral syndrome on his knees in 2013. The Board of Veterans Appeals informed Aldridge that he had 120 days to file a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court, 38 U.S.C. 7266(a), by April 23, 2014. The Veterans Court received his notice on October 27, 2014. Aldridge acknowledged that his appeal was late, but argued that deaths in his family and his resulting depressive state prevented him from timely filing. His mother died on September 27, 2013; his daughter gave birth to a stillborn child on December 16; and his sister died on January 14, 2014. He asked the court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. The court determined that Aldridge had failed to demonstrate that his family’s losses “themselves directly or indirectly affected the timely filing of his appeal,” noting that Aldridge closed the estates of his deceased mother and sister, became his father’s primary caregiver, maintained his job at a Veterans Affairs hospital, and attempted to hire a lawyer during the time at issue. The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding the Veterans Court’s application of a legal standard that required proof of causation. View "Aldridge v. McDonald" on Justia Law

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Petitioner was charged with misdemeanor counts of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), and driving while having 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his blood in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b). He pled not guilty, and moved for military diversion under Penal Code section 1001.80. Section 1001.80 authorizes a trial court to grant pretrial diversion to a defendant charged with a misdemeanor if the defendant was, or currently is, a member of the United States military and suffers from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of his or her military service. Based on the rules of statutory construction, the language of section 1001.80 and Vehicle Code section 23640, and the legislative history of section 1001.80, the court concluded that Vehicle Code section 23640 does not bar pretrial diversion for veterans or active duty members of the military who meet the criteria of section 1001.80 and are charged in a DUI case. The court urged the Legislature to act by amending section 1001.80 to express its intent with regard to military diversion in DUI cases. Therefore, the court discharged the order to show cause and ordered a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Appellate Division to vacate its order denying petitioner's petition for writ of mandate, and to make a new and different order granting the petition. View "Hopkins v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

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Petitioner is the alleged mastermind of the bombings of the U.S.S. Cole and the French supertanker the M/V Limburg, as well as the attempted bombing of the U.S.S. The Sullivans. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus to dissolve the military commission convened to try him and appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to preliminarily enjoin that trial. The court concluded that the district court did not err as a matter of law by extending the abstention principles established in Schlesinger v. Councilman, which dealt with courts-martial, to petitioner's pretrial challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of a military commission. The court also concluded that the district court's ultimate decision to abstain based on the unique circumstances to petitioner's case was appropriate. Because petitioner cannot show that his conduct clearly and indisputably took place outside the context of hostilities, the court denied his petition for mandamus relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In Re: Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Al-Nashir" on Justia Law

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Liberty’s 325 patent, issued in 2010, is “directed to a projectile structured to be discharged from a firearm and designed to overcome the disadvantages and problems associated with conventional firearm projectiles such as, but not limited to lead or steel jacketed projectiles.” The patent grew out of the U.S. military’s “Green Ammunition Program,” developed in response to concerns that lead-based ammunition was polluting military training ranges. The 325 patent sought to address “problems of lethality” with the conventional Army “green” ammunition. The Claims Court held that ammunition rounds used by the Army embody the claims of the patent, violating 28 U.S.C. 1498. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court erred in construing claim terms: reduced area of contact; intermediate opposite ends. When the terms are construed correctly, the Army rounds do not embody the claimed invention. The court affirmed the Claims Court's rejection of a breach of contract claim based on a non-disclosure agreement signed by the named inventor of the 325 patent and an Army official during negotiations for a possible contract. The Army official did not have authority to enter into an NDA on behalf of the government. View "Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

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In 2015, Jones, a veteran, filed 16 appeals with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), alleging that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301–4333, when it did not select him for various job vacancies. An administrative judge consolidated the appeals and ultimately denied relief in an Initial Decision. That Decision became the Final Decision of the MSPB when Jones did not timely file a petition for review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, first holding that it had jurisdiction, rejecting an argument that there was no . final MSPB decision from which Jones could appeal. The AJ properly found that neither direct nor circumstantial evidence supported Jones’s USERRA claim and failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his military service was a motivating factor in HHS’s decision not to hire him for the subject job vacancies. View "Jones v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

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Zafer, an Ankara, Turkey, contractor, and the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) entered into a firm-fixed-price contract to construct the MILCON Support Facility at the Bagram Air Force Field in Afghanistan. Zafer was responsible for delivering materials to the site, and assumed the risk “for all costs and resulting loss or profit.” After issuing notice to proceed, USACE recognized that it could not make the project site available immediately and increased the contract price and set a new completion date. In November 2011, Pakistan closed its border from the seaport city of Karachi along the land routes into Afghanistan in response to a combat incident with the U.S. and NATO. The route remained closed for 219 days, Zafer notified USACE that the closure would greatly impact its delivery of materials and requested direction on how to proceed. USACE replied that the closure was “purely the act of Pakistan governmental authorities,” that the U.S. government was “not responsible” and denied further compensation. Zafer subsequently, repeatedly, asked for payment for additional costs. In 2013, Zafer submitted an unsuccessful request for an equitable adjustment. The contracting officer found no evidence supporting a constructive change claim. The Claims Court granted USACE summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Zafer failed to designate specific facts to establish a constructive change claim based on either a constructive acceleration theory or on a government fault theory. View "Zafer Taahhut Insaat v. United States" on Justia Law

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After the United States detained Mohammed Jawad at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base for more than six years until he was released and returned to his native Afghanistan, Jawad filed suit alleging that they subjected him to torture while he was in their custody. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Jawad’s complaint because the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear his claims. Section 7(a) of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2), strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most claims against the United States arising out of the detention of aliens like Jawad captured during the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The court rejected Jawad's reasons why the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) finding that he was an "enemy combatant" does not satisfy the section 7(a) requirements. The court also rejected Jawad's remaining claims. View "Jawad v. Gates" on Justia Law